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ON CONSTRUCTIVE-ENGAGEMENT STRATEGY
OF COMPARATIVE PHILOSOPHY:
A JOURNAL THEME INTRODUCTION
BO MOU

ABSTRACT: In this journal theme introduction, first, I explain how comparative philosophy
as explored in the journal Comparative Philosophy is understood and how it is intrinsically
related to the constructive engagement strategy. Second, to characterize more clearly and
accurately some related methodological points of the constructive-engagement strategy, and
also to explain how constructive engagement is possible, I introduce some needed conceptual
and explanatory resources and a meta-methodological framework and endeavor to identify
adequacy conditions for methodological guiding principles in comparative studies. Third, as a
case analysis, I show how the constructive-engagement reflective practice bears on recent
studies of Chinese and comparative Chinese-Western philosophy, especially in the past
decade, for two purposes: to illustrate the foregoing theoretic characterization of the
constructive engagement strategy, and to identify and explain some constructive morals that
might have general significance for comparative studies.

Keywords: comparative philosophy, constructive engagement, methodology

One crucial feature of comparative philosophy, as understood in a philosophically
interesting and significant way and as emphatically explored in the journal
Comparative Philosophy (‗Journal‘ for short), lies in its constructive engagement goal
and methodological strategy, which constitutes the theme of the Journal and is
highlighted in its full title ‗Comparative Philosophy: An International Journal of
Constructive Engagement of Distinct Approaches toward World Philosophy‘. The
constructive-engagement goal and methodological strategy of comparative philosophy
(‗constructive-engagement strategy‘ for short), briefly speaking, is to inquire into how,
via reflective criticism and self-criticism, distinct modes of thinking, methodological
approaches, visions, insights, substantial points of view, or conceptual and explanatory
resources from different philosophical traditions and/or different styles/orientations of
doing philosophy (within one tradition or from different traditions) can learn from each
other and jointly contribute to our understanding and treatment of a series of issue,
________________________
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themes or topics of philosophical significance, which can be jointly concerned through
appropriate philosophical interpretation and/or from a broader philosophical vantage
point.
In this journal-theme-introduction essay, first, in Section 1, I introduce and briefly
explain how comparative philosophy as explored in the Journal is understood and how
it is intrinsically related to the constructive engagement strategy and goal. Second, in
Section 2, to characterize more clearly and accurately some related methodological
points of the constructive-engagement strategy, and also to explain how the
constructive engagement is possible, I introduce a meta-philosophical metamethodological framework via some needed conceptual and explanatory resources and
endeavor to identify adequacy conditions for methodological guiding principles in
comparative studies. Third, in Section 3, as a case analysis, I show how the
constructive-engagement reflective practice bears on recent studies of Chinese and
comparative Chinese-Western philosophy, especially in the past decade, for two
purposes: to illustrate the foregoing theoretic characterization of the constructive
engagement strategy, and to identify and explain some constructive morals that have
general significance for other tradition-vs.-tradition (and/or orientation-vs.-orientation)
comparative studies.
Among parts of this journal-theme introduction below, some are descriptive in
nature and concern certain relevant reflective endeavors, some are interpretative
elaborations of them, and some other parts are rather this author‘s prescriptive
reflection on the involved issues. Also, note that some portions of the subsequent
discussion are related to the papers included in this issue of the Journal in two ways:
first, the suggested meta-methodological framework might be useful for thinking of
how to understand the constructive-engagement relation between the distinct
approaches under examination; second, some parts directly explore the involved
methodological issues of comparative philosophy as addressed by some of these
papers.

1
The label ‗comparative philosophy‘ is not new. Historically speaking, its usage has
been diverse.1 My aim here is neither to give a review of the usage, nor to evaluate the
reflective practice under the label in the past, nor to argue about which word or phrase
would be better to label the philosophical scholarship that we currently use the label

1

It has been used with the primary historical orientation by some with their primary focus on historical
description of similarities and differences of figures or texts under comparative examination. Moreover,
whether or not with the foregoing historical orientation, the label is sometimes used narrowly, being
limited to comparative studies of different approaches from different ethnic/national traditions or groups;
or, more narrowly, it is sometimes considered to focus merely on the works of ―under-represented‖
ethnic/national groups.
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‗comparative philosophy‘ to identify. 2 For the purpose of this writing, I will positively
and straightforwardly present and explain how comparative philosophy as explored in
the Journal is understood and how it is intrinsically related to the goal and strategy of
constructive engagement.
One strategic goal and basic methodological strategy of comparative philosophy as
understood in a philosophically interesting and significant way can be summarized in
this manner: to inquire into how, via reflective criticism (including self-criticism) and
argumentation, distinct modes of thinking, methodological approaches, visions,
insights, substantial points of view, or conceptual and explanatory resources from
different philosophical traditions and/or different styles/orientations of doing
philosophy (within one tradition or from different traditions) can learn from each other
and jointly contribute to our understanding and treatment of a series of issues, themes
or topics of philosophical significance, which can be jointly concerned through
appropriate philosophical interpretation and/or from a broader philosophical vantage
point. This strategic goal and basic methodological strategy might as well be called the
‗constructive engagement‘ goal and methodological strategy of comparative
philosophy (‗constructive-engagement strategy‘ for short). 3 The constructive2 Indeed, the label ‗comparative‘ can be misleading, as it appears to suggest that comparative
philosophy focuses just on, and stops at, mere descriptive comparisons of similarities and difference of
views under examination. Nevertheless, such cases in which involved labels for disciplines or subjects
tend to be misleading are not odd. Consider the term ‗philosophy‘, whose original meaning can be traced
back to the literal sense of its Greek original ‗philosophia‘—the love of wisdom. Surely, the love of
wisdom is not the privilege of philosophical inquiry; reflective pursuers in any intellectual inquiries can
possess the trait. But the label ‗philosophy‘ (or its counterparts in the phonetic languages) can be, and
actually is, used referentially (if not fully descriptively at the initial stage of using the term) to designate
such a generic type of reflective inquiry: (1) philosophical inquiry can ask any fundamental questions,
and can have various fundamental concerns, about the world and human beings; (2) philosophical
inquiry is critical in nature in the sense that it does not blindly claim or accept anything and nothing is
absolutely excluded from a philosophical inquirer‘s gaze; (3) philosophical inquiry establishes its
conclusion intrinsically and primarily through argumentation, justification, and explanation rather than
being based on faith. The foregoing three crucial features of philosophical inquiry have thus become the
due contents of the very notion of philosophical inquiry as held in the (worldwide) philosophical
community. By the same token, the label ‗comparative philosophy‘ can be used referentially (if not
descriptively at the initial stage of using the term) as a conventional and convenient means to designate a
kind of philosophical scholarship that is to be characterized here and explored by the Journal. With the
foregoing clarification and explanation, the phrase ‗comparative philosophy‘ can thus be rendered
harmless but useful and convenient as a label for one significant kind of philosophical scholarship,
specifically speaking, and for one significant methodological strategy of philosophical scholarship,
generally speaking.
3 It is noted that exactly how to label this strategic goal and methodological strategy of comparative
philosophy is a relatively unimportant thing; one can label it in some other ways one would reasonably
prefer. The methodological strategy is characterized in terms of ‗constructive engagement‘ with two
major considerations. First, the key words in the phrase (‗constructive‘ and ‗engagement‘) and the
phrase as a whole do literally capture some of its crucial features. Second, the label has been historically
associated with the strategy both in some relevant documents in print and in recent reflective practice of
comparative philosophy that have been guided by the methodological strategy (see the discussion in
Section 3). It is also important to note that the key term ‗philosophy‘ or ‗philosophical‘ that appears in
this passage is to be understood in the sense as identified in the previous note.
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engagement strategy of comparative philosophy highlights a number of characteristic
features of comparative philosophy and thus bears on the coverage, emphasis,
orientation and goal of the Journal.
First, the constructive-engagement strategy of comparative philosophy emphasizes
or is featured by the philosophical-issue-engagement that aims at how thinkers‘ ideas
and texts under comparative examination can make a joint contribution to a series of
issues, themes or topics of philosophical significance that can be commonly or jointly
concerned through appropriate philosophical interpretation. The philosophical-issueengagement actually constitutes one major methodological orientation in carrying out
comparative philosophy. I will further elaborate and clarify the philosophical-issueengagement orientation from the methodological point of view in a metamethodological framework to be suggested in the next section.
Second, the constructive-engagement strategy of comparative philosophy
emphasizes or is featured by philosophical interpretation that aims to enhance our
understanding of (ancient or contemporary) thinkers‘ ideas/texts under a comparative
examination and their relevance to the philosophical issue addressed in the
comparative examination via relevant and effective conceptual and explanatory
resources (including those from contemporary philosophy), whether or not those
resources were actually used by those thinkers. This emphasis is intrinsically related to
the foregoing philosophical-issue-engagement emphasis. On the one hand, jointlyconcerned issues or topics in the philosophical-issue-engagement are identified and
explained in comparative studies through philosophical interpretation and for the sake
of enhancing our understanding and treatment of the issues and topics in philosophical
inquiry, instead of being (exclusively) relied on or determined by what the (ancient)
figures or texts under examination historically said. On the other hand, one‘s reflective
efforts in the philosophical-issue-engagement often (though not always) motivate and
guide one to carry out philosophical interpretations of thinkers‘ ideas or texts4 under a
comparative examination in a certain direction, from a certain broad philosophical
vantage point, and through certain conceptual and explanatory resources that are most
relevant to the philosophical issue or topic involved in the comparative examination.
The philosophical-interpretation concern actually constitutes another major
methodological orientation in carrying out comparative philosophy. 5 I will also further
4

Indeed, for the purpose of this writing, I intentionally leave it open whether we are trying to enhance
our understanding of (ancient) thinkers‘ ideas or their texts, by using the phrase ―ideas or texts‖ and
being deliberately vague on it, although I have my own position on the issue, which will be elaborated in
another writing, and although a thinker‘s ideas and her texts can be talked about in a compatible way in
contrast to the position of (a certain form of) radical textualism to the effect that we simply cannot get
behind a thinker‘s texts to interpret her ideas and that there can be no analysis of an ancient thinker‘s
intentional states. In the subsequent discussion, I sometimes simply use the phrase ‗a thinker‘s ideas‘ for
short to refer to her ideas or texts. I am thankful to Marshall Willman for his helpful explanation of how
he views the issue correctly pointing out that one can distinguish a thinker‘s ideas as were instantiated in
her intentional states at the time when a given work was written from the ideas that are implied or
determined by the text itself (given a certain relevant framework of interpretation).
5 Sometimes one can carry out philosophical interpretation of a thinker‘s idea or text (say, via some
appropriate conceptual/explanatory resources of contemporary philosophy to enhance understanding)
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elaborate and clarify the philosophical-interpretation-concerned orientation from the
methodological point of view in a meta-methodological framework to be suggested in
the next section.
Third, the constructive-engagement character of comparative philosophy places its
joint emphasis on the philosophical-issue-engagement concern and the philosophicalinterpretation concern without ignoring or dismissing the historical-description-giving
approach that aims at collecting historical data and giving accurate descriptions of
relevant historical matters of fact. What comparative philosophy, understood in a
philosophically interesting way (through the foregoing constructive-engagement
strategy), alerts us to is this: although historical descriptions provide necessary sources
and data bases for further philosophical interpretation and elaboration, comparative
philosophy (as philosophical inquiry) can neither stop at merely giving historical
descriptions and being content with seeking apparent similarities and differences of
thinkers‘ views or texts under comparative examination without further philosophical
interpretation and philosophical-issue-engagement, nor even take the historicaldescription-giving approach as the exclusively legitimate approach in comparative
studies. Likewise, I will further elaborate and clarify the relation between the three
orientations or approaches addressed above when elaborating the philosophical-issueengagement orientation and the philosophical-interpretation-concerned orientation
from the methodological point of view in a meta-methodological framework to be
suggested in the next section.
Fourth, as far as the coverage of comparative philosophy is concerned, the
foregoing first methodological emphasis or feature determines that the coverage of the
Journal is not restricted to, but can include, any particular comparative-engagement
pairs of distinct approaches from distinct philosophical traditions 6 or different

without explicitly or directly addressing some philosophical issue. In this way, the foregoing two
concerns or orientations are distinct both at the conceptual level and at the level of reflective practice,
though they are closely related especially when one carries out comparative studies in philosophical
inquiry.
6 The term ‗distinct (philosophical) tradition‘ narrowly means a distinct culture-associated philosophical
tradition: generally speaking, it consists of (1) its various classical movements of philosophical thought
in a collectively-distinctive cultural, linguistic and geographic setting and (2) their contemporary studies.
For example, by ‗Chinese philosophical tradition‘ here I primarily mean various movements of
philosophical thought in China from the Zhou Dynasty (roughly eleventh century to 256 B.C.) through
the early Qing Dynasty (1644 – mid 19th century) and their contemporary developments and studies
(‗Chinese philosophy‘ for short below). Due to the purpose of this writing, I neither intend nor pretend
to be able to exhaustively identify other distinct philosophical traditions, such as the Indian
philosophical tradition (Indian philosophy), Islamic philosophical tradition (Islamic philosophy) and
Jewish philosophical tradition (Jewish philosophy). For their identities, the interested reader can look at,
say, the relevant book titles on these traditions in the recently published Philosophy A-Z book series
(such as Bartley 2006, Groff 2007, and Hughes 2006). Clearly, there are distinct approaches that are
from the same culture-associated philosophical traditions but represent distinct styles/orientations of
doing philosophy, such as the analytic and ―Continental‖ approaches whose representative forms have
been developed in the Western philosophical tradition. On the other hand, those approaches from
different culture-associated philosophical traditions are often distinct approaches of different styles or
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styles/orientations of doing philosophy (e.g., the East-West, North-South, or analytic―Continental‖, though such labels might be misleading out of context), so long as they
contribute to our understanding and treatment of the issues and topics of philosophical
interest and significance. Likewise, the emphasis of the Journal, regarding
conceptual/explanatory resources and modes of thinking in philosophy, is not exclusive
to any particular way of thinking (e.g., neither the Greek-style nous alone nor the
Chinese-style dao alone) but inclusive and open-minded, generally speaking.
However, the foregoing inclusive strategic attitude does not mean indiscriminately
addressing any distinct approaches, whether they are relevant or irrelevant, without
being sensitive to the nature and features of specific philosophical issues/topics and the
demand of concrete situations. In comparative philosophy it is noted that as
comparative-engagement pairs are typically from distinct traditions or
styles/orientations of doing philosophy, their study typically demands or assumes a
certain meta-philosophical and meta-methodological cross-tradition/style/orientation of
understanding in philosophy. Such a cross-tradition meta-methodological
understanding, explicitly or implicitly involved in a comparative-engagement pair, is
one defining characteristic of the study of the comparative-engagement pair in
comparative philosophy; the meta-philosophical exploration of such a cross-tradition
meta-methodological understanding thus constitutes an intrinsic and important concern
in general theory and methodology of comparative philosophy. This is one important
way in which comparative philosophy can significantly contribute to philosophical
inquiry in general. 7
Fifth, the Journal is inclusive but not merely for the sake of being aware of views
from other traditions or styles of doing philosophy or merely for the sake of tolerating
different opinions. That bar would be too low, and would miss the point of
philosophical inquiry. The inclusive character of the Journal is intrinsically related to
its critical character. The critical engagement character of philosophy (generally
speaking) and of comparative philosophy understood in the above philosophically
interesting way (specifically speaking) has the Journal aim neither at indiscriminately
celebrating any ad hoc work from any tradition nor at uncritically pre-setting its value.
In this connection nothing is taken for granted without critical examination. Rather, the
recognition and appreciation of the value and significance of any work under
comparative-engagement examination, no matter from which ethnic groups or from
which geographic traditions, should result from critical examination in the constructive
engagement strategy; for the critical examination in the constructive engagement is not
just for the sake of criticism without serious consideration of constructive, positive
contribution (if any). Through critical examination, the Journal is to identify and
explicitly emphasize the genuine value, significance and relevance (if any) of the
thinkers‘ ideas and their movements of thought to the common philosophical enterprise
orientations. In this way, the term ‗cross-tradition‘ can be used in its broad sense, including cross-style,
cross-orientation as well as cross-culture-associated-tradition.
7 For a thoughtful discussion of the relation between comparative philosophy and philosophy, see
Allinson 2001.
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and contemporary development of philosophy. In this way, what the Journal
emphasizes and promotes is the reflective dialogue, mutual understanding and
constructive engagement between distinct approaches from different traditions or
styles/orientations of carrying out philosophical inquiry instead of indiscriminately
celebrating and promoting any ad hoc distinct approach.
Sixth, comparative philosophy understood in the above philosophically interesting
way is intrinsically related to philosophical scholarship of studies of any philosophical
traditions, either Chinese philosophy, Indian philosophy, or African philosophy, just to
name a few. For a philosopher in her philosophical inquiry of such an ad-hoc-traditionrelated philosophy is to be intrinsically interested in distinct approaches (from other
philosophical traditions and/or from different styles/orientation of doing philosophy) to
those jointly concerned issues, problems, themes or topics. In this way, the contents of
the Journal are to be intrinsically relevant to the philosophical interest and inquiry of
philosophy scholars and students, no matter which specific traditions they study (e.g.,
Chinese or Indian philosophy) and no matter which style of philosophy they instantiate
(e.g., analytic or ―Continental‖ philosophy), given that they work on issues and topics
under examination in the Journal. For a philosopher would be intrinsically interested in
distinct approaches to the issues and topics under philosophical (instead of merely
historical) examination and in their reflective relation to her current working approach,
whether or not she takes some other distinct approach as her current working approach,
which may be related to her training/specialty background, personal research interest or
the need of the current study.
Seventh, as far as the relation between comparative philosophy and world
philosophy is concerned, they are intrinsically related. For comparative philosophy,
understood in the foregoing philosophically interesting way, considers philosophy in a
global context and emphasizes the constructive engagement of distinct approaches and
resources from various philosophical traditions and styles/orientations of doing
philosophy. Generally speaking, world philosophy is construed as a world-wide jointendeavor of philosophical inquiry that crosses the boundaries of particular traditions,
styles or orientations of doing philosophy for the sake of contributing to the common
philosophical enterprise. Given that this is one primary goal of world philosophy, a
central or crucial issue is how to implement this goal. One way is the constructiveengagement methodological strategy. World philosophy approached in this way is
essentially comparative philosophy aiming at constructive engagement. That is why
‗Constructive Engagement of Distinct Approaches toward World Philosophy‘
(highlighted in italics here) is emphatically stated in the subtitle of the Journal. 8

Although sometimes the phrases ‗world philosophy‘ and ‗global philosophy‘ can be used
interchangeably, the former is considered more inclusive, while the latter might imply globalizing a
certain (particular or ‗universal‘) mode of doing philosophy (cf., Searle 2008). To this extent, global
philosophy, when associated with the foregoing agenda, might stand as an alternative way of doing
world philosophy (at a certain stage).
8
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2
In this section, I introduce some needed conceptual and explanatory resources and
present a meta-philosophical methodological framework. 9 The discussion in this
section serves three purposes. First, it serves as an interpretation framework of how the
constructive engagement of distinct approaches is possible and how such engagement
can be adequately regulated.10 Second, as a view concerning the methodology of
comparative philosophy, it is also taken as my contributing piece to the ongoing debate
on several issues, some of which have been already addressed in the included research
articles (such as Xianglong Zhang‘s article) and the reflective report (i.e., Steve
Angle‘s report). Third, it is hoped that this would provide the reader with one useful
meta-methodological framework on how to look at and evaluate the relation and
engaging contribution of distinct approaches in philosophy. It is noted that a reader
need not accept all of the elements of the framework; for one thing, one characteristic
feature of this framework is its open-ended character: the six conditions for adequacy
of a methodological guiding principle can be expanded and enlarged. For another
thing, one can selectively employ some of the conceptual and explanatory resources
introduced here, if they are considered useful and effective.
2.1
The suggested meta-philosophical methodological framework 11 has one basic,
minimal metaphysical assumption or, actually and more accurately, one intuitive
9

Based on the preceding discussions and conceptual and explanatory resources, a methodological
framework can be introduced for the sake of enhancing our understanding of relevant methodological
issues concerning comparative philosophy and for the sake of cross-tradition understanding and
constructive engagement in carrying out philosophical inquiries in a global context, generally speaking.
The core portion of the methodological framework consists of the adequacy conditions for
methodological guiding principles that are supposed to regulate how to look at the relation between
(eligible) methodological perspectives and how to employ them in legitimate and constructive ways. The
suggested framework is methodological in a dual sense. First, it is directly and explicitly concerned with
cross-tradition understanding and constructive engagement of seemingly competing methodological
approaches from different traditions. Second, the framework per se is methodological in nature: it is
concerned with how to look at seemingly competing methodological approaches from different
traditions. In the above second sense the suggested framework is about philosophical methodology; in
this sense, the suggested framework is also meta-philosophical in nature.
10 I intend neither to imply that the prospective author is expected to indiscriminately follow this
framework, nor to imply that it is to be imposed on the reader. Rather, I intend to use the resources and
the framework to help elaborate some relevant general points made in the previous section, on the one
hand, and extend a reflective framework to the reader in case she/he finds it helpful.
11 An earlier version of the suggested meta-methodological framework, labeled ‗transcendental
perspectivism‘, has been systematically presented, and guided my work on the issue of the
philosophical concern with truth, in Mou 2009d. By ‗transcendental perspectivism‘ I mean a kind of
objective perspectivism, instead of subjective perspectivism (or a radical ―anything goes‖ version of
conceptual relativism), which gives a meta-philosophical methodological framework of how to look at
seemingly competing perspectives taken to approach an object of study for the sake of their constructive
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understanding of the nature of an object of study that I believe most of us would have
(let me call it, an intuitive ‗common-object‘ understanding):
(C)

Given an object of study, there is a way that the object objectively is such
that it is not the case that ―anything goes‖, and we can all talk about that
same object of study even though we may say different things about it.

That is, in a more theoretically loaded manner of speaking, given an object of study,
and given that the identity of the genuine aspects of the object are thus determined
(regardless of whether it is a naturally produced object in physical reality, a socially
constructed object in social reality, an abstract object out of theoretic construction, or
just a ‗linguistic‘ object which are introduced linguistically), there is the same object of
study that can be linguistically [or, more exactly speaking, semantically in the sense of
(iii) below] commonly addressed, though perhaps in different ways of focusing on its
distinct aspects, and examined in a minimally objective way (i.e., not a ―anythinggoes‖ subjective way). In other words, upon a reflective analysis, the intuitive
understanding, (C), can be elaborated into three related components or sub-theses, each
of which is more or less intuitive and can be reasonably expected: (i) given an object of
study, the object has an objective character in a certain sense so that the subjective
perspectivism of ―anything goes‖ cannot succeed; (ii) given an object of study, the
object possesses its aspects, whether one or many, so that various agent-speakers who
point to these aspects actually talk about the same object; (iii) an agent-speaker who
talks about the same common object can semantically reach the common object as a
whole, 12 whether or not she is currently able to epistemologically reach all the aspects
of the object.13
It is known that the term ‗method‘ or ‗methodological approach‘ in philosophical
inquiries can mean a number of things. Given that the term ‗method‘ or
engagement. By ‗transcendental‘ I highlight one crucial character of such a meta-philosophical
framework to the effect of identifying adequacy conditions for adequate methodological guiding
principles that transcend various (local or finite) perspectives to approach an object of study via
regulating how to look at their status, nature and relation and render complementary those eligible
perspectives that really capture certain aspects of the object of study.
12 Given the standard sense of ‗semantics‘ that means the study of the non-linguistic relations between
the linguistic expressions and the extra-linguistic objects for which they stand, members of a linguistic
community can reach the object that they semantically talk about (or rigidly designate) via a certain
communication link (including but not being limited to a Kripkean causal-historical chain), no matter
how much cognitive knowledge they would have about the object, and whether or not (some of) their
(epistemic) descriptions of it are correct. There is the rich literature and remarkable research
achievements on the issue in contemporary study of philosophy of language; cf., Martinich 2008.
13 In so understanding, one has reached a basic vantage point, indeed one due starting point of the
constructive-engagement strategy, which Davidson intends to make in a more theoretic (and thus more
or less controversial) terms: ―No world views or conceptual schemes are truly incommensurable.‖
(Davidson 2001, p. v). As I see it, all the authors in this issue of the Journal have already substantially
committed themselves to this vantage point when they are not limited to this or that ad hoc local or finite
(methodological or substantial) perspective but transcend them in their reflective explorations as given
here, whether or not they intend to explicitly recognize it.
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‗methodological approach‘ means a way of responding to how to approach an object of
study, there is need, both conceptually and practically speaking, to make the distinction
between three kinds of ways or methods, which constitute three distinct dimensions of
methodology: a methodological perspective (or a perspective method), a
methodological instrument (or an instrumental method), and a methodological guiding
principle (or a guiding-principle method).
(1) A methodological perspective (or a perspective method) is a way responding to
how to approach an object of study that is intended to point to or focus on a certain
aspect of the object and capture or explain the aspect in terms of the characteristics of
that aspect, together with the minimal metaphysical commitment that there is that
aspect of the object or that the aspect is genuinely possessed by the object.
There is a distinction between eligible and ineligible methodological perspectives
concerning an object of study. If the aforementioned minimal metaphysical
commitment is true in the sense that the object does possess that aspect, the
methodological perspective is considered eligible in regard to that object. Otherwise,
the methodological perspective is considered ineligible in regard to that object. If a
methodological perspective is eligible for capturing or characterizing (a certain aspect
of) an object of study, then one‘s reflective activity per se of taking that
methodological perspective alone as one‘s working perspective to look at the object is
philosophically innocent, whether or not one also consciously takes some other eligible
perspective as one‘s working perspective, and whether or not one holds an adequate
methodological guiding principle to be explained below. [For convenience, in the
foregoing sense, it is just said that (taking) an eligible methodological perspective per
se is philosophically innocent.]
It is noted that a methodological perspective as specified above is a
methodological-perspective simplex, in contrast to a methodological-perspective
complex, which either integrates two or more perspective simplexes into one
(‗perspective-only complex‘ for short) or combines a perspective simplex with a
certain (adequate or inadequate) methodological guiding principle to be explained
below (‗guiding-principle-associated perspective complex‘ for short). In the following,
unless otherwise specified, by ‗perspective‘ I mean a methodological-perspective
simplex. 14
14 Here and below, for the sake of illustration of relevant methodological points, I use as examples of
methodological perspectives two paradigm methodological-perspective models that appear to be so
different but can be somehow complementary, i.e., the Socrates-style being-aspect-concerned
methodological perspective, as suggested and illustrated through Socrates‘ characterization of virtue,
justice and piety in some earlier Plato dialogues, and the Confucius-style becoming-aspect-concerned
methodological perspective as suggested and illustrated through Confucius‘ characterization of ren
(humanity) and xiao (filial piety) in the Analects. The two methodological perspectives respectively
constitute the methodological-perspective dimensions of the two thinkers‘ methodological approaches,
besides their respective methodological-guiding-principle dimensions and methodological-instrument
dimensions. Though there are various aspects or layers of any object, what Socrates was concerned with
is the aspect of the object that is stable, definite, regular, constant, unchanged or invariant (stably and
invariantly existing in all F-things) and thus inter-subjectively accessible by any rational mind, as
illustrated in his specified three conditions for any adequate definition of piety in the Euthyphro (cf., 5c-

Comparative Philosophy 1.1 (2010)

MOU

11
(2) A methodological instrument (or instrumental method) is a way in which to
implement, or give tools to realize, a certain methodological perspective. If the
methodological perspective that an instrumental method is to implement is eligible for
characterizing the object, then the instrumental method is also eligible. On the other
hand, if the methodological perspective that an instrumental method is to implement is
ineligible for characterizing the object, it is not necessary for the instrumental method
to be ineligible too; an instrumental method (such as a deductive-reasoning method, an
argument-by-analogy method) might be neutral to various perspectives and thus can be
used to implement some other eligible methodological perspectives.
(3) A methodological guiding principle (or guiding-principle method) is a way
concerning a certain methodological perspective (or a group of perspectives), or a
certain methodological instrument to implement the methodological perspective, in
regard to an object of study, which is, or should be, presupposed by the agent who
takes that perspective (or one or more among the group of the perspectives) and its
related instrument for the sake of guiding and regulating how the perspective or the
instrument should be evaluated (its status and its due relation with other perspectives or
instruments) and used (how to choose among the group of perspectives or instruments),
and how the purpose and focus that the perspective serves should be set. There is the
distinction between adequate and inadequate methodological guiding principles
concerning methodological perspective(s) in regard to an object of study. The six sorts
of adequacy conditions for adequate methodological guiding principles are explored in
Section 2.4 below.
For the sake of the reader capturing their distinctions in a vivid way, let me use the
following ―method‖-house metaphor to illustrate the relevant points. Suppose that a
person intends to approach her destination, say, a house (the object of study), which
has several entrances—say, its front door, side door and roof window (a variety of
aspects, dimensions or layers of the object of study). She then takes a certain path (a
certain methodological perspective) to enter the house, believing that the path leads to
the entrance of this side (say, the front door) or the entrance of that side (say, a side
door) of the house. If a path really leads to a certain entrance of the house, the path is
called an ‗eligible‘ one; otherwise it is called ‗ineligible‘ (thus the distinction between
eligible and ineligible methodological perspectives). When she takes a certain path to
enter the house, she holds a certain instrument in her hand (a methodological
instrument) to clear her path, say, a hatchet if the path is overgrown with brambles or a
snow shovel if the path is heavily covered with snow. She also has a certain idea in her
mind (a methodological guiding principle) that explains why she takes that path,
d). For convenience, a blanket term, ‗the being-aspect‘, can be used to cover those characteristics of the
object, or to stand for the aspect of the object that is characterized in terms of the aforementioned
characteristics. In contrast, what Confucius was concerned with in the Analects is the aspect of the object
under examination that is particular, concrete, dynamic, ever-changing, as illustrated in his
characterization of (filial) piety in the Analects (cf., 2.5. 2.6, 2.7 and 2.8); all those characteristics are
intrinsically connected with various situations in which things reveal themselves. A blanket term, ‗the
becoming-aspect‘, is used here to refer to these characteristics of the object that essentially involve
dynamic change or becoming.
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instead of another, and guides her to have some understanding, adequate or inadequate,
of the relation of that path to other paths (other methodological perspectives), if any, to
the house. Surely such a guiding idea can be adequate or inadequate (adequate or
inadequate methodological guiding principle): for example, if she recognizes and
renders other eligible paths also eligible and thus compatible with her current path,
then her guiding idea is adequate; in contrast, if she fails to recognize that and thus
renders her current path exclusively eligible (the only path leading to the house), then
her guiding idea is inadequate, though her current path per se is indeed eligible. 15
Given the above specifications, there are two preliminary points concerning the
relation between a methodological perspective and a methodological guiding principle
that are especially relevant. First, generally speaking, the merit, status, and function of
a methodological perspective (a methodological-perspective simplex) per se can be
evaluated independently of certain methodological guiding principles that the agent
might presuppose in her actual application of the perspective. One‘s reflective practice
per se of taking a certain eligible methodological perspective as a working perspective
is philosophically positive and innocent in the following senses, whether or not it is
associated with or guided by an adequate or inadequate methodological guiding
principle in one‘s application of the perspective. On the one hand, it is philosophically
positive insofar as that perspective really points to or captures a certain aspect of the
object and is thus eligible; on the other hand, it is philosophically innocent insofar as
one‘s reflective practice per se of taking that perspective amounts neither to one‘s
losing sight of other genuine aspects of the object nor to one‘s rejecting other eligible
perspectives in one‘s background thinking nor to one‘s presupposing an inadequate
methodological guiding principle that would render ineligible other eligible
methodological perspectives (if any). In this way, even if an agent‘s methodological
guiding principle is inadequate in her applying a certain eligible methodological
perspective, the eligibility of the methodological perspective still needs to be
recognized, and her reflective practice per se of taking that perspective still has its due
value in philosophical inquiry.
Second, however, it is indeed important for the agent to have an adequate
methodological guiding principle, which the agent is expected to presuppose in
evaluating the status and nature of the eligible methodological perspectives, applying
her methodological perspective, and looking at the relation between her current
working perspective and other perspectives. For it does matter whether one‘s taking a
certain methodological perspective is regulated by an adequate or inadequate guiding
principle, especially for the sake of constructive engagement of seemingly competing
approaches. When one‘s application of an eligible methodological perspective as one‘s
working perspective is guided by some adequate guiding principle and thus contributes
It is noted that I do not intend to use this ―method‖-house metaphor here to illustrate, thus presuppose
and advocate any ad hoc conception of philosophizing; in the context of the preceding inclusive
characterization of the identities of comparative philosophy and its constructive-engagement strategy,
one is expected to have one‘s inclusive understanding of this metaphor and the due meanings of its
involved metaphoric terms like ‗taking a certain path‘.

15
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to a holistic understanding of the object of study, one‘s application of that perspective
would be philosophically constructive and sighted insofar as one would constructively
treat other eligible methodological perspectives (if any) and their relation to one‘s
working perspective and thus have a comprehensive outlook for the sake of a complete
account of the object of study. Otherwise, it would be philosophically less constructive
and less sighted (or even blind) in that connection—but, even so, the reflective practice
per se of taking that eligible perspective can be still philosophically positive and
innocent in the foregoing senses, as indicated before.16
In the context of philosophical inquiry, for one thing, there is the need to refine the
notion of methodological approach into these three distinct but related notions of
methodological approach for the sake of adequately characterizing the foregoing three
distinct but related methodological ways (in philosophical inquiry). For another thing,
in view of their distinction and connection at least at the conceptual level, we might as
well regard the three methodological ways as three dimensions of (philosophical)
methodology or of the concept of methodological approach, although this by no means
takes for granted that any methodological way that has ever been historically taken was
16

Let me give an example to illustrate the points here. Consider analytic method/ methodology.
Analytic methodology, understood broadly, is a general methodological approach in philosophical
inquiry. It is not limited to a single and specific instrumental method (i.e., what ‗analysis‘ means in its
technical sense, in contrast to ‗synthesis‘), but collectively includes (i) a collection of ―analytic‖
instrumental methods and their associated conceptual and explanatory resources, and (ii) a generic type
of methodological perspectives that is intended to point to and capture something certain, stable,
constant, regular, definite, universal, or unchanging (i.e., the being-aspect/dimension/layer, understood
in the sense of ‗being‘ in contrast to that of ‗becoming‘) of an object of study (and/or its conceptual
characterization). (The two are closely related: the analytic methodological perspective or analytic
expectation demands such ―analytic‖ instruments as meaning analysis, conceptual clarity, precise
formulation, or rigorous argumentation, by means of which to implement the ―analytic‖ being-aspectconcerned methodological perspective. In this sense, and to this extent, the generic type of analytic
methodological perspective underlies various analytic instrumental methods.) It is important to note that
analytic methodology as a generic type of methodological perspectives, together with a collection of
instrumental methods, is not intrinsically or conceptually related to an ad hoc methodological guiding
principle concerned with how to look at the relationship between such methodological perspectives and
instruments and other types of methodological perspectives and instruments. Historically, analytic
methodology was applied by philosophers who might hold or presuppose different methodological
guiding principles, some of which were arguably adequate while some others were not. In this way, on
the one hand, given an object of study (or its conceptual characterization) does have its being aspect as
specified above, a certain analytic (or being-aspect-concerned) methodological perspective in regard to
the object of study is to be eligible, and thus an agent‘s reflective practice per se of applying analytic
methodology to examining the object of study is reflectively innocent, worthy and reasonable, no matter
what kind of methodological guiding principle the agent actually assumes, since analytic methodology is
not intrinsically or conceptually associated with any ad hoc (adequate or inadequate) methodological
guiding principles. However, on the other hand, the application of analytic methodology needs to be
regulated by adequate methodological guiding principles so that the agent can have a more holistic or
complete understanding of various aspects of the object of study and can easily and adequately make her
perspective shift when her current working purpose changes to some other working focus(es) on some
other aspect(s) or layer(s) of the object of study than its being-aspect (alone).
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actually presented in its agent‘ ideas and texts indiscriminately as an methodological
approach that would manifestly reveal all the three dimensions.
With the above conceptual and explanatory resources, I will elaborate the two
(aforementioned) methodological emphases of the constructive engagement strategy of
comparative philosophy and thus of the Journal.
2.2
The first emphasis is on philosophical interpretation 17 of the (ancient) thinker‘s
ideas/texts instead of mere historical description. Note that, generally speaking, the
primary purpose of this methodological orientation is to enhance our understanding of
a thinker‘s ideas/texts and their implications of philosophical significance via relevant
effective conceptual and explanatory resources, whether or not those resources were
actually used by the thinker herself. It is clear that a purely historical approach does not
fit here: to elaborate and understand the thinker‘s ideas/texts does not amount to
figuring out exactly what resources the thinker actually used and exactly what she
explicitly thought/wrote. Instead, such interpretation and understanding might include
the interpreter‘s elaboration of the thinker‘s points and their subtle implications, which
might not have been explicitly considered by the thinker herself, and/or the
interpreter‘s representation of the thinker‘s point in clearer and more coherent terms or
in a more philosophically interesting way, which the thinker herself may or may not
have actually adopted.18 In both cases, given a thinker‘s ideas/texts (in one tradition or
account) under interpretation, some effective conceptual and explanatory resources
well developed in another tradition or account can be consciously used to enhance our
understanding of, and to elaborate, the thinker‘s ideas/texts.19
I use the term ‗interpretation‘ in a narrow or straightforward sense as specified in terms of
elaborating and understanding to be explained below (‗philosophical interpretation‘ for short) rather than
in a broad or implicit sense in which any intellectual exploration (including the historical-descriptionconcerned approach) could be somehow identified as an ‗interpretation‘ or an ‗interpretation-concerned‘
approach. As far as some sample explorations of philosophical interpretation in contemporary studies of
Chinese and comparative Chinese-Western philosophy are concerned, see Ames and Hall 1995, Graham
1989, Hansen 1983, and Shun 1997, to name a few.
18 Then, can these implications be said to belong to the thinker‘s ideas in the text (and thus fall into
what the thinker truly means/meant or what the thinker‘s ideas truly has/had)? In an important sense, the
answer would be yes; for these implications are truly implied by the ideas delivered by the thinker,
although one can surely say that these implications were not actually expressed by the thinker, and one
thus might say that they are not what the thinker actually (truly?) means/meant. (At this point, one can
see that such expressions as ‗what a certain thinker truly means/meant‘ or ‗what she truly has/had‘ tend
to be ambiguous and vague and thus deserve clarification, especially when one intends to make claims
about what a thinker truly means/meant or what her ideas truly has/had.)
19 From the viewpoint of comparative engagement, those conceptual and explanatory resources used are
thus tacitly and implicitly, but constructively, in comparison and contrast to those original resources by
means of which the insight or vision was somehow delivered, insofar as such comparison of the two
distinct sorts of resources is not expressly and directly conducted. The term ‗constructively‘ here means
that such tacit comparative approach intrinsically involves how the interpreter of the thinker‘s ideas/texts
could learn from another tradition or account regarding resources to enhance the interpreter‘s
17
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In this way, the use of external resources might really enhance our understanding of
a thinker‘s ideas/texts or clarify some original unclear or confusing expression of her
ideas. Consequently, the endeavor per se of using external resources in this orientation
is not automatically inappropriate, as it would be in the merely historical orientation.
Note that when those explanatory and conceptual resources are used, they are not
intended to assign the same degree of articulated systematization and mastering of
some conceptual and explanatory resources to an ancient thinker but to enhance our
understanding of her ideas delivered in the text. For this interpretative purpose, it is not
merely legitimate but beneficial to employ more explicit or clearer conceptual
resources to elaborate some otherwise implicit and hidden thing (say, coherence and
connectedness) in a thinker‘s ideas that was sometimes less clearly delivered or
expressed in some paradoxical way for lack of those contemporary explanatory and
conceptual resources that were unavailable to the ancient thinker but are now available
to us. Note also that, when a thinker‘s line of thought and ideas lack articulated
systematicity in their language expressions, that does not amount to saying that the
thinker‘s line of thought and ideas per se go without (implicit and hidden) coherence
and connectedness deep in a thinker‘s ideas. Consequently, we cannot base ourselves
merely on this lack of articulated systematicity in language expression and therefore
judge that the thinker‘s text itself is not a philosophical work when the text was indeed
intended to deliver her reflective ideas. At this point, with the previous and current
methodological considerations, some further elaborations of the thinker‘s line of
thought and surrounding reflective ideas via adequate conceptual and explanatory
resources available to us are genuinely needed, instead of being the mere issue of
preference, for the sake of enhancing our understanding of the thinker‘s ideas/texts
including their due implications. 20
It is also important to note that an interpreter‘s project of studying a figure‘s
thought or a movement of thought from a philosophical tradition with the
interpretation-concerned orientation, instead of a mere historical orientation often
focuses on a certain aspect, layer or dimension of a thinker‘s ideas based on the
purpose of the project, the reflective interest of the interpreter, etc. Indeed, instead of a
comprehensive coverage of all aspects or dimensions of the object of study, focusing
on one aspect or dimension is a kind of simplification. Now the question is this: Is any
simplification per se doomed to be indiscriminately a sin of over-simplification?
Surely, when a project aims at accurately describing relevant historical matters of facts
and pursuing what the thinker under description actually thought, and what resources
understanding of the thinker‘s ideas; therefore, some constructive philosophical engagement between
distinct resources respectively from different traditions or accounts is tacitly involved in this orientation
and its corresponding methodological approach.
20 The ―blurring‖ assimilation might result from ―over‖-use of external resources when interpreting one
or both parties under comparative examination, especially when the external resources used to
characterize one party come from the other party. But, for the purpose of interpretation, the resulting
assimilation is not necessarily inappropriate but might illuminate the essential connection and common
points between the assimilated ideas at the fundamental level so as to enhance our understanding of
those ideas.
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the thinker actually used, simplification is always over-simplification; any
simplification is guilty of being negatively excessive and thus identical with
falsification. Nevertheless, it should be clear that, if the purpose of a project is to focus
on interpreting or elaborating one aspect or dimension instead of giving a
comprehensive historical description, charging the practitioner of this project with
over-simplification would be unfair and would miss the point.
Indeed, a comparative philosophy project should be guided by a comprehensive
understanding or an adequate methodological guiding principle whose adequacy
conditions are explored in the next sub-section. But a reflective project in philosophy
(including those studies in comparative philosophy) that takes a certain methodological
perspective by focusing on one aspect of the object of study can be totally compatible
with a comprehensive understanding. At this point, what needs to be recognized is an
important distinction between a methodological perspective as a current working
perspective and a methodological guiding principle that an agent presupposes when
taking the methodological perspective, where the principle would be used by the agent
to guide or regulate how the current perspective would be applied and evaluated in
view of some other eligible perspectives. As emphasized above, one‘s reflective
practice per se of taking a certain methodological perspective amounts neither to
reflectively rejecting some other eligible methodological perspectives nor to
presupposing an inadequate methodological guiding principle that would render
ineligible other eligible methodological perspectives (if any). What is at issue is
whether the interpreter has assumed an adequate methodological guiding principle to
guide and regulate how to look at the relation between the current methodological
perspective used as a working perspective and other eligible methodological
perspectives that would point to other aspects of the object of study. Consequently,
when one evaluates a project in comparative philosophy, what really matters is for one
to understand what kind of methodological guiding principle is held or presupposed
behind the working perspective.
2.3
The other methodological emphasis of the constructive-engagement strategy is on the
relevance and significance of the thinkers‘ ideas related to the common philosophical
enterprise and contemporary development of philosophy. This emphasis is intrinsically
related to one significant methodological orientation in comparative philosophy, i.e.,
the philosophical-issue-engagement orientation that aims to contribute to common
philosophical concerns. The primary purpose of this orientation in studies of ancient or
contemporary thinkers is to see how, through reflective criticism (including selfcriticism) and argumentation, these thinkers could constructively contribute to the
common philosophical enterprise and/or a series of issues, themes or topics of
philosophical significance that can be jointly concerned through appropriate
philosophical interpretation and/or from a broader philosophical vantage point (‗joint
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concerns‘ or ‗common concerns‘ for short below),21 rather than focus on providing a
historical or descriptive account (or on interpreting some ideas historically developed
in a certain tradition or account) merely for the sake of being aware of them. Typically,
addressing a jointly concerned issue of philosophy, substantial ideas historically
developed in distinct philosophical traditions are directly compared in order to
understand how they could jointly and complementarily contribute to this issue in
philosophically interesting ways. Insofar as the foregoing purpose of constructiveengagement in treating various joint concerns and issues of philosophical significance
is most philosophically interesting, this philosophical-issue-engagement orientation
and its methodological strategy directly, explicitly and constructively conducts
philosophical engagement and is thus considered to be most philosophically
interesting. To highlight the characteristic features of a reflective project with this as its
primary orientation, let us examine the appropriateness of three sorts of worries or
charges that have sometimes been put into doubt or brought against projects with this
orientation in studies of comparative philosophy, i.e., the worries about, or the ―sins‖
of, oversimplification, over-use of external resources, and blurring assimilation.
A typical procedure of conducting a philosophical engagement in such projects
could be both conceptually and practically divided into three phases:
1. The pre-engagement phase, in which certain ideas from distinct accounts or from
different traditions that are relevant to the common concern under examination and
thus to the purpose of the project are focused on and identified;
2. The engagement phase, in which those ideas internally engage with each other in
view of that common concern and the purpose to be served; and
3. The post-engagement phase, in which those distinct ideas from different sources
are now absorbed or assimilated into a new approach to the common concern under
examination.
The three alleged ―sins‖ may be considered to be typically associated respectively
with the three phases. The ―sin‖ of over-simplification regarding a certain idea
identified from a certain account or tradition may be typically associated with
reflective efforts in the pre-engagement phase; the ―sin‖ of over-use of external
resources regarding elaborating a certain idea from a certain account or tradition may
be typically associated with reflective efforts in the engagement phase; and the ―sin‖ of
blurring assimilation may be typically associated with reflective efforts in the postengagement phase. Now let me briefly evaluate the appropriateness of the three
charges respectively in the corresponding three phases; looking at them in this way will
help highlight certain features of projects in comparative philosophy primarily with the
philosophical-issue-engagement orientation.
It is arguably right that many issues that were traditionally identified as (some) ―unique‖ issues in
different traditions have turned out to be primarily concerned with different aspects, layers or
dimensions of some jointly concerned, more general issues of philosophy, especially from a broader
philosophical vantage point. This is one point that I have endeavored to make and illustrate in several of
my writings mentioned above.

21
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In the pre-engagement phase, it might be not only legitimate but also adequate or
even necessary to provide simplification and abstraction of some ideas in one account
or tradition through a perspective: this perspective per se is presented in most relevant
terms to the joint concern addressed, and the purpose served in a philosophical-issueengagement concerned project, while without involving those irrelevant elements in
the account or tradition from which such a perspective comes, though the latter might
be relevant to figuring out the point of those ideas. The reasons are these. First, the
primary concern of the project is not with how such an idea is related to the other
elements in the source account or tradition but with how it is relevant to approaching
the jointly concerned philosophical issue. Second, while one needs to understand the
point of an idea in the context in which it was raised, once one understands the point
(either through employing data provided by projects with the historical-descriptionconcerned orientation and/or the interpretation-concerned orientation or through one‘s
own background project with one of the these two orientations), there would be no
present purpose served by discussing the background. Third, it is clear that such an
approach per se does not imply denying the social and historical integrity of the idea in
the source account or tradition; the point is that the existence of such integrity cannot
automatically guarantee an indiscriminate priority or even relevance of expressly
addressing it in any projects in comparative philosophy without regard to their
orientations and purposes.
In the engagement phase, relevant (eligible) perspectives from different source
accounts or different traditions would constructively engage each other. From each
party‘s point of view, the other party is something external without; but, from a broader
philosophical vantage point and in view of the jointly concerned issue, the distinct
views may be complementary within. In this context, the term ‗external‘ would miss
the point in regard to the purpose here: the pivotal point is not this or that distinct
perspective but the issue (and its comprehensive approach) to whose various aspects
those perspectives point; in view of the issue, all those perspectives become internal in
the sense that they would be complementary and indispensable to a comprehensive
understanding and treatment of the current philosophical issue.
In the post-engagement phase, some sort of assimilation typically results from the
preceding reflective engagement; that is, such assimilation would adjust, blur and
absorb different perspectives into one new approach as a whole. This would be what is
really expected in this kind of reflective engagement in studies of comparative
philosophy, instead of a sin.
It should be noted that, if a project in comparative examination, which explicitly
has one of the previously mentioned orientations (the interpretation-concerned
orientation, the philosophical-issue-engagement orientation, and the historicaldescription-concerned orientation), is considered a project-simplex, then a project in
reflective practice concerning comparative philosophy might be a complex that goes
with a combination of two or more orientations. A comprehensive project concerned
with historical figures under comparative examination for the sake of their
philosophical engagement often consists of such a combination of different stages of
study with their distinctive focuses. Recognition of the characteristic features of the
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above three distinct orientations/purposes and their respective methodological
approaches would help us discriminatively treat and evaluate different stages or parts
of a project-complex of comparative philosophy.
2.4
For the purpose of cross-tradition/style understanding and constructive engagement, it
is especially philosophically interesting, relevant, or even crucial to have an adequate
methodological guiding principle, which the agent is expected to hold in evaluating the
status and nature of the eligible methodological perspectives, applying her
methodological perspective, and looking at the relation between her current working
perspective and other methodological perspectives. The suggested metamethodological framework endeavors to identify six conditions for adequate
methodological guiding principles. (Their illustrations via two representative
methodological perspectives will be provided in footnotes.) The first four, (1)-(4), and
one of the last two, (5) and (6), depending on situations, are expected for a
methodological guiding principle to be adequate. This set of conditions does not
pretend to be exhaustive, exclusive, or dogmatic; the conditions are open to critical
examination for their validity and explanatory force.
(1) The perspective-eligibility-recognizing condition. A methodological guiding
principle that is held or presupposed by the agent who uses some eligible
methodological perspective as her current working perspective is considered adequate
(in this connection) when this guiding principle renders other eligible methodological
perspectives (if any) also eligible and somehow compatible with the application of the
current working perspective. In contrast, it is considered inadequate (in this
connection) if otherwise. This adequacy condition may be called a ‗minimal‘ condition
in the sense that it is presupposed by the remaining kinds of adequacy conditions. 22
22

As explained above, given an object of study, whether or not a methodological perspective is eligible
or ineligible is to be determined based on whether or not the aspect, dimension or layer to which the
perspective in question is intended to point is really possessed by the object. Consider the two samples
of methodological perspectives briefly characterized in Footnote 14, namely, the Socrates-style beingaspect-concerned perspective and the Confucius-style becoming-aspect-concerned perspective. The two
kinds of methodological perspectives point respectively to two most basic modes of existence (being and
becoming) of things in the world that are typically possessed simultaneously by most things in nature.
Now the object of study under Socrates‘ and Confucius‘ examination is (filial) piety. [Surely, it is
through arguably appropriate philosophical interpretation, beyond being based merely on the translation
of the Chinese term ‗xiao‘ in the Analects into the English term ‗(filial) piety‘ or its Greek counterpart,
that Socrates and Confucius are considered to have their joint concern with the issue of (filial) piety but
take distinct approaches with regard to different aspects or layers of this jointly-concerned issue. It is
philosophically interesting and significant to explore how such philosophical interpretation is possible. I
cannot pursue this issue here due to the purpose of this writing; but one thing is certain: both Socrates
and Confucius were concerned with the issue of how one should treat one‘s parents in a morally
adequate way.] If piety as the object of study genuinely possesses both its being and becoming aspects,
Socrates‘ and Confucius‘ are both eligible in regard to our reflective examination of piety. In this way, a
methodological guiding principle that renders both methodological perspectives eligible on the issue of
piety would have the perspective-eligibility-recognizing adequacy.
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(2) The agent-purpose-sensitivity condition. A methodological guiding principle is
considered adequate (in this connection) if it guides the agent to have her choice of a
certain working perspective, among eligible methodological perspectives, sensitive to
the agent‘s purpose and thus renders the most applicable or the most appropriate (the
best relative to that purpose) the perspective that (best) serves that purpose. In contrast,
it is considered inadequate (in this connection) if otherwise. 23
(3) The equality-status-granting condition. A methodological guiding principle is
considered adequate (in this connection) if it renders all the eligible methodological
perspectives (perspective simplexes) 24 equal in the following two senses: being
equally necessary for the sake of a complete account of an object of study and being
equally local from the global point of view that transcends any local methodological
perspectives; thus none of them absolutely superior (or inferior) to the others in the
above senses. In contrast, it is considered inadequate (in this connection) if otherwise. 25
(4)
The
new-eligible-perspective-possibility-recognizing
condition.
A
methodological guiding principle is considered adequate (in this connection) if it
guides the agent to have an open-minded attitude toward the possibility of a new
eligible perspective that is to point to some genuine aspect of the object of study but
have yet to be realized by the agent because of the ‗unknown-identity‘ status of that
23

Again consider the two sample methodological perspectives, the Socrates-style being-aspectconcerned perspective and the Confucius-style becoming-aspect-concerned perspective. Given that the
two methodological perspectives are both eligible in regard to the issue of piety, a methodological
guiding principle that sets out to decide which methodological perspective among the two is to be taken
by an agent herself as her working perspective, or how to evaluate the validity of some other agent‘s
working perspective (either one) should be sensitive to the agent‘s purpose or her own focus on which
aspect of piety to be captured in a certain context. The methodological guiding principle then has the
agent-purpose-sensitivity adequacy. Otherwise, that is, when a methodological guiding principle
demands the agent indiscriminately to choose one ad hoc methodological perspective without regard to
the agent‘s purpose and focus in a certain context, the methodological guiding principle would fail to
have this adequacy. Perhaps a most prominent ancient thinker who explicitly addresses the agentpurpose-sensitivity condition (and the equality-status-granting condition) is Zhuang Zi. For a recent
discussion of Zhuang Zi‘s point in this connection, see Mou 2008b.
24 Clearly, what is talked about here is not a methodological-perspective complex that can be a
combination of multiple methodological-perspective simplexes.
25 Again consider the two sample methodological perspectives, the Socrates-style being-aspectconcerned perspective and the Confucius-style becoming-aspect-concerned perspective and assume that
both are eligible methodological perspectives that point respectively to the being aspect and becoming
aspect both of which are really possessed by piety. When one resorts to a certain methodological guiding
principle to guide one‘s evaluation of the status of the Socrates-style being-aspect-concerned perspective
(or the Confucius-style becoming-aspect-concerned perspective) and thus render it indiscriminately and
absolutely superior to the Confucius-style becoming-aspect-concerned perspective (or the Socrates-style
being-aspect-concerned perspective), the methodological guiding principle thus fails to have the
equality-status-granting adequacy concerning the aforementioned two methodological perspectives on
the issue of piety. In contrast, if a methodological guiding principle renders one of the two better than
another or most suitable only in view of a certain context and in regard to a certain aspect of piety to
which the perspective in question points but without viewing it absolutely superior to the other, this
methodological guiding principle will thus meet the equality-status-granting condition concerning the
aforementioned two methodological perspectives on the issue of piety.
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aspect. A methodological guiding principle is considered inadequate (in this
connection) if otherwise.26
(5) The complementarity-seeking condition. Given that multiple, seemingly
competing eligible methodological perspectives concerning the object of study turn out
to be complementary (in the sense that each of them points to one aspect of the object
and is indispensable for a complete understanding of the object), a methodological
guiding principle is considered adequate (in this connection) if it captures the
complementary character of the involved aspects of the object and thus seeks the
complementary connection and harmonious balance between those perspectives for the
sake of enhancing the complementary unity of those eligible perspectives. In contrast,
it is considered inadequate (in this connection) if otherwise. 27
(6) The sublation-seeking condition. Given that there are two seemingly competing
guiding-principle-associated perspective complexes whose perspective parts are
eligible (i.e., capturing distinct aspects of the object of study) but whose respectively
associated methodological guiding principles are genuinely competing or incompatible
(either because one of them is inadequate or because both are inadequate), such a
methodological guiding principle would be considered adequate (in this connection) if
it seeks a due solution through a Hegelian synthetic balance via sublation that keeps
what are reasonable or appropriate from both guiding-principle-associated perspective
26 Again consider the two sample methodological perspectives, the Socrates-style being-aspectconcerned perspective and the Confucius-style becoming-aspect-concerned perspective and assume that
both are eligible methodological perspectives on the issue of piety. If, besides the two methodological
perspectives, a methodological guiding principle has its open-minded attitude towards the possibility of
new (yet-to-be-recognized) aspects, dimensions or layers of piety and thus the possibility of new eligible
methodological perspectives that are to point to and explain them, the guiding principle thus enjoys The
new-eligible-perspective-possibility-recognizing adequacy. In contrast, any methodological guiding
principle that renders exclusive and exhaustive the current working perspective (or the current stock of
methodological perspectives that are so far epistemologically available), the guiding principle is thus
inadequate because it fails to meet the condition of the new-eligible-perspective-possibility-recognizing
adequacy.
27

Again, consider the two sample methodological perspectives, the Socrates-style being-aspectconcerned perspective and the Confucius-style becoming-aspect-concerned perspective. The two kinds
of methodological perspectives point respectively to two most basic modes of existence, being and
becoming, of things in the world that are typically possessed simultaneously by most things in nature.
Now the object of study under Socrates‘ and Confucius‘ examination is (filial) piety. Suppose that piety
as the object of study genuinely possesses both its being and becoming aspects and that both aspects are
interdependent, interpenetrating, interactive and complementary in regard to the constitution of piety.
Then the Socrates-style being-aspect-concerned perspective and the Confucius-style becoming-aspectconcerned perspective are complementary instead of being incompatible or opposed to each other on the
issue of piety. In this way, any methodological guiding principle that renders the two methodological
perspectives complementary and seeks their complementary connection and joint contribution to a
complete understanding of the issue of piety thus meets the complementarity-seeking condition. If
otherwise, a methodological guiding principle would be inadequate in this connection on the issue. The
complementarity-seeking condition essentially reflects the point of the yin-yang model of interaction and
transformation. For the yin-yang model, see Allinson 2003 and Mou 2003b. For a similar metamethodological spirit of complementarity-seeking harmonization of seemingly-competing modes of
philosophizing, also see Rescher 1994.
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complexes (i.e., their eligible perspectives, maybe plus some adequate guiding
principle from one perspective complex if any) while disregarding what are not, i.e.,
the inadequate guiding principle (or principles) in one (or both) of the perspective
complexes. In contrast, it is considered inadequate (in this connection) if otherwise. 28
Among the foregoing six kinds of adequacy conditions, the minimal perspectiveeligibility-recognizing condition is presupposed by the remaining kinds of conditions.
Which one, between the last two kinds of conditions, needs to be maintained would
depend on the nature of the object of study, the character of the involved perspectives
and the purpose that a certain methodological guiding principle serves.
It is noted that, as indicated before, although comparative philosophy typically
treats prominently cross-tradition/orientation comparative cases, the methodological
points of the adequacy conditions are intended to be general concerning the
constructive engagement of any distinct approaches in philosophical inquiry, whether
they are from different traditions/orientations of doing philosophy or within the same
tradition/orientation. That is one value of the meta-philosophical exploration of
methodology of comparative philosophy.
3
It is important to note that the constructive-engagement strategy is not merely armchair
speculation but has already been reflectively implemented in—and, indeed, has
impacted—the reflective practice of comparative philosophy. This is the case with
respect to philosophical studies of classical Chinese philosophy and comparative
Chinese-Western philosophy29, especially in the past decade. In this section, I intend to
give a case analysis of how the constructive-engagement strategy effectively bears on
studies of Chinese and comparative Chinese-Western philosophy30 especially in the
28

For example, there might be two seemingly competing guiding-principle-associated perspective
complexes as two approaches to build up a social-economic community: the profit-seeking-only
perspective complex (i.e., the profit-seeking perspective that is associated with a guiding principle which
renders the perspective exclusively eligible) and the welfare-seeking-only perspective (i.e., the welfareseeking perspective that is associated with a guiding principle which renders the perspective exclusively
eligible). It might be the case that a social-economic community does, or should, have both its profitseeking layer and its welfare-seeking layer for the sake of its well-being. In this case, what really makes
the two perspective complexes competing or incompatible would be their respectively associated
guiding principles that render their respectively guided perspectives exclusively eligible. Then, when a
methodological guiding principle seeks a synthetic balance (via sublation) to bring about a new approach
that keeps what is reasonable in the two perspective complexes (i.e., the two involved perspective
simplexes per se) while disregarding what is not (i.e., the two involved inadequate guiding principles),
the methodological guiding principle would be considered to be adequate because it meets the sublationseeking condition in this case. Though labeled in terms of Hegel‘s ideology, the idea of the sublationseeking condition can be traced back to Aristotle‘s method of saving the phenomena (cf., Nicomachean
Ethics, 1145b1-7). For an elaboration of the Aristotelian method, see Yu and Bunnin 2001.
29 For a survey of comparative Chinese-Western philosophy, see Wong 2005.
30 Without the implication that one is superior to the other, the phrase ‗comparative Chinese-Western
philosophy‘, instead of ‗comparative Western-Chinese philosophy‘, is used in view of the following
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past decade for three purposes: (1) to illustrate the foregoing theoretic characterizations
of the constructive engagement strategy; (2) to show how the constructive-engagement
approach has effectively enhanced and promoted studies of Chinese and comparative
Chinese-Western philosophy; (3) to illustrate how the constructive engagement in the
reflective practice of comparative Chinese-Western philosophy can provide
constructive morals and methodological templates that can be applied to other
tradition-vs.-tradition (and/or orientation-vs.-orientation) comparative studies. Indeed,
why this case analysis concerning comparative Chinese-Western philosophy instead of
some other case is given here has two related considerations. Comparative ChineseWestern philosophy, through contemporary studies of Chinese philosophy, has been
one significant and well-developed part of comparative philosophy. Theoretically
speaking, both the Chinese and Western traditions of philosophy are several-thousandyear-long traditions with their distinctively rich resources in various philosophical
subjects. Practically speaking, it seems that currently there are notably more research
results in the literature, as well as research personnel, worldwide than any other
tradition-vs.-tradition comparative studies in philosophy.
In contemporary studies of Chinese philosophy 31 and comparative ChineseWestern philosophy, the label ‗the constructive-engagement trend/movement‘32 can be
understood in a weak sense and in a strong sense. In its weak sense, the phrase means a
more or less collective trend in studies of Chinese philosophy and comparative
philosophy as shown in the past few decades in the direction of the foregoing
constructive-engagement strategy, whether or not its involved meta-philosophical and
methodological issues have been consciously and systematically examined, whether or
not the trend has its explicit systematic agenda in print, and whether or not it has been
explicitly promoted by a certain academic organization with its articulated
constructive-engagement purpose. Nevertheless, in its stronger sense, the term means a
trend/movement that has emerged especially since the earlier years of the 21 st century
with its explicitly specified research agenda, some related academic organizations or
institutions as a collective driving force, various coordinated systematic efforts for the
constructive-engagement purpose, and some other distinct features to be addressed
historical fact: such studies have been carried out primarily by scholars whose primary areas of research
include Chinese philosophy and through their studies of Chinese philosophy.
31 As indicated in Footnote 6, by ‗Chinese philosophy‘ I primarily mean various movements of
philosophical thought in China from the Zhou Dynasty (roughly eleventh century to 256 B.C.) through
the early Qing Dynasty (1644 – mid 19th century) and their contemporary developments and studies.
32 As suggested in Footnote 3, exactly how to label the methodological strategy and its associated trend
or movement is a relatively unimportant thing; one can label it in some other ways one would reasonably
prefer. The point is this: the methodological strategy together with its associated movement is not merely
an armchair strategy on paper; rather, it has already substantially implemented and through a variety of
collective reflective practice that has resulted in solid scholarship. The methodological strategy and its
associated movement are characterized in terms of ‗constructive engagement‘ here with two major
considerations, especially in view of the trend/movement in the mentioned strong sense. First, the phrase
does literally capture some of their crucial features. Second, the label has been historically associated
with them both in some relevant documents in print and in some prominent academic events and projects
that have been guided by the methodological strategy.
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below. Such systematic efforts have produced some major collective research
programs and resulted in substantial outcomes. The nature and methodological features
of the constructive-engagement trend/movement in the foregoing strong sense 33 can be
characterized in the following ten connections.
First, generally speaking, the constructive-engagement trend as a whole has moved
beyond some previous individual efforts, each of which typically featured this or that
specific perspective in comparative studies, and has been guided under a broad vision
or methodological guiding principle concerning how to look at the relation between
various eligible but seemingly competing methodological perspectives in comparative
studies of Chinese and Western philosophy: essentially it renders complementary those
eligible perspectives that respectively capture some distinct aspects, layers or
dimensions of objects of study, instead of indiscriminately subscribing to one single
finite perspective or rendering it exclusively eligible without doing justice to other
eligible perspectives. The constructive-engagement movement as a whole is not limited
to that between Chinese philosophy and Western analytic philosophy 34 (or Chinese
philosophy and ―Continental‖ philosophy) but that between Chinese philosophy and
any movement of thought in the Western philosophical tradition (or even any
movement of thought in other philosophical traditions) in a global context. 35 In this
connection, it is neither to reform the studies of Chinese philosophy exclusively in
virtue of an analytic approach, nor to reformulate studies of Chinese philosophy
exclusively by the resources of ―Continental‖ philosophy. Nevertheless, that amounts
to saying neither that any specific project that is part of the movement has to be
comprehensive in its manifest current coverage nor that it has to take a comprehensive
perspective complex as its current working perspective; what makes a difference lies in
the foregoing sort of methodological guiding principle that guides the project with a
broad vision concerning how to look at the relation between the current
subject/concern and other subjects/concerns and between the current working
perspective and other eligible perspectives.
Second, as far as the methodological dimension of the trend is concerned, a
systematic, in-depth meta-philosophical discussion of the relation between the Western
33

It is arguably correct that some of those indicated features are also applicable to characterizing the
constructive-engagement movement in the weaker sense, whether they are shown in some explicit or
implicit, manifest or obscure, ways.
34 By ‗Western analytic philosophy‘ or ‗Western philosophy in the analytic tradition‘ I mean a Western
mainstream philosophical tradition from Socrates, Plato and Aristotle to Descartes, British empiricism
and Kant to the contemporary analytic movement. Note that, besides indicating a historical connection
between Western philosophy in such a tradition and analytic methodological approach taken in this
tradition, such phrases as ‗Western analytic philosophy‘ used here are not intended to imply that analytic
methodology is, intrinsically or conceptually, exclusively connected with Western philosophy. See
Footnote 16 where a brief characterization of the identity of analytic methodology is given.
35 At the most recent stage of the development of modern Chinese philosophy, one of its prominent
features (at least in regard to one significant portion of modern Chinese philosophy) lies in its movement
towards world philosophy via the constructive-engagement movement. In this sense, and to this extent,
the context of the recent development of modern Chinese philosophy and the mentioned global context
have merged essentially into the same context.
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(especially analytic) philosophical tradition and Chinese philosophical tradition
concerning philosophical methodology and the nature of philosophical inquiry has
provided a necessary, theoretical and meta-philosophical preparation for a
comprehensive, systematic constructive-engagement enterprise. For example, as
analytic and classical Chinese philosophy have been considered by many to be less
relevant or even alien to each other, some recent systematic and in-depth metaphilosophical discussions of how their constructive engagement is possible, especially
in view of their respective methodologies, has provided an indispensable
methodological preparation for subsequent in-depth investigations on how they can
jointly make a contribution to our understanding and treatment of a series of concrete
issues. 36 When a movement of thought in philosophy has its systematic metaphilosophical reflection on its own nature, direction and methodology, this reflective
endeavor would be viewed as one mark of maturity and one necessary condition of its
long-term healthy development.
Third, as far its subject coverage of the trend is concerned, the constructiveengagement trend or movement in contemporary study of Chinese philosophy is
comprehensive, including the engaging examination of a series of fundamental or
significant issues and concerns in those central areas of philosophy like metaphysics,
philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, epistemology, etc., instead of focusing
merely on the issues in ethics and social & political philosophy. In the past, there has
been one quite widespread stereotypical understanding of the nature and scope of
traditional Chinese philosophy that renders it philosophically valuable only in regard to
its thoughts on moral and social-political issues. Though also emphasizing the
necessity of Western and Chinese philosophers learning from each other, some
scholars consider such mutual beneficial engagement valuable and valid only or largely
in regard to limited areas like ethics and social & political philosophy. But this view
has turned out to be incorrect, as some individual scholars‘ explorations in the past
decades and some recent collective engagement projects in those important areas like
metaphysics, philosophy of language and philosophy of mind, together with their
fruitful research results have already clearly and convincingly shown it.
Fourth, as far as its engagement mode is concerned, the constructive-engagement
trend or movement emphasizes the direct and critical but constructive dialogue
between the engaging parties (whenever situations allow) for the sake of effectively
carrying out reflective criticism and self-criticism and jointly making contributions to
the common enterprise of philosophy. Indeed, this is one of the meanings of the phrase
‗constructive engagement‘ that captures one crucial character of philosophical inquiry,
i.e., the critical engagement for the sake of making joint contributions to the
understanding and treatment of common concerns. Such a critical engagement
character, instead of mere celebration, has effectively motivated relevant engaging
parties in participation. For example, two recent projects on constructive engagement,
namely, Davidson‘s philosophy and Chinese philosophy, and of Searle‘s philosophy
and Chinese philosophy, have well adopted such an approach to critical engagement.
36

One of such systematic methodological examinations is presented in Mou 2001a.
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Fifth, as far as collective and systematic character is concerned, the constructiveengagement trend in contemporary studies of Chinese philosophy is not some
individual scholar‘s personal project but has already developed into a collective
enterprise with its systematic character and extensive joint efforts. This shows the
degree of its matureness, results from its in-depth theoretical preparation, and helps to
bring about its related academic community that can provide decent critical
examination of the works in the constructive-engagement scholarship. Especially, the
movement is now well implemented through some effective organizational forces.
Among others, one contributing force in this connection is an international academic
association, i.e., The International Society for Comparative Studies of Chinese and
Western Philosophy (ISCWP), which was formally established in 2002. The ISCWP
has systematically planned and organized a series of academic events and projects
explicitly for the sake of the constructive-engagement purpose and agenda. The
foregoing conception of constructive engagement of Chinese and Western philosophy
has been explicitly and formally documented in the ISCWP constitution as follows:
With the preceding general purposes, the Society emphasizes (but is not limited to) the constructive
engagement between Chinese philosophy and Western mainstream philosophy (analytic tradition as
well as continental tradition in the West in their broad senses); the Society stresses the sensitivity of
such comparative studies to contemporary development and resources of philosophy and their
mutual advancement; and, through the characteristic path of comparative studies of Chinese and
Western philosophy, the Society strives to contribute to philosophy as common human wealth as
well as to respective studies of Chinese philosophy and Western philosophy. The Society also
emphasizes building up a channel and outlet for the academic exchange and communication
between the homeland of Chinese philosophy and the Western world in philosophy. 37

The reader can see that the above citation from the ISCWP constitution, though in a
concise way, reflects a number of key features of this movement and actually serves as
the guiding line of the association for its agenda and organizational activities.
Sixth, as far as the constitution of the participants in the movement is concerned,
they are limited to neither those who major in traditional Chinese philosophy nor those
who are native Chinese philosophers, but also include scholars from other
philosophical communities of the world (for example, the mainstream philosophical
circle in English-speaking countries). In this aspect and to this extent, the constructiveengagement movement in contemporary studies of Chinese philosophy has already
become an international enterprise (as one significant part of the constructiveengagement-oriented comparative philosophy worldwide or thus oriented world
philosophy); it provides one effective channel by which scholars from different
traditions and/or with distinct styles/orientations of doing philosophy carry out
international cooperation, constructive dialogue and comparative engagement in
studying Chinese philosophy towards world philosophy or doing philosophy in a
global context. For example, in the past decade, some well-respected scholars in the
37

The full text of the ISCWP Constitution (both in English and Chinese) is available from the ISCWP
website whose current address is http://sangle.web.wesleyan.edu/iscwp/.
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analytic tradition, such as Donald Davidson, Michael Krausz, Ernie Lepore, A. P.
Martinich, Adam Morton, John Searle, Avrum Stroll, and Samuel C. Wheeler have
been drawn to this enterprise. Although Chinese philosophy is not among their area of
specialty, on the one hand, they have made contributions to studying Chinese
philosophy either via their valuable works on some meta-philosophical and/or
methodological issues involved in the constructive engagement of Chinese and
Western philosophy, or directly through exploring some jointly concerned issues in
such studies; on the other hand, they have also more or less benefited from the relevant
resources in Chinese philosophy through such comparative engagement that have
constructively contributed to their own studies.
Seventh, as far as its research outcomes are concerned, the constructiveengagement trend or movement, with the aforementioned systematic efforts, has
already produced substantial results in research on a series of philosophical issues,
neither merely stopping at some sort of armchair speculation of the mere possibility,
nor merely remaining at the level of purely meta-philosophical discussion of how such
constructive engagement is possible, though the latter discussion is necessary and has
provided indispensable theoretic and methodological preparation for its healthy
development, as emphasized before. Such in-depth detailed analysis of how distinct
approaches (for example, Chinese and Western philosophy) to concrete issues can
constructively engage with each other have been given not merely in some individual
scholars‘ works that have contributed to the development of the constructiveengagement movement, but also in some remarkable research results from the recent
collective efforts that have been made expressly for the constructive-engagement
purpose.38
Eighth, as far as its relation to contemporary philosophy is concerned, the
movement is especially sensitive to various resources of the post-Kantian stage of
modern philosophy, or sometimes labeled ‗contemporary philosophy‘ in its broad
sense, especially those of 20th century contemporary philosophy, in both the analytic
and ―Continental‖ tradition. The reason is this. One primary purpose of the
constructive-engagement strategy in studying Chinese and comparative philosophy is
to inquire into how to make contributions to the jointly-concerned issues in the
common enterprise of philosophy; for this purpose, the movement as a whole has paid
much attention to, and has been concerned especially with, two things: (1) distinct
approaches to those issues that have been suggested from other traditions (especially
those in contemporary analytic philosophy and ―Continental‖ philosophy in the
Western tradition), and (2) new developments of philosophy as explored in various
areas of contemporary philosophy. The concern (1) renders the movement comparative
in character, while the concern (2) renders the movement sensitive to the updated
development of philosophy and conceptual-explanatory resources in contemporary
38

Among others, two recent anthology volumes respectively on the constructive engagement of
Davidson‘s philosophy and Chinese philosophy and of Searle‘s philosophy and Chinese philosophy, for
the two aforementioned collective research projects, have already come out in print (see Mou 2006a and
Mou 2008a). For my own explorations in these two connections, see Mou 2006b and Mou 2008b.
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philosophy; both concerns (1) and (2) render the movement especially active in
comparative engagement with various distinct approaches from other traditions or
styles/orientations in contemporary philosophy and in adoption of various relevant
conceptual-explanatory resources developed in contemporary philosophy. 39
Ninth, as far as its own standard for philosophical scholarship is concerned, the
constructive-engagement agenda and fruitful research results of the movement with the
preceding characteristics have raised a higher standard for the philosophical
scholarship of studying Chinese philosophy and comparative (Chinese-Western)
philosophy to this extent: the philosophical (instead of merely historical) studies of
Chinese philosophy needs in-depth understanding and command (not merely
introductory-level knowledge) of the developments of contemporary philosophy in
various closely related central areas together with their conceptual and explanatory
resources, instead of treating them as things irrelevant or alien. It has been realized that
such understanding is not a mere preference but a must for the constructiveengagement purpose and agenda. In other words, when carrying out studies of Chinese
philosophy for the sake of constructive-engagement, one cannot be satisfied merely
with an introductory level of knowledge of relevant subjects and their related
conceptual-explanatory resources in contemporary philosophy; rather, one needs to
have an updated, in-depth understanding of them, including a careful reading of the
relevant literature of contemporary philosophy and being sensitive to its new
developments on relevant fronts.
Tenth, as far as its fundamental nature and direction is concerned, the movement is
part of world philosophy (or part of comparative philosophy in general as doing
philosophy in a global context), instead of a mere local one associated with Chinese
philosophy alone or comparative studies of Chinese and Western philosophy alone, in
the following two senses or connections. (1) As far as its fundamental direction is
concerned, as already highlighted before, one fundamental agenda of the movement is
a general constructive-engagement strategy: to inquire into how, via reflective criticism
and self-criticism, distinct modes of thinking, methodological approaches, visions,
insights, substantial points of view, or conceptual and explanatory resources fro m
different philosophical traditions and/or from various styles/orientations of doing
philosophy (including those from the complex array of distinct styles/orientations of
doing philosophy within the same tradition), can learn from each other and jointly
contribute to the common philosophical enterprise and/or a series of issues or topics of
philosophical significance, which can be jointly concerned through appropriate
philosophical interpretation and/or from a broader philosophical vantage point. In this
39 For example, to jointly implement the two related concerns in this connection, the ISCWP as one
contributing force to the movement has established its workshop-roundtable series, i.e., ISCWP‘s
Beijing Roundtable on Contemporary Philosophy, which directly and explicitly address the two
concerns in a joint way. Now the Beijing Roundtable on Contemporary Philosophy has already
successfully held five workshops respectively in the summers of 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008 and 2009 and
well implemented the agenda in this regard.
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way, the issues and concerns under its reflective examination are eventually general
and associated with cross-traditions instead of idiosyncratically holding for Chinese
philosophy alone. (2) As far as its basic methodological strategy is concerned, in view
of its foregoing fundamental agenda, the constructive-engagement movement in
modern Chinese philosophy is not limited to its constructive engagement with Western
philosophy but also with other philosophical traditions, as well as constructive
engagement between distinct movements within Chinese philosophy. To this extent,
constructive engagement between Chinese and Western philosophy can serve as a
methodological template for the constructive engagement between any two (or more
than two) seemingly competing approaches in philosophical inquiries towards world
philosophy, say, between the Chinese tradition and other non-Western philosophical
traditions.
I contend that the foregoing ten characteristic features shown in the recent
prominent case of the constructive-engagement trend or movement in contemporary
studies of Chinese and comparative Chinese-Western philosophy have their general
philosophical implications and morals for our colleagues whose primary expertise lie
in other traditions or other styles/orientations of doing philosophy but who share the
same fundamental constructive-engagement goal in their philosophical inquiries.
Indeed, I hope that this case analysis has illustrated how, through the reflective practice
of constructive-engagement, those (individually and/or collectively) whose primary
research areas lie in one tradition (in this case, Chinese philosophy) or whose primary
methodological approach focuses on one style/orientation (in this case, some
representative style in Chinese philosophy) can learn from other traditions/orientations
of philosophy and thus enhance the philosophical scholarship of their home area and/or
their primary approach and contribute to the common philosophical enterprise. The
same moral can be presented from the point of view of a philosopher from another
tradition. 40
*
*
*
In this ―Journal Theme Introduction‖, first, I have characterized the identity and nature
of comparative philosophy as understood in a philosophical way and as explored in this
Journal. Second, through needed conceptual and explanatory resources and a metamethodological framework, I have further elaborated some central methodological
emphases of the constructive-engagement strategy of comparative philosophy and
explained how the constructive engagement strategy is possible. Third, I have
illustrated the strategy of constructive-engagement and drawn some morals and
methodological templates that have general significance through a case analysis
40 In this connection, we might take a real-life figure, John Searle, as example: the morals of such
constructive engagement are well recorded in print through the engaging contributions by the
participants of the foregoing two identities (those whose primary research areas include Chinese
philosophy and those whose primary research areas do not include Chinese philosophy but analytic
philosophy) in the monograph anthology Searle’s Philosophy and Chinese Philosophy: Constructive
Engagement (see Mou 2008a).
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concerning studies of Chinese and comparative Chinese-Western philosophy,
Now, with all the foregoing explanation, elaboration, clarification and illustrations,
I summarize the orientation, emphasis, coverage and goal of the Journal in a way that
prospective authors and readers can easily capture its points. The coverage of the
journal Comparative Philosophy is not restricted to, but can include, any particular
comparative-engagement pairs of traditions/styles of doing philosophy (e.g., the EastWest, South-North, or analytic-'Continental'), in view of the common philosophical
enterprise and series of issues or topics of philosophical interest and significance.
Generally speaking, the emphasis of the Journal, regarding conceptual/explanatory
resources and modes of thinking in philosophy, is not exclusive to any ad hoc way of
thinking (e.g., neither the Greek-style nous alone nor the Chinese-style dao alone) but
inclusive; but, specifically speaking, this emphasis is also sensitive to the nature and
features of specific philosophical issues/topics and the demand of situations. On the
other hand, the Journal is inclusive but not merely for the sake of being aware of views
from other traditions or styles of doing philosophy without critical engagement. The
Journal emphasizes critical engagement but does not go without serious consideration
of positive constructive contribution. As highlighted at the outset, the Journal explicitly
emphasizes the constructive engagement of distinct approaches in light of critical
examination: it is to inquire into how, via reflective criticism (including self-criticism)
and argumentation, distinct modes of thinking, methodological approaches, visions,
insights, substantial points of view, or conceptual and explanatory resources from
different philosophical traditions and/or different styles/orientations of doing
philosophy (within one tradition or from different traditions) can learn from each other
and jointly contribute to our understanding and treatment of a series of issues, themes
or topics of philosophical significance, which can be jointly concerned through
philosophical interpretation and/or from a broader philosophical vantage point. The
international journal Comparative Philosophy sets out to make its substantial
contribution to the common philosophical enterprise through this way.
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ABSTRACT: There is very little study of Latin American philosophy in the English-speaking
philosophical world. This can sometimes lead to the impression that there is nothing of
philosophical worth in Latin American philosophy or its history. The present article offers
some reasons for thinking that this impression is mistaken, and indeed, that we ought to have
more study of Latin American philosophy than currently exists in the English-speaking
philosophical world. In particular, the article argues for three things: (1) an account of
cultural resources that is useful for illuminating the fact of cultural differences and variations
in cultural complexity, (2) a framework for understanding the value of philosophy, and (3) the
conclusion that there is demonstrable value to Latin American philosophy and its study.
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1. PHILOSOPHY‟S CULTURE OF SILENCE ABOUT CULTURE
At least in the United States, there are not many philosophers in the “analytic” core of
the profession who make it their task to write about the nature, status, and direction of
culture. What work there is tends to be about the implications of culture, its social
construction and its effects. Almost nothing is done at the level of offering a
fundamental ontology of culture. There are a number of reasons why this might be so.
Perhaps there is a sense that culture is too amorphous a thing for serious, rigorous
philosophical reflection. Perhaps many philosophers simply prefer to avoid running the
risks that are endemic to reflection on culture. Philosophical writing on cultural
differences has been plagued by an unflattering collection of vices—racism, sexism,
Eurocentrism, and so on—so, maybe we are better off passing over these topics in
silence.
Nonetheless, there are things to be said about culture. My aim here is to examine
the relationship of culture to philosophy, and in particular to explore some
consequences of thinking about philosophy in terms of something I call cultural
_____________________
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resources. This account is not intended to provide anything like an all-encompassing
picture of the fundamental ontology of culture. At best, it is a very small contribution
to a part of that much larger task. All I hope to show is that thinking in terms of
cultural resources can help us make sense of a range of different phenomena, including
one of several values in philosophical work, and the value of doing the history of
philosophy. I go on to extend this account to the somewhat peculiar case of philosophy
done in Latin America, and the issue of whether we ought to treat it as a significant or
relevant part of the study of philosophy in the United States. I will argue that —
contrary to what many might assume— it is plausible that philosophy here in the
United States would have benefited if we had been allocating some resources to the
study of Latin American philosophy all along. So, really, I aim to argue for three things:
(1) the utility of my account of cultural resources for illuminating the fact of cultural
differences and the existence of differences in cultural complexity, (2) a framework for
understanding the value of philosophy, and (3) the conclusion that there is
demonstrable value in the study of Latin American philosophy. But first—some
preliminaries.

2. SOME TRUISMS AND OVER-SIMPLICATIONS ABOUT CULTURE
In what follows, I will assume the truth of the following two claims:
(1) There are cultural differences.
(2) Cultural differences can have consequences.
Regarding the first claim — that there are cultural differences — I take it that this
much is obvious. Any doubts you might have about this will go away very rapidly if
you do much traveling. 1 Even though it is easy to get consensus about the fact of
cultural differences, it is remarkably difficult to say philosophically illuminating things
about these differences. Demarcating differences and similarities is no easy task. It is
notoriously difficult to describe cultural differences without building in biased or
otherwise partial assessments of what is being described. Even so, those differences are
there. There are, of course, all the obvious differences we point to in our varied cultural
celebrations — food, music, dance, language — but there are also the harder to specify
differences of implicit values, social organization, and what we might somewhat
romantically call “the rhythms of life.” To a greater and lesser extent all of these
differences, both obvious and subtle, are the domains of various disciplines— cultural
1 One does not have to leave one‟s home country for this to happen. I was born and raised in the U.S.
However, I experienced some degree of culture shock when I moved from the Central Valley of
California to Northern Indiana. What made it especially shocking was that I had recently returned from a
trip to Mexico City, and in comparison, Indiana was considerably more foreign to me than Mexico City
was. I never expected to undergo culture shock in my own country, much less more culture shock than
when visiting a different country.
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anthropology, sociology, cultural studies, and so on. But it is notable that most
Anglophone philosophers have had little interaction with these various fields. 2
The second claim, that cultural differences have consequences should be obvious as
well. Empirical work speaks to this claim, but if you accept that there are cultural
differences (which you should), then it would be very difficult to argue that those
differences do not have consequences. Indeed, it is difficult to see how cultural
differences could be obvious and detectable if they did not have consequences.

3. SOME TROUBLES ABOUT CULTURAL DIFFERENCES
So, I will assume the truth of these two ideas: that there are cultural differences, and
that these differences make a difference. This is where the trouble starts, though. Once
we admit that cultural differences can make a difference, it looks like (at least in
principle) there is no reason why the differences made by culture are always positive.
We tend to emphasize the benefits of cultural diversity. We tend to celebrate the
various advantages that multiple cultural affiliations can bring to an organization or to
the life of individuals. But if cultural differences can bring with them various
advantages, there is no obvious reason why they cannot bring with them various
disadvantages. And, this makes cultural differences problematic in a number of ways.
It raises troubling questions about what sorts of cultures individuals, groups, or
populations are better off having. It makes us wonder about both the costs and benefits
of cultural changes. It raises worries about group identity and autonomy. It also raises
worries about whether cultural change is threatening to group identity. But perhaps
most troubling is what happens when the varied benefits and costs of a culture interact
with what Nietzsche called “the instinct for rank.” If cultural differences can make
better and worse differences, you might start to wonder whether there are better and
worse cultures. You might even go on to say things like this:
The fact that, out of the many cultures which have appeared in history, only three
survive — the Indian, the Chinese, and the Western — seems to suggest that these
three possess some particular advantage over the others. In my judgment, this
superiority consists in the fact that the three, in contrast to all the others, contain an
answer (each a radically different one, of course) to the most profound and permanent
questions and needs of man . . .. But while others were unable to supply more than
myths, which in the course of time wear out and lose their charm, or halfway goals
that proved unsatisfactory, the three mentioned above have each found a great clue or
goal which has determined their organization.3
2 On this matter, things are somewhat better in the ostensibly “Continental” parts of the profession. But
my aim here is to offer a philosophical framework for understanding some culturally complex matters
for those parts of the profession not already enriched by systematic reflection on culture. So, consider
this a tentative first step at establishing one kind of bridge between those parts of the profession invested
in reflections on culture and that large part of the profession detached from reflections about culture as
such.
3 I‟ve substituted „Western‟ for the translation‟s „Occidental‟. The original text is (Romero 1949, 403).
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That is a passage from a 1949 essay “Man and Culture” by Francisco Romero,
perhaps the most influential Argentinean philosopher of the 20 th century. It is, I think,
clearly problematic in a number of ways. Among the problems are these: (1) Romero
simply assumes that it is obvious what culture is —but it is not; (2) he gives us no
way to make sense of cultural identity over time: that is, how to understand the idea
that we are talking about the same Western culture from 10AD Athens, Greece to 2009
upstate New York; (3) He seems to assume that the survival of a culture is
straightforwardly a matter of a culture‟s response to issues of meaning and “permanent
questions” and not, for example, a function of accidents of history, technology,
geographic location, and so on; (4) He ignores the fact that there are plenty of cultures
that have survived for considerable time (or that are currently existing) that are not
obviously Western, Chinese, or Indian. For example, there are several varieties of
African cultures, various cultures throughout what we call “The Middle East”, Japan
and other parts of the world, that have had or continue to have considerable longevity;
(5) He does nothing to justify the obviously problematic reduction to umbrella
categories what are, at best, webs of distinct cultures internal to the West, China, or
India; (6) Finally, Romero seems blind to the possibility of cultures that might survive
in various unobvious ways, as in the case of crypto-Judaism, or in Bonfil Batalla‟s idea
that lurking under contemporary Mexico there is a México profundo that is the cultural
legacy of an older Mesoamerican civilization.
So, there are a number of troubling aspects to this passage. Still, we should be
careful not to overclaim what is objectionable about it. Susana Nuccetelli has
maintained “[Romero‟s] assertion plainly implies that the cultures of the indigenous
peoples of Latin America, among others, were inferior compared to the Indian, the
Chinese, and the Western cultures. If Romero is right, the consequence would indeed
be unfortunate, for then the pervasive neglect of indigenous Latin American cultures
would be entirely justified” (Nuccetelli 2002, 83). This diagnosis is erroneous or
misleading on several accounts.
First, we should not be mislead about the inferiority/superiority distinction used by
Romero. In this passage, Romero makes it clear that the sense in which he is evaluating
a culture as superior or inferior simply has to do with its survival. 4 Cultures that
survive for longer (or perhaps, at until the present) are at least with respect to survival
superior to those that do not survive as long (or, perhaps that do not currently survive).
This entails nothing about superiority in some overarching sense, and it entails nothing
about the intrinsic value (or possible lack there of) of these or any other cultures,
including those that have not survived, or have not survived for very long. It is entirely
consistent with what Romero claims in this passage that a culture might have a high
intrinsic value but be inferior with respect to the issue of survival. And, it is entirely
consistent with this that the indigenous people of Latin America might have had

4 This is also consistent with his usage of these ideas in the rest of the chapter from which this passage
is taken.
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cultures that were superior to Indian, Chinese, and Western cultures with respect to
some standard other than survival.
Second, contrary to what Nuccetelli suggests, nothing in the quotation from
Romero speaks to whether “the pervasive neglect of indigenous Latin American
cultures is justified”. Judgments about the longevity of a culture do not entail that
shorter-lived cultures are not worth studying. Nor would this be entailed by something
like a judgment of the all-things-considered superiority of Indian, Chinese, and
Western cultures. That I think Chrysippus is superior to Leibniz does not mean that I
have to think Leibniz isn‟t worth studying, or that we would be justified in neglecting
his work. Similarly, even if Romero were saying that Indian, Chinese, and Western
cultures are all things considered superior cultures, it does not follow that we are
justified in neglecting other cultures. Or, to put the point differently, the justification
for studying a culture need not flow from (i) whether the considered culture is longlived, (ii) whether it is excellent at answering what Romero calls the “profound and
permanent questions and needs of mankind” or (iii) whether it is superior in some all-in
sense. We might have a fully adequate justification for studying a culture if we have
something to learn from it, or if we simply find it interesting. We need not draw the
conclusion that a view like Romero‟s requires that we dismiss indigenous thinking, or
for that matter, the study of Latin American thought more generally.
Although there is still plenty that is problematic about Romero‟s remarks, I do
think there are provocative kernels of truth in them: cultures do vary, cultures provide
resources for individuals and societies, those resources may vary from culture to
culture, and there might be a way to think comparatively about the cultural resources
had by societies. What I‟d like to do now is to think about one way of making sense of
these ideas in a fairly systematic way, and to explore what some of the consequences of
these ideas might be for the value of philosophy.

4. SKETCH OF A THEORY OF CULTURAL RESOURCES
The fundamental nature of culture, the theoretical work of the category, and the
ontological commitments of talk about culture are all subjects of contention across a
variety of disciplines. Fortunately, I am not going to try to say anything interesting
about culture per se. For present purposes, we can define culture as a pattern of learned,
shared norms and attendant behaviors, judgments, and affective responses. One can
surely quibble with aspects of this construal of culture, but nothing much depends on
its particulars. Instead, my focus is on something I will call a cultural resource.
A cultural resource is, in the characteristic case, any entity, practice, pattern of
judgment, or collection thereof whose nature and origin depend at least in part on the
shared norms of a community of intentional agents. 5 To some ears, this may sound
5 This is not intended to be anything like necessary and sufficient conditions for what constitutes a
cultural resource. Instead, my hope is to characterize some of the typical features and functions of
cultural resources, recognizing that there will surely be degenerate cases, cases that only partially or
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very mysterious. The reality of such objects, however, is completely familiar. When I
speak of cultural resources, I speak of ideas or practices with a kind of significance that
depends on the fact of our being intentional, norm-using creatures. So, objects as
diverse as novels, wedding ceremonies, philosophy lectures, telenovelas, birthdays,
felonies, and handshakes all count as cultural resources in my sense. These objects may
be in some sense physical, but their reality is importantly dependent on our collective
mental life; their currency is ideational or symbolic, and their structure is at least partly
given by the cognitive, affective, and behavioral norms in virtue of which the objects
or products are apprehended. The ontology of cultural resources thus has less to do
with the arrangement of physical objects and more to do with the arrangement of new
norms or the reconfiguration of old norms, whatever that comes to.
We might say that cultural resources are the result of the operations of
sophisticated forms of agency in the world. Some cultural resources arise as happy
accidents arising inadvertently. Other times, the development of cultural resources is
the principal aim of an activity. In either case, cultural resources tend to have cultural
utility. Cultural utility is anything that assists in the flourishing, survival, or
perpetuation of a given culture, understood in very broad ways. So, for example, a way
of greeting ones neighbor might have the cultural utility of perpetuating certain kinds
of social relations that are in turn part of a web of practices that jointly contribute to the
survival, flourishing, or perpetuating of a people or culture. Depending on the cultural
resource, cultural utility will frequently overlap with other kinds of utility, for example:
economic, practical, or hedonic utility. However, connections between cultural and
other kinds of utility will typically be contingent and historically bounded.
Cultural production is just that— the production, by whatever means, of cultural
resources. Sometimes this production is original and other times it is reproductive (that
is, reproducing an already existing cultural resource). Cultural resources can also be
renewable resources. That is, a given cultural resource can be repeatedly used as a
source of new or reproductive cultural production. For example, part of a song might
be sampled for a newer musical composition, and in turn that newer composition
(including the sample) might be sampled and transformed for the purposes of a newer
instance of music.6
incompletely manifest the functions and properties I am about to outline. As I use the term, cultural
resources is a broader category than meme (e.g., Dawkins) or cultural capital (Bourdieu). Some
sociologists use a notion of cultural resources to track something like Bourdieu‟s notion of cultural
capital. As will be clear in a bit, if it isn‟t already, I have a somewhat different notion at work in my
account.
6 An example: consider the rhythm line used in Missy Elliott‟s track “Get Ur Freak On.” It was
subsequently sampled, and played backwards as a rhythm line in Bubba Sparxx‟s “Ugly.” Part of what
makes this an innovative instance of cultural resource recycling has to do with the contrasting content of
the songs and the nature of the performer— Missy Elliott is an African American woman touting her sex
appeal (“I look like a Halle Berry poster”) and exhorting listeners to sexual activity whereas Bubba
Sparxx‟s song is about, among other things, his resignation to the fact that he and his friends‟ sexual
appeal is limited (“let‟s face it, none of us will ever date a model . . . it‟s getting ugly”). The significance
of context for cultural recycling can extend out quite broadly from the particulars of a given case.
Cultural recycling can be cultural appropriation, and the mainstreaming of “black” music has historically
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Importantly, cultural resources can range from simple to complex. That is, cultural
resources exist on a continuum of complexity where some resources contain features
that are more complex than others. It is hard to give any well-defined account of these
things, but the idea should be intuitive enough— other things being equal, a symphony
is more complex than a single note, a painting is more complex than a single daub of
color, an epic poem is more complex than a single word.
The distinction between simple and complex cultural resources does not track a
distinction between “high” and “low” culture. Something we learned from both
Shakespeare and Jazz is that low culture resources can turn out to be as complex as any
high culture resource. Moreover, that there is a distinction between simple and
complex cultural resources does not mean that we have perfect epistemic access to
every instance of that distinction. We can be insensitive to complexity for a variety of
reasons. For instance, features of our own culture, or a lack of the right kind of
acculturation, may prevent us from recognizing a complex cultural resource. A striking
example of this kind of imperfect epistemic access comes out in Gunther Schuller‟s
Early Jazz (as quoted in Nussbaum 1997, 163):
Schuller describes the difficulty Western musicologists had in even notating African
music, when they first began to do fieldwork in Africa. Before the fieldwork of Jones
(an Englishman who had lived most of his life in Africa), the expectation of visiting
scholars was that they would encounter „primitive‟ musical forms. But Europeantrained musical ears, accustomed to hearing all voices strike together on a downbeat,
proved unable to notate correctly the complicated polyphonies of African ensemble
music, in which often each of twelve or more voices will go its separate way, weaving
and interweaving. Reconstructions based on the flawed notation seemed to Africans
laughably crude, in the way in which a child‟s copy of complex artwork would seem
crude. Nor could European ears catch the small rhythmic differences that were crucial
to the correct notation of African song, as intervals of a twelfth of a second or less
were routinely deployed by the African performer. European music simply did not
operate with such small rhythmic intervals, so European-trained notators made errors.

This example is remarkable for several reasons. First, it illustrates the difficulty of
recognizing cultural complexity even when presented with it. European musicologists
were not equipped to recognize or detect the complexity that was actually there. In
particular, being familiar with one species of complexity in a domain of culture —for
example, European symphonies— is no guarantee of accurate detection, and in fact
might be a hurdle to it, when dealing with a different species of complexity in the very
same general cultural domain. Second, the example illustrates that cultural complexity
is hardly uniform internal to a culture. That a group of people might have complex
cultural resources in one domain (e.g., symphonic music) does not mean that it
worked through the redeployment of black musical forms by non-black performers. In this case, though,
Missy Elliott was working with considerable success in an already mainstreamed music genre, whereas
the less famous Bubba Sparx (presumably perceived as something of an outsider to the genre even after
it became mainstream) explicitly acknowledges his piggybacking on a version of Missy Elliott‟s beat—
albeit while noting her insistence that her music is “copywritten, so don‟t copy me.” In short, context can
play a large and complex role in determining the content and significance of a recycled cultural resource.
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possesses all the possible complex cultural resources in the more general domain
(music). And, that one has complex cultural resources in music tells us nothing about
whether that group of people has similarly complex cultural resources in other domains.
As the music example reminds us, the possession of economic and technological power
is no guarantee or even an indicator of complex cultural resources in the myriad of
domains of human concern. Writ large, this means that we should not expect that our
society — immensely complex in some economic and technological ways — is
complex in other ways, or even in all ways economic and technological. Similarly, we
should not expect that societies with comparatively simple technological and economic
resources are comparatively simple in most or all domains.
Complex cultural resources provide a distinctive opportunity for reuse. A simple
object usually permits a wide variety of reuses, but a complex cultural resource is
partitionable to a degree unavailable to simples. On one level, a complex cultural
resource typically involves a range of more basic cultural resources, so in some sense it
has the potential utility of whatever its constitutive resources might possess. More
importantly, however, complex cultural resources typically involve an arrangement of
relations among more basic cultural resources that is oftentimes novel, useful, or
illuminating. 7 At least in the typical case (and there are doubtlessly atypical cases), the
greater the complexity, the more ways in which it is likely to have some kind of
usefulness, both as a matter of decomposition into its more basic resources but also in
terms of the relations it suggests or makes possible. Consider, for example, the Iliad.
Without the Iliad, there would be no Aeneid, without which there would be no Inferno,
without which there would be no Paradise Lost, and so on, right up to O Brother
Where Art Thou. One need not appreciate all the resultant products to appreciate that
the cultural utility produced by the Iliad is vast. It is something that was made possible,
if I am right, in substantial part because of the complexity of the work.
Of course, it isn‟t just complexity that accounts for the Iliad‟s fecundity. Partly it is
a matter of how accessible it is to audiences. But this is just to return to the epistemic
point— different objects are differently accessible, and accessibility is a function of
object, context, and perceivers. But that we have imperfect access to complexity does
not mean that it isn‟t there.
In sum, then: (1) the complexity of a cultural resource can be independent of the
knowing powers of any particular individual (2) a resources‟ complexity may have
nothing to do with the ethnic or social-economic status of its producer, (3) and ceteris
paribus, complex cultural resources typically provide more long term cultural utility
than simple cultural resources.

7 It is possible that a simple cultural resource might turn out to be more valuable in the long run than a
complex cultural resource. One never knows what the vagaries of history will make true. But it does
seem to be safer to bet on the long-standing value of a cultural resource with great complexity (like the
Iliad, for instance) than one without a great deal of complexity (a Coca-Cola advertisement, say).
Though, as Andy Warhol taught us, even a Coke ad can turn out to have some potential for cultural reuse.
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What these points allow us to see is how those kernels of truth in Romero‟s
reflections on culture need not be as problematic as they might initially seem. While
we might acknowledge that there may be differences between the number of complex
cultural resources had by a culture or society, these differences need not be connected
to the actual survival of a culture, or its technological or world-historical status.
However, the difference-making elements (the number of complex cultural resources)
will be often be invisible to cultural outsiders. Indeed, as a matter of our actual
epistemic circumstances, it may never be possible to make reliable judgments about
comparative cultural sophistication. But this does not deny that there are genuine
cultural differences, and that differences can and do have real consequences.

5. NEW WORK FOR A THEORY OF CULTURAL RESOURCES
One upshot of my account is that it provides one explanation of why humanities
departments in U.S. universities are vital to the production and preservation of culture.
In our society, universities are one of the primary institutions responsible for the
discovery, development and propagation of complex cultural resources. Of course,
universities have other functions as well. And, other institutions have functions that
overlap with these aspects of a university (e.g., libraries and museums). But a crucial
justification of the university system is its unique role in the traffic of cultural utility.
By preserving, producing, and propagating complex cultural resources, the university
contributes in a profound and systematic way to the attainment of cultural utility—
something that often overlaps with other more familiar forms of utility.
It goes without saying that these functions do not operate in a vacuum. The
relationship of a university system to the other parts of society is also important for
how well a university does with respect to the aims of protecting and producing those
resources with cultural utility. But in the contemporary context an effective university
system will be involved in a complex exchange of cultural resources both internal and
external to the academic world. Individuals and institutions take cultural resources
discovered or propagated internal to an academic context and transform them, in turn
creating new cultural resources (movies, music, literature, tennis shoes, sports, etc.)
which feed back into the academic system.
The humanities, those oft-unappreciated disciplines in the university system, are
deeply involved in the production and preservation of complex cultural resources. The
discipline of philosophy is a species of this more general project of producing and
preserving complex cultural resources. Philosophy shares with other disciplines the
general task of discovering, constructing, and preserving complex ideas with a wide
degree of cultural utility. What is, I think, distinctive about philosophy is that it is
concerned with, roughly, the development and preservation of complex cultural
resources in domains where we have no reliable method for determining truths. This is
why the scope of philosophy is so broad, and at the same time, it is why, if we focus on
identifiable, demonstrable truths that it has produced, those achievements can fade to
invisibility. On the model I am suggesting, philosophy is, roughly, our collective
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attempt to puzzle out issues in just those contexts where we have no reliable method
for determining what is probably true. When we do determine a methodology that is
reliable in some domain, and we can point to markers of its success, we tend to regard
it as something other than philosophy in the strict and proper sense (Vargas 2007, 64).
But this is only to say that the barrenness of philosophy is only apparent. If, instead, we
conceive of it as a field that specializes in generating tools and ideas for precisely those
places where we have impoverished ways of understanding things, philosophy‟s
contribution becomes more visible. Indeed, by this measure, the body of complex
cultural resources produced by philosophers likely outstrips most known disciplines.
(Please note that this story does not exclude the possibility of other accounts of the
value of the humanities, philosophy, and so on! I believe that there are other, nonmutually-exclusive accounts of the value of these things, but the present argument shall
just make use of this particular conception of the value of these things.)
This also goes some distance towards explaining why the study of the history of
philosophy should have an important place in the profession and teaching of
philosophy. The history of philosophy is the history of a succession of immensely
complex cultural resources, by some of our best minds. Although our current beliefs
differ significantly, and in some cases differ radically from the presuppositions of
many historical figures, we cannot say in advance which historical ideas will turn out
to have utility in the future. We cannot anticipate when some conceptual innovation,
some idea, or some turn of argument will yield a new framework for understanding
ourselves, or the universe. However, one effective way of aiding this process is to not
lose track of those innovations, ideas, and arguments that we have already developed.
The only way to preserve our access to those resources, then, is to ensure that our
community of scholars includes those whose business it is to study the history of
philosophy. Only then can we have some hope of not losing the resources that are
already ours. This task requires genuine, dedicated scholars. It is not a simple matter to
study resources created in a context remote from our own. Recall those African
musicians whose music was so badly reproduced by early European musicologists.
Thus far, my account has been operating at a fairly abstract level of description. It
may help to think about a handful of concrete cases of what are at least prima facie
examples of the sort of complex cultural resources developed, discovered, and/or
propagated by the discipline of philosophy. Here are three examples.
Social expectations and the construction of individual capacities
An important recurrent theme in foundational philosophical work on gender and race
has been the idea that social expectations can construct the kinds of capacities that
people have. So, for example, Dubois argued that social expectations concerning
“Negroes” structured the actual capacities they came to have. And, perhaps even more
famously, John Stuart Mill and Mary Wollstonecraft each argued that social
expectations about women structured the kinds of capacities that women have (Mill
1869). If you don‟t believe that women are capable of scientific achievement, then you
won‟t bother to provide them with the sort of education required for scientific

Comparative Philosophy 1.1 (2010)

VARGAS

43
achievement. As a result, in societies with those expectations, few if any women will
have the requirements for producing scientific achievements, which in turn vindicates
the view that women lack the capacity for serious scientific work.
Values and theory underdetermination
Over the past few decades there has been an interesting discussion in the philosophy of
science on the appropriate role of values and social and political ends in the
interpretation of scientific data (Anderson 1995, 27-58). An important development in
this literature was the argument, advanced by some feminist epistemologists and
philosophers of science, that value-laden aims (e.g., the aim of gender equity) play an
appropriate role in theory selection in cases where the evidence underdetermines what
scientific theory we should accept. And, since the evidence at least very frequently is
consistent with a range of possible scientific theories, value-laden selection of theories
may be frequently permissible. Although this remains a subject of dispute, it is clear
that reflections on these issues have constituted a general contribution to philosophical
reflections on knowledge and scientific theorizing.
The relevance of psychology for ethics and political philosophy
In her landmark 1958 paper, “Modern Moral Philosophy” G.E.M. Anscombe argued
that we cannot profitably engage in normative ethics without having a better grasp of a
range of psychological issues (Anscombe 1981, 26-42). This is an idea that is picked
up and developed by a number of influential figures in moral political philosophy,
including Richard Brandt and even (surprisingly enough) John Rawls. In his essay
“The Independence of Moral Theory” Rawls writes that:
the further advance of moral philosophy depends upon a deeper understanding of the
structure of moral conceptions and of their connections with human sensibility . . . We
must not turn away from this task because much of it may appear to belong to
psychology or social theory and not to philosophy. For the fact is that others are not
prompted by philosophical inclination to pursue moral theory; yet this motivation is
essential for without it the inquiry has the wrong focus” (Rawls 1999, 302).

Only recently have philosophers begun to make good on these calls to action,
attempting to incorporate work in the various sciences of the mind with philosophical
work in ethics and normative theory (Doris and Stich 2005). Though this project is still
young, it is clearly bearing important fruit. Empirically informed work on
philosophical intuitions, character traits, the nature of rationality, moral motivation,
and so on, are increasingly important for some branches of normative philosophy.
This trio of ideas (or collections of ideas) are instances of complex cultural
resources. These ideas have considerable utility, or at least promise of utility, and they
are the kinds of things with a wide range of re-application and downstream fecundity.
And, I think, the development and propagation of these resources constitute a cultural
achievement that philosophy can rightly claim as its own.
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6. THE VALUE OF PHILOSOPHY: THE LATIN AMERICAN CASE
Suppose you accept my account of complex cultural resources, and suppose you accept
the global account of what the humanities (and philosophy) are engaged in.
Additionally, let us suppose you accept that the examples I have offered constitute
prima facie good cases for a complex cultural resource of the sort that philosophy is
appropriately concerned with. Now let us turn to the Latin American case. Is there any
reason to think that Latin American philosophy might have similar value, from the
perspective of a concern for complex cultural resources? I believe that a compelling
case can be made for the conclusion that there are valuable complex cultural resources
in Latin American philosophy, and consequently, that it merits sustained scholarly
attention in the United States.8
Note, though, that even if we currently have no reason for thinking that the study
of Latin American philosophy will yield the discovery, production, or preservation of
complex cultural resources, the general philosophical community in the United States
simply isn‟t in a position to make a negative assessment about the value of Latin
American philosophy as a field of study. Given the fact that there is little or no
systematic study of Latin American philosophy in the United States, it would surely be
premature to draw a negative conclusion on the basis of a failure to gather evidence.
This would be akin to deciding that a particular person has nothing valuable to say —
without having ever bothered to speak to that person, without having read anything that
person has written, and without learning anything at all about that person. So, to be in a
position to make a negative assessment we would first have to learn something about
Latin American philosophy.
Conveniently enough, however, there is excellent evidence that Latin American
philosophy can and has made contributions of complex cultural resources comparable
to the ones I‟ve cited above. Consider the following passage from Sor Juana Inés de la
Cruz (de la Cruz 2004, 59-60):
You foolish and unreasoning men
Who cast all blame on women,
Not seeing you yourselves are cause
Of the same faults you accuse
. . . You combat their firm resistance,
And then solemnly pronounce
that what you‟ve won through diligence
is proof of women‟s flightiness . . . .
. . . .Why then are you so alarmed
8 None of what follows precludes the possibility that Latin American philosophy is valuable on other
grounds. I am sure that it is. However, what follows is an argument for why given the present account of
cultural resources, it is plausible to think that Latin American philosophy is valuable and worth studying.
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by the fault that is your own?
Wish women to be what you make them,
Or make them what you wish they were.9

The poem from which this is taken, as well as a letter written in defense of her pursuit
of education in the late 1600s, are well-established texts in the canon of Latin
American philosophical texts, and familiar to some readers versed in the history of
feminism. Part of their importance centers on the issue she gives expression to in the
above passages: social expectations and social context structure the capacities and
dispositions of people of her time, and in particular, a strongly patriarchal social
structure is what made women the kinds of persons (flighty, unlearned, etc.) faulted by
the men of that time. This is, of course, to make the point that social expectations can
play an essential role in the construction of capacities in people. And it is a point that
was made by a woman philosopher —a Mexican nun —, in a philosophical context,
literally centuries before similar claims by John Stuart Mill, Mary Wollstonecraft, and
W.E.B. Dubois. So, a complex cultural resource like the idea that social expectations
can structure capacities of individuals and groups not only can be developed in the
Latin American philosophical context— it was developed there, and earlier at that.10
I now want to turn to briefly consider the work of a more recent Latin American
philosopher, José Vasconelos. Though he wrote extensive treatises on metaphysics,
aesthetics, and the history of philosophy, in the United States Vasconcelos is
principally known (if he is known at all) for his work, especially in The Cosmic Race,
on philosophical issues about race, and in particular, his promotion of race mixing in
Latin America. However, some of his best work is in a neglected essay from Aspects of
Mexican Civilization. There, he concludes that the scientific evidence about the
benefits and costs of race mixing are unclear. The available biological, genetic, and
cultural data of his time did not, in his judgment, settle whether race mixing is
generally positive, or even what its principle effects might be. What is interesting,
though, is what he goes on to argue. Vasconelos maintains that practical or normative
considerations can play an appropriate role in theory selection, especially in light of the
particular cultural role played by theories of mixed race. As he puts it: “If all nations
then build theories to justify their policies or to strengthen their deeds, let us develop in
Mexico our own theories; or, at least, let us be certain, that we choose among the
foreign theories of thought that stimulate our growth, rather than restrain it.”

9 In Gracia and Millán-Zaibert, eds. Latin American Philosophy for the 21st Century, Amherst, NY:
Prometheus, 2004, pp. 59-60.
10 Notice that the success or failure of the argument does not directly hinge on chronology. I mention
chronology for two reasons, though. First, the earlier advent of these ideas in Latin America makes it
clear that their development in Latin America weren‟t simply later appropriations of the more familiar
examples known to Anglophone philosophers. Second, the development of a valuable notion elsewhere
can suggest the possibility that the utility of that idea might have become available to us (in the
Anglophone world) sooner if we had been paying closer attention to philosophical work in Latin
America. I return to this idea and its limitations later in the article.
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(Vasconcelos 1926, 96)11 His view is not just that we can pick any scientific theory we
like. We are appropriately constrained by what the available empirical data shows.
However, in cases where the data does not favor one particular theory over another,
and given that the issue is something we have reason to settle, then consideration of
things like cultural uplift, national development, and so on, can provide adequate
reason to favor one view over another. And, as he observes, these value-laden
considerations drive theory construction in a good number of cases.
Vasconcelos‟ move is, of course, the kind of thing that has been said in recent
debates in the philosophy of science and in epistemology. And, notably, Vasconcelos‟
explicit use of this idea antedates by half a century the deployment of these ideas in the
context of Anglo-American epistemology and philosophy of science. 12
I want to conclude by briefly considering the work of one more philosopher in the
Latin American canon. In 1934, the Mexican philosopher Samuel Ramos published an
extremely influential book, Profile of Man and Culture in Mexico (Ramos 1962). In
that work, he endeavored to describe the character flaws and attendant cultural defects
of then-contemporary Mexicans. Though the book was part of an already existing
tradition of Latin American speculation about what was flawed or problematic about
various national or regional characters 13, Ramos‟ book spawned several generations of
competing and counter-diagnoses of widely variable philosophical sophistication, the
most prominent of which is Octavio Paz‟s Labyrinth of Solitude. What is remarkable
about Ramos‟ text is his insistence that the key to understanding the moral and cultural
defects of Mexicans is to be found in the careful deployment of scientific psychology,
particularly the work of Alfred Adler. On Ramos‟ model, moral psychology is subject
to regional variation, and variations can only be illuminatingly studied against the
backdrop of an empirically informed investigation in to the psychological mechanisms
that underpin moral, social, and political phenomena. Similarly, any normative theory
about how Mexicans ought to be, whether morally, culturally, or politically, would
have to be similarly sensitive to the best going accounts of psychology (especially what
we would now call social psychology). Of course, Ramos‟s vision of these things, and
his use of Adler are importantly at odds with what we would recognize as the best
current accounts of human psychology. But that is not the point. The point is that as
early as 1934, there were philosophers who thought that normative theory needed to be
informed by empirically adequate pictures of human beings. 14 In other words, this
11 These remarks are echoed in La raza cósmica, where it is clearer the way in which this sort of view
is of a piece with views about metaphysics and epistemology (Vasconcelos 1997).
12 It is also worth recognizing that Vasconcelos‟ deployment of underdetermination is also
comparatively early in the history of this idea. While versions of it show up prior to Vasconcelos‟ work
(e.g., the late 19th century), his use of this idea nevertheless antedates (for example), Quine‟s famous
discussion of theory underdetermination.
13 This tradition extends well back to the origins of Western philosophical and proto-philosophical
reflection in and about Latin America— including early figures such as Sepulveda, Vitoria, and
Garcilaso de la Vega.
14 One might reply that something true has been going on for much longer in the Anglo-American
tradition. One might cite Herbert Spencer, for instance. But Latin American positivists (inspired by
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too constitutes prima facie evidence that there are complex cultural objects to be found
in Latin American philosophical work that antedates similar achievements in the
Anglo-American context.
These examples all derive from philosophical work on race, identity, and gender in
Latin America. To those familiar with the history of Latin American philosophy, this
will be no surprise at all. Social and political philosophy, of which discussions about
culture, ethnicity, race, and gender all play a part, has been something of first
philosophy in much of the various strands of Latin American philosophy. So, if there
were something of value to be found in the context of Latin American philosophy, it
would likely be found in these areas, areas where Latin American philosophical
traditions are complex and long-standing
Still, it is plausible that with more detailed scholarship, we might successfully
challenge whether one or more of the examples really do constitute an instance of
anticipating ideas well known and celebrated in the Anglo-American tradition. Or
perhaps there are genre considerations that might incline us to throw out one of these
works. For what it is worth, I think these examples will hold up well to extended
scrutiny. And, we would do well to remember that the history of philosophy is littered
with instances where recognizably philosophical works were produced in genres other
than those we currently favor.15 But all this would be to miss the point. My aim is not
to convince you that these cases really do constitute important anticipations of the
Anglo-American tradition. Rather, my point is that we have good prima facie evidence
for thinking that if genuinely complex cultural resources are to be found in philosophy
they can be found in Latin American philosophy.

7. FURTHER OBJECTIONS AND REPLIES
What might a determined critic say in reply to the general line of argument I have been
developing thus far? I find it remarkable that the most common reply is not one that
rejects the substance of the argument, or one that takes issue with my account of the
worth of philosophy and Latin American philosophy‟s similar worth. Instead, the most
Comte) were committed to scientific approaches to the study of moral and social theory around the same
period. And if you really want to push dates, one might construe the position of Las Casas in the famous
debate at Valladolid (in the 1600s) as hinging, in part, on the idea that natural slave theory and the
resultant political theory presumed an empirically irresponsible picture of human motivation and
practices. One might reply by finding an even earlier figure who thought that normative theory in one or
another domain could not fruitfully proceed without getting some of the empirical facts straight.
Irrespective of how all of this all turns out, it should be clear that there is an interesting discussion to be
had about these things. Perhaps the figures we typically celebrate as having sparked this development
might well have been unneeded had we had a philosophical community familiar with ideas produced in
Latin America.
15 For example, if we are to judge as “not philosophical” any work done in the genre of poetry, we
would have to dismiss many works by pre-Socratics, as well as important texts such as Lucretius‟ De
Rerum Natura. It would certainly have come as a surprise to many figures in the post-Hellenic period of
philosophy to learn that Lucretius‟ work did not count as philosophy.
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common reply is, as best as I can make out, one that insists on moving the goalposts.
So, I am told, even though the argument may work as far as it goes, before we bother
with the business of Latin American philosophy what we really need is proof that there
is some worthwhile idea in it now, some idea that does not already have currency in
Anglophone philosophy. This, I am told, is the kind of evidence we need before we
invest resources into the study of Latin American philosophy.
I am convinced this demand can be met, but I remain skeptical that were I to meet
it, the goalposts wouldn‟t move once again. If showing that 20 th century Anglophone
philosophy would have benefited from attention to the history of Latin American
philosophy up through the 1940s is not sufficient to make the case for its worth, then I
doubt that making the case of 21st century Latin American philosophy will suddenly
unleash a torrent of support among my Anglophone philosophical brethren. And why
should it? Anything I would cite as a novel case of innovation that doesn‟t have a track
record in the Anglophone philosophical community could be dismissed precisely
because it lacks that track record.
On the one hand, unless the critic already shares a conviction expressed in the
purported innovation or idea, the purported innovation can be readily dismissed as
insufficiently innovative, mistaken, or otherwise unpromising precisely because its
features are not accepted by the critic, because the intellectual context that make it
plausible is unfamiliar, or because there is no track record of esteem in which the idea
is held by those the critic holds in high regard. On the other hand, if the critic already
shares a conviction expressed in the purported innovation, then here too the example
will fail to persuade. After all, it is no innovation to highlight an idea already had by
the critic. So, the situation is dire.
Of course, a critic could be satisfied if I produced evidence of the philosophical
worth of contemporary Latin American philosophy. And, for the record, I provided
such evidence, elsewhere (Vargas 2007, 77 n.14). Still, my sense is that philosophers
of good will will not need a further argument from the fecundity of contemporary Latin
American philosophy, and any critic insufficiently moved by what I have already
offered might, without much effort, manufacture some further reason for ongoing
dissatisfaction with the new examples I would adduce. 16
A different objection challenges the very idea of there being a significant problem
with the ongoing failure of philosophers in the Anglophone world to study and teach
philosophy produced in Latin America. There are different strands of this argument.
One strand focuses on the very idea of Latin American philosophy, and argues that it is
a red herring, as there is properly only philosophy. Regional or cultural locations are
irrelevant to considerations of philosophical worth and whether the work merits
attention. A second strand is content to accept that it may make sense to speak of
regional, national, or linguistic groupings of philosophy, but goes on to deny that there
is any real barrier to the study of these things because we never criticize philosophical

16 For a lengthier discussion of the barriers facing the acceptance of Latin American philosophy, see
Vargas 2007, and for potential cultural barriers, see also Gracia 2000.
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work for being Latin American or otherwise. We criticize philosophical work for being
bad, unrigorous, ill-conceived, or wrong.
Regarding the first strand, the denial of the relevance of regional philosophy, the
matter is surprisingly complicated. First of all, it is not clear that we never think about
philosophy in terms of regional, national, or linguistic clusterings. When we speak of
American philosophy, it is generally understood that this refers to philosophers
working in the U.S. in various frameworks of conviction (e.g., pragmatism,
transcendentalism) prior to the arrival of logical positivists fleeing wartime Europe.
Similarly, I trust that it is recognizable what one has in mind, more or less, when we
speak of French philosophy, African philosophy, and Chinese philosophy. Second, it is
worth noting that there has been a lively debate (especially within Latin American
philosophy) about whether it makes sense to think of regional or local philosophy.
Third, and most importantly, even if we put aside current practice and accept the view
that philosophy is either just philosophy or it is not philosophy, the basic argument
goes through. We can say that there is a body of “just” philosophy (i.e., philosophy
without reference to some regional moniker) that happens to be almost entirely
produced in Latin America and that through sheer happenstance tends to be principally
written in a language that is neither written in English nor one of the Big Four
“philosophical” languages (i.e., French, German, Greek, or Latin), and that as a matter
of unremarkable historical contingency is virtually never studied or taught in the core
of the discipline in the United States. Fine. At that point, the present argument is
simply this: given that this body of philosophical work (label it however you like) has
some valuable cultural resources in it, resources that are worth studying, then we
should study it. Since we largely do not, we should do things differently than we are
doing them. 17
The second thread of the “there is no problem here” objection, (i.e., that there is no
barrier to the study because Latin American-ness is never grounds for criticism of
philosophical work) is unduly optimistic. Suppose it is true that Latin American-ness is
never grounds for criticizing philosophical work, even indirectly. Even so, there would
remain significant institutional and practical barriers to the study of Latin American
philosophy. For graduate programs with foreign language requirements, students
virtually never need to offer justification or demonstration of the utility of the Big Four
languages for the study of philosophy. Anecdotally, the situation is not the same for
Spanish and Portuguese. Moreover, for students interested in writing a dissertation in
Latin American philosophy, there is virtually no top-30 graduate program in
17 There is sometimes a different aspect to the first strand (or depending on how one individuates these
things, perhaps a further strand) that may bear some mention. The complaint I have in mind goes
something like this: for all I have said, I haven‟t shown what is special about Latin American philosophy.
In reply: it is special in the only way that matters to this argument: it is valuable and ignored. Nothing
turns on it being special in the sense of being radically different, laden with privileged insights, different
from all other philosophical work, or the like. Rather, the point is that it is philosophy—in an
uncontroversially Western, full-blooded sense of the term—and for whatever reason(s) it is not studied
in any of the most influential parts of the field. The present article is one argument among many possible
arguments for why we should try to change that fact.
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philosophy where one can go and expect to have an advisor competent enough to direct
such a dissertation.18 This generates a double burden on students interested in Latin
American philosophy: if they wish to have access to the best education and the best
subsequent opportunities in the profession, they will have to work in at least two fields
—something that already has currency and representation among influential
Anglophone Ph.D.-granting departments— while effectively committing themselves to
the life of an autodidact in Latin American philosophy. Perhaps that is just the kind of
cost that will need to be paid in the growth and study of the field. I mention these
things, though, because the mere fact (if that is what it is) that Latin American-ness is
never a barrier to the study of Latin American philosophy, does nothing to mitigate the
very limited and impoverished paths of access to what valuable complex cultural
resources there are to be found in Latin American philosophy. So, again, I think the
basic structure of the argument remains: there is something valuable here, we would do
well to study it, but doing that would be something different than what we are in fact
doing.
Let us therefore return to the main line of argument. As to the question of whether
or not there is reason to believe that there is value to be had in studying Latin
American philosophy the answer is clearly yes. Given that we are (or ought to be)
committed to the value of complex cultural resources, Latin American philosophy
clearly satisfies the test of meriting sustained scholarly attention in the United States.
Indeed, if we had always had a tradition of scholarship on Latin American thought,
already internal to the discipline of philosophy within the United States, these ideas
(expectations constructing abilities, theory underdetermination, and the importance of
empirical psychology) — which are widely regarded as important developments 19 in
the United States — would have been ideas to which we already had access. These
cultural achievements would have become resources that were available to us to deploy
decades and even centuries earlier than they were developed in the Anglo-American
context. Failing this, even concurrent or after-the-fact awareness of similar ideas in a
different context might prove to be interestingly valuable: the fact of a different
deployment or circumstance of development of some idea might itself be illuminating
18 In speaking “top-30” departments, I am thinking of the Philosophical Gourmet Report. Rankings of
philosophy Ph.D. programs is a notoriously controversial matter, and I do not mean to here take a stand
on the whether and how of ranking graduate programs. A different measure of the strength of graduate
programs in philosophy might generate a different story— perhaps as many as two graduate programs in
a different top-30 would have a scholar who works on Latin American philosophy. The basic point,
though, would remain the same: even if there is no criticism of Latin American philosophy and
philosophers on grounds of being Latin American, this does not mean that students of philosophy can
undertake the study of works in Latin American philosophy with the same ease, seriousness, and
professional promise with which they might study the work or ideas of Descartes, Nietzsche, or David
Lewis.
19 Of course, that something is an important development does not mean that one thinks that the
development gets the facts of the matter right. You needn‟t think they get things right to believe that
they are valuable, important, or worth studying. But, in virtue of being complex and worth engagement,
they might, after all, spark more accurate proposals by way of refutation of these ideas. Either way, we
are likely better off with these ideas.
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about the considered idea or phenomenon. This is not to say that these benefits will
always obtain, or that a given idea would have had the same effect in one time as at an
earlier time (perhaps they would have had different, and perhaps differently valuable
effects, or none whatsoever). However, inasmuch as it is prima facie valuable to have a
wide storehouse of complex cultural resources at our disposal, it behooves us to be
interested in acquiring those resources that have been developed in the Latin American
tradition.
Of course, similar arguments might well be made about Indian, Chinese, and
perhaps African philosophy. There are various analogies and disanalogies that hold
between these cases. For example, among these, only Latin American philosophy is
clearly a part of the Western philosophical tradition and clearly concerned with similar
issues, figures, and methods. But if similar arguments can be given to favor these other
families of philosophy, and these traditions show a promise of similar fecundity, then
there should be space at the academic table for research in these fields, too.
Even so, we should not downplay real-world constraints on expanding the contents
of a discipline without expanding the numbers of philosophers. Moreover, there is also
an issue of diminishing utility to one‟s own work that comes from being in a context in
which everyone is working on significantly different research programs. These things
will constrain the resources we pour in to the study of any field, and there are surely no
hard and fast principles governing how these resources should be allocated.
Nevertheless, Latin American philosophy merits more attention than it has thus far
received.
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ABSTRACT: Any philosophical method that treats the analysis of the meaning of a sentence
or expression in terms of a decomposition into a set of conceptually basic constituent parts
must do some theoretical work to explain the puzzles of intensionality. This is because
intensional phenomena appear to violate the principle of compositionality, and the assumption
of compositionality is the principal justification for thinking that an analysis will reveal the
real semantical import of a sentence or expression through a method of decomposition.
Accordingly, a natural strategy for dealing with intensionality is to argue that it is really just
an isolable, aberrant class of linguistic phenomena that poses no general threat to the thesis
that meaning is basically compositional. On the other hand, the later Mohists give us good
reason to reject this view. What we learn from them is that there may be basic limitations in
any analytical technique that presupposes that meaning is perspicuously represented only
when it has been fully decomposed into its constituent parts. The purpose of this paper is to (a)
explain why the Mohists found the issue of intensionality to be so important in their
investigations of language, and (b) defend the view that Mohist insights reveal basic
limitations in any technique of analysis that is uncritically applied with a decompositional
approach in mind, as are those that are often pursued in the West in the context of more
general epistemological and metaphysical programs.

Keywords: Mohist Logic, compositionality, intensionality, idiomaticity

1. INTRODUCTION
Any philosophical method that treats the analysis of the meaning of a sentence or
expression in terms of a decomposition into a set of conceptually basic constituent
parts must do some theoretical work to explain the puzzles of intensionality. This is
because intensional phenomena appear to violate the principle of compositionality, and
the assumption of compositionality is the principal justification for thinking that an
analysis will reveal the real semantical import of a sentence or expression through a
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method of decomposition. In this regard, a natural strategy for dealing with intensional
phenomena is to argue that there is a principled distinction to be drawn between
extensionality and intensionality in natural language, and that the latter is really just a
small, aberrant class of linguistic phenomena that poses no general threat to the thesis
that meaning is basically compositional. Philosophical analysis, if properly construed
as a decompositional enterprise, may then carry on unimpeded, provided that the
entities or contexts being analyzed are not intensional (i.e., they are extensional), and
are clearly distinguished from their more recalcitrant, but less common, intensional
counterparts. In that way, compositionality can be said to hold its place as a plausible
descriptive thesis about the semantics of natural language. 1
Yet there is good reason to believe that this way of presenting the problem of
intensionality is mistaken. The later Mohists, who may well have been the first in the
world to attempt to furnish a systematic philosophical treatment of intensional
phenomena, were aware of this, at least implicitly. The Mohists were keen observers of
language, and their semantical investigations made them suspicious about the role of
compositionality in the determination of the meanings of compound expressions. What
they realized, and what we can subsequently learn from them, is that compositionality
is not a principle to be taken for granted; it cannot be assumed a priori to hold of a
definitive range of complex expressions that are distinguishable on the basis of their
syntactical properties alone. While it may be fitting to characterize much of natural
language meaning as compositional, it is incorrect to suppose that there can be any
principled distinction between intensionality and extensionality in natural language.
The later Mohists‘ interest in intensional phenomena is thus more than a matter of
historical curiosity. Fully explained, it draws our attention to fundamental limitations
in Western techniques of philosophical analysis. Part of the picture that emerges of
Western philosophy is one of a myopic vision of the nature of language that has misled
philosophers into assuming that a sentence, expression, proposition, concept, or idea is
perspicuously represented or understood only when it has been fully decomposed or
resolved into its constituent parts. Part of my purpose in this paper is to explain why
the Mohists found the issue of intensionality to be so important in their logical and
1

I assume in this essay that any explanation of analysis firmly rooted in the decompositional conception
invariably presupposes at least some version of the principle of compositionality. To analyze a complex
idea or expression, in this view, it is both necessary and sufficient to identify the meanings of its
constituent parts and the way in which they hang together. Compositionality maintains, in other words,
that the meanings of wholes are determined by the meanings of parts in connection with any logical
structures that are formed through their combination. For a stronger version of this basic idea, it is often
argued that the structures or logical forms of the meanings of natural language expressions are tracked,
systematically, by the compositionality of their syntax. Note that this is best considered ―stronger‖ than
the basic idea because one might acknowledge the plausibility or veracity of the compositionality of
meaning while insisting that the combinatorial rules that govern the syntax of natural language
expressions do not always mirror the logical forms of their meanings. Still, a logical analysis typically
begins with a sentence, and this sentence will usually serve as a guide to the analysis itself. To the extent
that it does, it should be possible to show that the rules governing the syntax of natural language
sentences can be associated with determinate semantical operations that act on the meanings of
grammatical constituents in precisely the ways in which these constituents are combined in the syntax.
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semantical investigations. But more importantly, I will defend the view that Mohist
insights, in connection with a number of issues emerging out of the idiosyncrasies of
the Chinese language, reveal obvious and important limitations in any technique of
analysis that is uncritically applied with a decompositional approach in mind, as are
those that are often pursued in the West in the context of more general epistemological
and metaphysical programs.

2. WESTERN CONCEPTION OF ANALYSIS
Analysis in Western philosophy has, of course, been conceived and practiced in many
different ways, and the decompositional conception is but one among many accounts
that have been proposed or suggested over the ages. But it is not an exaggeration to say
that the decompositional conception, more than any other, has exercised a profound
influence on the minds of philosophers in the West. The British empiricists followed it
in their analyses of complex ideas. 2 It played a key role in the writings of Leibniz and
Kant,3 and G.E. Moore adhered to it in the conception of analysis he developed in his
major work Principia Ethica (1903).4 In point of fact, the decompositional conception
2

See, for instance, Locke 1690, 291-3.
Leibniz‘s well-known ―containment principle‖ asserts that all judgments contain as parts a subject and
a predicate, and an analysis of the logical relation that obtains between these two parts in a given
judgment is a necessary step in the evaluation of its truth. For Leibniz, what makes a judgment true is
that its predicate is logically contained within its subject, and the way in which we determine this is by a
process of decomposing its parts into a sequence of identities (Leibniz, Gottfried 1690, 62). In an essay
entitled ―Primary Truths‖, Leibniz writes: ―The predicate or consequent… is always in the subject or
antecedent, and this constitutes the nature of truth in general, or, the connexion between the terms of a
proposition, as Aristotle also has observed. In identities this connexion and inclusion of the predicate in
the subject is expressed, whereas in all other truths it is implicit and must be shown through the analysis
of notions, in which a priori demonstration consists‖ (Leibniz 1686, 30-4). The analysis of notions
consists of reducing complex truths into primary truths by the aid of definitions. Kant‘s account of how
we comprehend the meanings of judgments departs from Leibniz‘s in critical respects, chiefly in its
claim that synthetic judgments may also be true, but the underlying conception of how we determine
truth also requires that we resolve a judgment into the basic parts of subject and predicate (Kant 1787,
48-51 (A6-7/B10-1).
4
The decompositional conception is implicit in Moore‘s conception of analysis, which Moore conceives
as a process of providing a definition for a complex object (such as a proposition) by decomposing it, as
it were, into its ultimate, constituent parts: ―Definitions… which describe the real nature of the object or
notion denoted by a word, and which do not merely tell us what the word is used to mean, are only
possible when the object or notion in question is something complex. You can give a definition of a
horse, because a horse has many different properties and qualities, all of which you can enumerate. But
when you have enumerated them all, when you have reduced a horse to his simplest terms, then you no
longer define those terms. They are simply something which you think of or perceive, and to any one
who cannot think of or perceive them, you can never, by any definition, make their nature known
(Moore 1903, 7). The ―simplest terms‖ of which Moore speaks were themselves regarded as indefinable,
the notions ―good‖ and ―yellow‖ being primary examples: ―‗[G]ood‘ is a simple notion, just as ‗yellow‘
is a simple notion; that, just as you cannot, by any manner of means, explain to any one who does not
already know it, what yellow is, so you cannot explain what good is‖ (1903, 7). In Moore‘s view, the
3
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has had a profound influence even on those thinkers who have struggled adamantly to
articulate methodologies of a very different kind. A rather different conception of
analysis, often called logical analysis in connection with the development of modern
symbolic logic in the work of Frege and Russell, involves techniques of formal
transcription or translation that have little to do with the decompositional conception
per se. Generally speaking, an analysis may be considered ―logical‖ when its concern
is with the translation of statements of ordinary language into the theoretical
framework of a formal or semi-formal language whose logical notions are
perspicuously represented and set apart from its non-logical ones. On the other hand,
this practice of interpreting or translating is very often undertaken with the tacit belief
that a decomposition of one form or another is the goal of any formal representation of
meaning.
As an example this, we can note that in Western analytic philosophy, it is not at all
atypical to treat the concatenation of elements in complex expressions in terms of
predicate conjunction, which is really a form of decomposition. This is especially the
case with respect to complex nominal expressions. Thus, the sentence ‗Jill met a large,
angry dog‘ would be represented in first-order predicate logic as follows:
(1) (x) (Met(Jill, x) :&: Large(x) .&. Angry(x) & Dog(x))
Each of the words in ‗large, angry dog‘ is glossed as a simple predicate and joined
with the others by the logical operator for conjunction, represented by the ampersand
symbol, ‗&‘.
Complex verb phrases are more difficult to handle, but predicate conjunction still
seems presupposed as a basic principle in most cases. For instance, to represent the
sentence ‗Jill runs hastily‘, Pietroski considers an event-analysis in connection with
predicate conjunction:
(2) (e) (Agent(e, Jill) .&. Run(e) & Hasty(e))
The variable ‗e‘ is for events, and events are assumed to be capable of instantiating
a variety of properties: they have agents, objects, manners, etc., and occur at specific
times and places. In this case we have an event whose agent is Jill, since Jill is the one
who runs hastily. The event is also a running event and a hasty one (Pietroski 2000,
161-76).
Even Russell‘s theory of descriptions, which is said to facilitate the elimination of
problematic terms or expressions, is still reasonably construed as a kind of
decompositional analysis. Consider a natural language application of this theory to
descriptive phrases involving relative clauses, such as ‗The F that is G‘. On this point,
a Russellian analysis of the sentence:

process of providing a definition must eventually arrive these simple, indefinable parts, for otherwise the
analysis would go on ad infinitum and the definition would be impossible.
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(3) The F that is G is H
has the following logical form:
(4) (x) ((Fx & Gx) & (y)(((Fy & Gy) → y = x) & Hx))
This analysis is Russellian in that it replaces the analysandum with a quantified
formula in which the descriptive phrase has been eliminated. But it is also a
decomposition because the predicates embodied in the descriptive phrase ‗The F that is
G‘ have been resolved into a formula that represents them as a conjunction of
predicates.
These analyses, it should be noted, are not at all implausible, for they furnish a
straightforward method for dealing with entailment relations—something arguably
involved in the comprehension of any natural language sentence. If one knows, for
example, that the sentence ‗Jill ran angrily and hastily‘ is true, then one also knows that
the sentences ‗Jill ran‘, ‗Jill ran angrily‘, ‗Someone ran angrily‘, ‗Someone did
something‘, etc., are true. We also seem capable of recognizing second-order
entailments: ‗Running was instantiated by Jill‘, ‗Running was instantiated by someone‘,
and so on. Competency with respect to logical entailments is, arguably, a precondition
for the comprehension of sentence meaning. Moreover, Russell‘s theory has benefits of
its own: it can be utilized as an analytic tool to eliminate expressions referring to
metaphysically dubious entities, and it can help us deal with problems of scope and
ambiguity. On the other hand, as a general analytical methodology, the business of
explaining entailment relations, ambiguity, and scope in terms of predicate conjunction
will clearly not work for many of the arguments adduced in the Mohist Canons. This is
because these arguments are intensional in content and resist any easy compositional
representation. Moreover, a significant number of these arguments involve intensional
contexts whose contents are arguably non-epistemic, and are therefore not capable
being dismissed for reasons pertaining to the complications imposed by the
involvement of mental states.

3. MOHIST LOGIC AND INTENSIONALITY
The Mohist writings that I am concerned with in this essay are those in which the study
of logic and language play a central role. They are the entire four chapters of Book 10
and the first two chapters of Book 11 of the Mo-Zi (chapters 40-5, collectively referred
to as the Mohist Canons). The chapters of Book 10 are known by the titles Jing-Shang
(经上, Canons I), Jing-Xia (经下, Canons II), Jing-Shuo-Shang (经说上, Expositions of
the Canons I), and Jing-Shuo-Xia (经说下, Expositions of the Canons II). In Book 11,
we have the Da-Qu ( 大 取 , Major Illustrations) and the Xiao-Qu ( 小 取 , Minor
Illustrations). The text of the Canons leaves a great deal unsaid; there are missing
segments and obvious textual errors, and interpretations of a number of critical
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passages have exhibited widespread disagreement. In this essay I will follow the
numbering system presented in Graham, A.C., 2003 [1978], which pairs each Canon
with its corresponding Exposition and identifies the passages from each pair by
numbers prefixed with the letters A and B. (For instance, passage B40 of the Canons is
from Canons II.) Graham‘s work also reconstructs the Da-Qu (大取) and the Xiao-Qu
(小取) into a single corpus entitled Names and Objects (NO). (Graham 2003)
The Mohists seem to have been wrestling with intensional phenomena from a
variety of different points of view. In so doing they appear to have examined a number
of basic logical operations that are utilized today as tests of intensionality. This might
seem anachronistic; after all, I am imposing certain ideas on the Mohists that many
would think could not have been realized without the jargon of 20 th century analytic
philosophy. Yet there is a lot of textual evidence to support it, and a lot that can be
reconstructed in the background. To begin with, the Mohists seem to have had at least
an implicit awareness of the basic thesis (commonly attributed to Bertrand Russell) that
the grammatical form of a sentence or an expression cannot be assumed to be a reliable
indicator of its underlying logical form. To be sure, the Mohists quite likely had no
rigorous sense of what it means for a sentence or expression to have a logical form, to
say nothing of the formal symbolic apparatus that is generally necessary to
perspicuously represent it. But they did have a strong sense of the relevancy of treating
linguistic names and expressions as distinct objects of study, and they had clear
ambitions to introduce greater rigor into the standards of grammaticality. 5
Moreover, they were aware of the possibility that certain strings of characters
whose constituents play analogous grammatical roles can nonetheless have very
different conditions of satisfaction. That is the lesson we learn from an important later
passage from the reconstructed text entitled Names and Objects (NO) by A.C. Graham,
which essentially compares the satisfaction conditions of two analogous assertions
involving expressions that have the same grammatical form. The expressions are
‗loving people‘ and ‗riding horses‘:
Loving people requires loving all people without exception, only then is this called loving
people. Not loving people does not require loving no people at all; it is (rather) not loving all
people without exception, and by this it is called not loving people. Riding horses does not
require riding all horses without exception; it is (rather) riding some horses, and by this it is
called riding horses. But not riding horses does require riding no horses at all; only by this is it
called not riding horses. These are cases in which something applies without exception in one
case but not in the other. (NO17)

Evidently, the Mohists are pointing out here that the predicate ‗loves people‘ is
satisfied only by those who happen to love all people, whereas the predicate ‗rides
horses‘ is satisfied by anyone who happens to ride at least one horse. By the same
token, the predicate ‗does not love people‘ is satisfied by anyone who fails to love at
5

According to A.C. Graham, the Mohists‘ use of the expression ‗ye che‘ (也者) is used throughout the
Canons as a form of quotation to talk about the meanings of key words and expressions (Graham 2003,
140-1).
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least one person, whereas the predicate ‗does not ride horses‘ requires that one ride no
horses at all. Even ignoring the added complications of the intensionality of the verb
‗loves‘, we have here very different conditions:
‗Jill loves people‘ is true iff Jill  {x | (y)(Person(y) → Loves(x,y))}
‗Jill rides horses‘ is true iff Jill  {x | (y)(Horse(y) & Rides(x, y))}
‗Jill does not love people‘ is true iff Jill  {x | (y)(Person(y) & ~Loves(x, y))}
‗Jill does not ride horses‘ is true iff Jill  {x | ~(y)(Horse(y) & Rides(x, y))}
Notice, in spite of this, that the sentences ‗Jill loves people‘ and ‗Jill rides horses‘
have the same grammatical form; their constituents are playing the same basic
grammatical roles. In classical Chinese, these sentences would be written simply as ‗ 臧
爱人‘ and ‗臧乘马‘, respectively. Even if the Mohists did not possess a rigorous notation
for dealing with these differences of logical form, they were certainly knowledgeable
enough of the pitfalls of assuming that sentences with the same grammatical form
should be given analogous semantical representations.
Now, if the Mohists knew that two sentences of identical form could have very
different truth conditions, then they almost certainly sought out explanations for why,
in particular, sentences containing intensional verbs appear to behave so differently
from those without them. This would have been an integral part of their general
methodological program. Indeed, there is some evidence that they were aware of the
basic distinction between intensions and extensions; see Zong 2000, 221.6 If so, then
they would have had some feeling for the idea that the truth of a sentence containing an
intensional expression requires a consideration of the intension of this expression as
well. In any case, it is hard to make sense of the Mohists‘ logical writings without
assuming that they had at least an implicit understanding of intensional phenomena, if
not an explicit one.
For instance, in passage B40 of the Expositions they seem to employ or
presuppose a logical operation that many today would characterize as an
intersubstitution of coextensive predicates:
(5) 智狗重智犬，則過。不重，則不過。

6

Zong claims that this distinction was grasped by the Mohists in their discussion of time and sameness.
This is certainly debatable, but the text seems consistent with it. Note that the Mohists‘ awareness of an
intension / extension distinction does not imply that they could not have rejected the possibility of a
principled distinction between intensionality and extensionality in natural language. True, the possibility
of understanding the basic nature of intensional phenomena seems to require that one first grasp the
distinction between intensions and extensions. On the other hand, an acknowledgement of the presence
of intensional phenomena in language need not be taken to imply the possibility of a principled
distinction between intensionality and extensionality. There may be no such distinction; it may just be
that the facts that distinguish the two are in some cases arbitrary or imprecise. Compare the notion of
―child‖ with that of ―adult.‖ Except arbitrarily, one cannot identify an exact age at which one becomes
an adult, and yet no one believes that a four year old should have voting privileges or a driver‘s license.
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To assert the identity of knowing dogs and knowing canines is a mistake; to
not do so is not a mistake.7
This passage employs the terms ‗gou‘ (狗, dog) and ‗quan‘ (犬, canine), which the
Mohists used as standard examples of ming (名, name), names that refer to the same
thing, or predicates whose extensions are identical. That the Mohists were concerned
with two names referring to the same thing is obvious from their discussion of
sameness in A86 and elsewhere. They also clearly used the term ‗ming‘ (名) for what
we would today regard as predicates—no doubt in part because they did not distinguish
predicates from singular terms. If we characterize this epistemically, then the Mohists
seem to be asserting that the mental act of knowing what a dog is is not the same as the
mental act of knowing what a canine is, for one‘s comprehension of the concept in
each case is different. If this is correct, then in the Mohists‘ view, (7) does not follow
from (6), in spite of the fact that all dogs are canines:
(6) Jill knows what a dog is.
(7) Jill knows what a canine is.
The intersubstitution of the predicate ‗canine‘ for the predicate ‗dog‘ is an invalid
logical operation in the context of the intensional verb ‗knows‘. Indeed, if the Mohists
did distinguish intensions from extensions, then their reason for why it does not follow
from the fact that Jill knows dogs that she knows canines would have been that the
intensions expressed by the predicates ‗dogs‘ and ‗canines‘ are not identical. They
would have recognized that terms denoting these intensions are not logically
interchangeable, and their proposition at B40 would have followed as a trivial
consequence. 8
7

Unless otherwise specified, the translations in this section and the next are my own. Though I have
been greatly influenced by A.C. Graham, I have departed from his translations in many cases in favor of
interpretations that I feel more closely track the original grammar of classical Chinese.
8
It is not an incidental point, in this regard, that many commentators have misinterpreted this passage,
assuming that it is inconsistent with the line in the Canons with which it is paired, and in need of
emendation; Li 1969, 179, 194-5, He 1971, 151, 179, and Chen 1983, 21-22 are examples. (I have
borrowed these sources from Zong 2000.) By contrast, Zong claims that B40 of the Canons contains a
textual error, in that it omits a critical character for negation whose addition is necessary to square it
with the putative explanation we find for it in the Expositions (Zong 2000, 215-7). In my opinion there is
no inconsistency here; the explanation for the apparent discrepancy consists in the fact that the Mohists
are simply talking about two different senses of ‗knowing,‘ which they distinguish by the use of two
different ideographs, ‗zhi‘ (知) and ‗zhi‘ (智). This is the passage at B40 of the Canons: ―知狗而自谓不
知犬过也。说在重。‖ (―Knowing dogs while saying of yourself that you do not know canines is a
mistake. This is explained by (the notion of) identity.‖) It cannot be a coincidence that the Mohists fail to
repeat the use of ‗知‘ (zhi) in the line of the Expositions that corresponds to this passage (see (5) above),
preferring instead the character ‗智‘ (zhi), for they do the same thing in B39 and elsewhere, and they
explicitly distinguish their meanings in A3-6. In A5 they define ‗智‘ (zhi) as a form of knowing that
involves being able to identify something through its mao (貌), its describable characteristics. This could
very well have been conceived as a form of object identification through the connotations of a name,
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There are other tests for intensionality, of course, but the method of interchanging
equivalent expressions seems to be the most widely mentioned. If co-referential terms,
co-extensive predicates, or logically equivalent sentences are intersubstitutable without
a change of truth value, then the linguistic context in which they occur is extensional; if
not, then it is intensional. More often than not, however, we find the Mohists weighing
the consequences of interchanging predicates that are not coextensive, but which bear
some other obvious logical relation. For instance, if Jack is riding a horse, then Jack is
riding an equine animal. In this case we substitute the predicate ‗equine animal‘, whose
extension is the set of all equine animals, for the predicate ‗horse‘, whose extension is
the set of all horses. No fallacy is committed here, in part because the context created
by the verb ‗rides‘ is extensional. However, if Jack is thinking of a horse, then it may
or may not follow that he is thinking of an equine animal. Perhaps he does not know
what an equine animal is.
The inference that the Mohists seem to be presupposing here is the substitution of
a predicate G for a predicate F whenever the extension of F is a subset of the extension
of G. Evidence for the Mohists‘ interest in logical operations of this kind is apparent
from a number of different examples found in the Canons. For example, there is an
important earlier passage from the reconstructed text entitled Names and Objects (NO)
by A.C. Graham. In spite of apparently missing fragments and probably a number of
textual errors, the principal message of this text appears clear. I reconstruct it as
follows, filling in only those missing remarks that seem clearly intended:
Knowing is different from thinking… [Thinking of a huang is not thinking of a jade thing]; it is
[thinking of] a huang that happens to be a jade thing. Thinking of a pillar is not thinking of a
wooden thing; it is thinking of a pillar that happens to be a wooden thing. Thinking of a man‘s
finger is not thinking of a man; [it is thinking of a finger that happens to be part of a man].
[Thinking of a bird is not thinking of a game animal]; it is thinking of a bird that happens to be
a game animal.9
such as ‗gou‘ (狗, dog) or ‗quan‘ (犬, canine), which were thought to be different. They distinguish this
notion from a more basic form of intelligence that is the means by which one knows (cai 材), which the
Mohists seem to think involved a variety of things associated with the apparatus of sense, such as being
able to individuate an object in one‘s visual field by means of perceptual acquaintance with it. If this is
correct, then the assertion at B40 of the Canons is reasonable. Jill could assert truthfully of Jack that
Jack knows what a dog is, even if Jack fails to know the name ‗dog‘ or the meaning of ‗dog‘, as
acknowledged by convention. It may be unclear to what extent object individuation in perception
requires the mastery of a language, but a basic ability to do this is certainly possible for anyone who
does know a language, even when certain words are absent from one‘s vocabulary. If, therefore, one
knows dogs in the sense of ‗zhi gou‘ (知狗), by means of perceptual acquaintance with dogs, then one
also knows canines (zhi quan 知犬) by the same act of perception. This interpretation of B40, which
resolves the apparent inconsistency, is certainly preferable to Zong‘s and others‘, since it is corroborated
by other textual evidence and does not require any textual emendation.
9
This passage has been reconstructed from NO3, which I present here in full: ―智與意異。… 是璜也
是玉也。意楹非意木也，意是楹之木也。意指之人也非意人也。意獲也乃意禽也。‖ As given, the
text is badly corrupted and no interpretation of it can stand beyond controversy. I have used brackets in
the English translation to indicate places where the text seems to be missing. The account I have given
here seems consistent with both the extant fragments of the passage and a number of logical insights
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The relevant logical notions here are those either involving or presupposing
intersubstitution. The Mohists appear to be asserting, for instance, that in spite of the
fact that all huang are made of jade, it does not follow from one‘s thinking of huang
that one is thinking of a thing that is made of jade, for one might have no knowledge of
jade as such, a distinct mineral. 10 Here we seem to have evidence for an instance of
intensionality in the verb phrase ‗thinking of‘, but it is evident not from the
intersubstitution of co-extensive predicates, but from the intersubstitution of the
predicate ‗thing made of jade‘, whose extension is the set of all things that are made of
jade, for the predicate ‗huang‘, whose extension is the set of all huang.
Now, it must be noted that as a test of intensionality this inference form is
problematic. It successfully draws our attention to some contexts that are referentially
opaque but misleads us on others. For instance, suppose that Jack eats meat from every
kind of cow, but not from every kind of mammal. We substitute the term ‗mammal‘ for
the term ‗cow‘ to obtain a false statement from a true one. Yet no expression in the
sentence ‗Jack eats meat from every type of cow‘ appears intensional. 11 Moreover,
restrictions on this rule to simple verb phrases without the universal quantifier do not
solve the problem; any simple predicate with a transitive verb has a predicate nominal
that admits of a quantificational interpretation, and this interpretation can be exploited
to achieve the appearance of referential opacity by interchanging the right non-coextensive terms. Suppose that Jack rides horses, but not elephants. Then the sentence
‗Jack rides elephants‘ is false, but we can produce a true statement from this by
substituting the expression ‗mammals‘ for the expression ‗elephants‘, since all horses
are mammals. It makes no difference whether the predicate nominal is interpreted as a
universal quantifier or an existential one. Either way, the Mohists face difficulties in
the application of their rule, if their purpose is indeed to ferret out cases of
intensionality and distinguish them from those that are non-intensional.
Yet, for all that, the Mohists may not have been misguided here. More common
tests of intensionality are problematic as well, and for similar reasons. The method of
intersubstituting co-extensive predicates may fail to reveal forms of intensionality that
are obvious by other methods. Consider the word ‗needs‘. If a baker needs some
baking soda, then he also needs some sodium bicarbonate. The substitution of ‗sodium
bicarbonate‘ for ‗baking soda‘ does not alter truth value. In spite of this, ‗needs‘ is
intensional at least in this context, since existential generalization, another common
apparent in other writings in the Canons that are better preserved. Of critical interest here are the selfcontained remarks on the method of disputation that we find in NO12-18. I address these passages in
detail in section 4.
10
The Mohists may also have been right about this from another point of view. It may have been a mere
contingent fact that all huang are made of jade. If so, then no conclusions about the substance of huang
would be warranted from the mere facts that one is thinking about huang and that all huang are
(contingently) made of jade, since one could be thinking about a huang that happens to be made of some
other mineral, or something else.
11
This problem was first made known to me in an excellent review of an earlier draft of this paper by an
anonymous reviewer for this journal. I have used the same example provided by the reviewer.
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test of intensionality, may fail to apply: the baker may need some baking soda even
when none is available. Existential generalization, furthermore, has its own problems.
Consider ‗Jack feeds pigeons whenever he sees them.‘ We generalize on the term
‗pigeons‘ to obtain the existentially-quantified assertion ‗There are some pigeons that
Jack feeds whenever he sees them‘, but this would be false if there were no pigeons.
This seems to be a false positive result, since no term in this sentence appears
intensional. 12
More importantly, the method of interchanging co-extensive terms also gives
misleading results if we admit expressions that are interpreted non-compositionally,
and natural language is full of them. If referential opacity really is the true mark of
intensionality, then any expression consisting of two or more words that is interpreted
non-compositionally will be intensional. This includes compound expressions of
various kinds, such as ‗white collar‘ and ‗four wheel drive‘ in English, and ‗zui-ying‘
(argumentative) in Chinese, and any expressions that are irreducibly idiomatic, such as
‗cut to the chase‘. Jill may take the advice of her friend with a grain of salt, but she
would not be doing the same with a grain of sodium chloride. Or Jack may be
considered over the hill because he just turned 50, but he would not be considered over
a natural elevation of the Earth‘s surface because he just turned 50. Truth value
changes in these cases, not due to the meanings of terms like ‗take‘ and ‗considered‘,
but because of the idiomaticity of the expressions ‗with a grain of salt‘ and ‗over the
hill‘. Moreover, the intensionality of such phrases may not be apparent if we are
considering only co-extensive expressions. Many terms that are constituents of
idiomatic phrases in natural language may be ignored because terms that are strictly
co-extensive with them are not forthcoming (they may have different shades of
meaning), and many idiomatic phrases in natural language are not obviously
idiomatic.13
Awareness of these other forms of intensionality opens up new avenues for the
interpretation of Mohist texts. If the Mohists had been aware that referential opacity
could be caused by any expression that can be interpreted non-compositionally, and
that any word or phrase could serve as a constituent of an idiom regardless of its
meaning, then they would not have had any reason to believe that a sharp distinction
could be drawn between intensional and extensional phenomena in natural language.
Intensionality could not have been explained simply as a byproduct of assertions about
the mind, and they would not have felt any need to talk about ―intensional objects‖ and

12

A conditionalized interpretation of this statement in first-order logic, with the antecedent representing
‗whenever he sees them‘, would not have the same problem, but this would presuppose certain rules of
translation, which are not given. I am simply pointing out here that we cannot assume an unproblematic
intersubstitution of terms in natural language without further rules to handle contingent expressions
such as these.
13
Consider the interrogative ‗Could you pass me the salt?‘ which is used to make a request. Most people
would not respond to an utterance of this in the same way as they would to the sentence ‗Do you at
present have the physical ability to pass me the salt?‘ For a notable paper on the idiomatic features of
indirect speech acts, see Searle 1979, 59-82.
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such. On the whole their attitudes toward language would have been far more
inquisitive and adaptable.
If this is correct, then it casts new light on the aims that motivated the assertions at
NO3. It is not that the Mohists regarded ‗thinking of‘ as a fundamentally intensional
verb—somehow intensional in isolation; it is rather that they felt that its contribution in
connection with other phrases gave rise to various kinds of idiom in assertions, and this
forced them to re-evaluate their admissibility. They were not thinking simply
analytically; they were assimilating and evaluating linguistic complexes in wholes. Of
course, my interpretation of this passage is debatable, but there is ample textual
evidence in support of the view that the Mohists were concerned with idiomaticity as a
basic explanation for at least some forms of intensionality. In the next section I will
discuss some of the more striking cases in support of this.

4. INTENSIONALITY RECONSIDERED
Thus far our considerations have dealt mostly with rather standard forms of
intensionality, those engendered by the complications of linguistic expressions
involving mental states—‗knows‘, ‗thinks of‘, ‗believes‘, ‗loves‘ and the like. But
intensionality can be caused by other things as well, linguistic phenomena having
nothing to do with the mind. If the Mohists were not fully aware of this, then they were
at least disinclined to believe that the properties of intensionality must somehow track
the ontology of the mind. Consequently, with the absence of this constraint in their
logico-semantical methodology, they had a greater inclination to weigh the
consequences of combining and intersubstituting expressions in a variety of different
linguistic contexts. This led them to a number of insights into the logic of natural
language that went entirely unnoticed, as far as I can tell, in the early traditions of the
West.
Surprisingly, in his otherwise careful examination of Mohist logic, Zong entirely
misses this general point. Zong discusses a variety of intensional verbs used in the
Canons that make plain the Mohists‘ concern with intensionality, but he interprets
every one of these verbs epistemically. As a consequence, he neglects the Mohists‘
distinct contributions to the study of language:
[A] modern logician … is unlikely to be impressed by what I have presented [in these
examples]. After all, these are some particular forms of fairly simple modal inferences the
nature of which modern logicians know only too well. But my concern here is the history of
philosophy, not logic per se. … The examples show that Mohist scholars clearly distinguished
two kinds of contexts, one that involves intensional terms such as ‗knowing‘, ‗thinking of‘, and
‗believing‘, and one that does not. (Zong 2000, 213)

Zong‘s oversight here consists in a failure to recognize the possibility that
intensional contexts may be created by non-epistemic or non-mental terms or
expressions. Whether or not modern logicians are likely to be impressed by the
examples he gives, Zong is incorrect, I believe, in thinking that the Mohists were

Comparative Philosophy 1.1 (2010)

WILLMAN

65

preoccupied only with forms of intensionality that are engendered by the conceptual
problems associated with mental states. They were concerned with more general
problems of meaning that arise out of the concatenation of a variety of terms in
classical Chinese, and this made them more receptive to other forms of intensionality.
Chief among these forms are those involving idiomaticity, as noted in the previous
section. The most striking examples are found in the Xiao-Qu, the largely selfcontained treatise of the Canons that makes up the latter portion of Names and Objects.
In NO15, for instance, the Mohists are particularly interested in patterns of reasoning
they refer to as mou (侔, parallelizing). The Mohists‘ idea is to evaluate and categorize
expressions by investigating how meanings change when strings of characters
consisting of ordinary statements of identity or predication are supplemented with
other characters or strings. To do this, one reasons by bi ci er ju xing (比辞而俱行,
comparing expressions and letting them proceed). It is unclear what much of this
entails, but at least some of these patterns of reasoning involve proceeding from
statements of the form ‗An A is a B‘ to those of the form ‗VA is VB‘, where V is a verb
combined with the noun phrases A and B to yield, in effect, two distinct nominalized
infinitives. When these patterns of reasoning successfully advance from one
proposition or expression to another without contravening its admissibility, the Mohists
say that they xing 行 (proceed) and refer to them as shi er ran (是而然). In such cases
we may correctly assert ‗VA is VB‘ on the supposition that an A is a B. When they do
not successfully advance in this way, they are referred to as shi er bu ran (是而不然),
and the Mohists assert ‗VA is not VB‘ as a consequence.
Each of the assertions considered in NO15 involves an intensional transitive verb
exemplifying the basic principle shi er bu ran (是而不然) in which reasoning from a
statement of the form ‗An A is a B‘ does not successfully advance (or xing 行) to a
statement of the form ‗VA is VB‘. The passage offers eleven uses of transitive
intensional verbs. Of these eleven, five are straightforwardly or arguably non-epistemic,
or more generally, non-intentional (-with-a-‗t‘): ‗cheng‘ (乘, riding), ‗ru‘ (入, entering),
‗duo‘ (多, abounding in), ‗wu‘ (无, being without), and ‗sha‘ (杀, killing). The most
striking of these is the last, since ‗killing‘ would ordinarily be thought of as an
extensional verb. Regarding this verb, the Mohists assert the following:
(8) 盗人人也... 杀盗人非杀人也。
Robbers are people… but killing robbers is not killing people.
This is striking, of course, because almost anyone trained in Western symbolic
logic will consider it obvious that the contrary statement ‗Killing robbers is killing
people‘, or at least something equivalent to it, is provable in first-order predicate logic,
if we allow the assumption that all robbers are people, that is,
(9) (x) (Robber(x) → Person(x))
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The statement ‗Killing robbers is killing people‘ need only be transcribed as
follows:
(10) (e) (Killing(e) & (x)(Robber(x) & Object(x,e)) .→. (x) (Person(x) &
Object(x,e))
I am assuming here, as above, that we are quantifying over events, and that the
expression ‗Object(x,e)‘ is to be understood as: ―x is the object of event e.‖
Apparently, what the Mohists would object to here is our decomposition of the
expression ‗killing robbers‘ into a conjunction of individualized predicates. They seem
to have felt that the combination of the ideographs ‗sha‘ (杀, killing) and ‗dao ren‘ (盗
人, robbers) formed an idiom that was recognized as a distinct, unanalyzable unit of
common speech. This unit of speech carried with it connotations of justified execution,
so that, at least for some people in the linguistic community in which the Mohists lived,
the expression ‗sha dao ren‘ (杀盗人, killing robbers) was simply intended to mean
―justified execution of criminals‖. By contrast, connotations of justified execution were
not considered present in the meaning of the expression ‗killing people‘, which seemed
to connote more simply an act of murder. Indeed, the Mohists explicitly prohibited the
latter in connection with their espoused doctrine of universal love (cf. NO17).14
My interpretation of these expressions is controversial. In the next section I
respond to an important objection to it, but we can provide further evidence for it
14

This idea is suggested by A.C. Graham (2003, 488). Graham, however, seems to view it as a sort of
novelty, conceived by the Mohists more or less in isolation from their other semantical insights. Part of
my purpose in this paper is situate Graham‘s basic idea in the framework of a more comprehensive
theory that explains the Mohists‘ general semantical program, their interest in intensionality, and their
skepticism about the compositionality of language. For a proposal alternative to Graham‘s, see Mou
2009. As I understand it, Mou‘s account is only partly in disagreement with mine. It appeals largely to
phenomenological facts about the way in which our attention shifts among different aspects of things in
different contexts of communicative discourse. For example, Mou argues that ―we often shift our
attention from what is shared between involved parties … to what is distinction between [them]…
depending on the nature of the context and concrete situation.‖ To explain the killing robbers case, Mou
proposes the following: ―[W]hen saying ‗robbers are people‘, one focuses on the aspect of robbers, A,
that makes them being people; nevertheless, when saying ‗killing robbers is not killing people‘, one‘s
focus shifts to some other aspect of robbers, A*, which is possessed by robbers rather than by the other
people and which makes robbers deserve being killed (from the Mohist point of view, and cited for the
sake of argument): killing robbers for the sake of A*; that does not amount to killing people for the sake
of A* because people generally speaking do not possess A*.‖ Unfortunately, Mou does not further
explain what he means by A*, but this may be irrelevant. What matters here is whether Mou‘s
phenomenological explanation of the process by which we grasp the various aspects of things in verbal
discourse is compatible with my suggestion that the meaning of ‗sha dao ren‘ (杀盗人, killing robbers)
in classical Chinese was treated as idiomatic. As far as this is concerned, I don‘t see any disagreement.
However, Mou does make some rather substantive metaphysical claims in connection with his account
that I remain noncommittal about. He claims, for instance, that ―such a shift in focus is not supposed to
be made at random but has its due metaphysical foundation: an object of study really possesses its
multiple aspects / layers / dimensions‖. My own account is essentially semantical, not metaphysical, and
I regard it as compatible with a variety of different metaphysical views.
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simply by comparing it with other remarks in NO15 which more obviously indicate a
preoccupation with idiomaticity. For instance, there is the curious use of the expression
‗ru mu‘入木 (entering wood) in the following line from NO15:
(11) 船木也，入船非入木也。
A boat is wood, but entering a boat is not entering wood.
Importantly, there is nothing in the meaning of ‗ru‘ (入, entering) indicating, by
itself, an intensional context; non-mental objects or entities surely have the capacity to
enter things. As Zhang and Liu (2007) observe, the complex expression ‗ru mu‘ (入木)
is idiomatic. It means ―going to die‖, something entirely absent in the connotation of
‗ru chuan‘ (入船, entering a boat), which is used to signify just the generic action of
going into a boat.15 Note that the grammatical form of the expression ‗ru chuan‘ (入船,
entering a boat), which consists of a simple combination of two ideographs, is
precisely the same as ‗ru mu‘ (入木, entering wood). But grammatical form is deceptive,
as the Mohists knew, for it masks the contrast between analyzable compounds and
expressions involving idiomaticity. Similar points may be made with regard to the
remaining non-epistemic intensional transitive verbs.
In the remaining six cases we have assertions involving transitive verbs that are
often regarded as intensional for epistemic reasons. But epistemic-based intensionality
is not likely the problem the Mohists had in mind even with these. Consider the first
item from NO15:
(12) 获之（视）* 亲人也，获事其亲非事人也。16
The father of huo is a human; and yet it does not follow from this that when
huo serves his father, he is serving a human (or acting as a servant).
This example involves the transitive intensional verb ‗shi‘ ( 事 , serve). Now,
contexts created by epistemic terms are generally considered opaque on the supposition
that they may fail to support otherwise valid inferences owing to failures of knowledge.
Jack may believe de dicto that the Evening Star is bright, but not believe the same
thing about the Morning Star, if he fails to recognize that the two terms ‗Evening Star‘
and ‗Morning Star‘ designate the same astronomical body. Similarly, Jack may desire
de dicto to learn about the Evening Star without desiring the same thing about the
Morning Star, if (again) he fails to realize that the Evening Star is identical to the
Morning Star. On the other hand, unless Jack is simply mistaken about basic facts, it is
highly unlikely that he will fail to believe that he is serving a human if he knows that
he is serving his father, for it is common knowledge that all fathers are human. It is for
this reason that we should consider it implausible that the Mohists were worried about
the possibility of huo‘s not realizing that his father was a human. The Mohists were not
15

Zhang and Liu 2007, 85-102.
The text here has been emended by A.C. Graham (2003, 487). The notation ‗(Y)*X‘ is: ―Read X for
Y.‖

16
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assuming that the context created by the transitive verb ‗shi‘ (事, serve) is intensional
for reasons involving possible failures of knowledge. It is much more likely that they
were concerned that the phrase ‗shi ren‘ ( 事 人 , serve a human) was commonly
interpreted as an idiom signifying the poor labor involved in being a servant,
something they didn‘t feel was apparent in the connotation of the phrase ‗shi qi qin‘ (事
17
其亲, serve one‘s father).
Arguably, the same point is true of the example in NO15 that immediately follows
(12):
(13) 其弟美人也，愛弟非愛美人也。
One‘s brother is a handsome man; and yet it does not follow from this that
when one loves one‘s brother, one loves a handsome man.
It is implausible, in my opinion, that the Mohists were worried here about the
epistemic-based intensionality of the term ‗ai‘ (爱, love). It is conceivable, of course,
for one to fail to recognize the handsomeness of one‘s brother, as perceived or
acknowledged by others. A better account, however, is that the Mohists were
concerned with the idiomatic force of the complex expression ‗ai mei ren‘ (愛美人, love
a handsome man), which, in the great economy of classical written Chinese, may well
have involved connotations of sexual attraction. One‘s brother may be a handsome
man, but loving one‘s brother does not imply that one is sexually attracted to him. The
intensionality here that undermines the suggested inference is not engendered by the
single term ‗ai‘ (爱, love), but by the unique way in which the meaning of the string ‗ai
mei ren‘ (愛美人, love a handsome man) is determined idiomatically.
Indeed, if the Mohists really were concerned with possible failures of knowledge
in the passage at NO15, then surely they would have used more obvious and
convincing examples—assertions not hinging on an ignorance of basic facts like
―fathers are people‖. They would have used examples where it is clearly more likely
that one could fail to recognize certain identities, analogous to those inspired by
Frege‘s Morning Star-Evening Star scenario. Moreover, they would likely have felt the
need to distinguish epistemic forms of intensionality from idiomatic ones, something
we do not seem to find any indication of in NO15 or anywhere elsewhere in Names and
Objects. Whatever the case, any sharp contrast between intensional and non-intensional
terms seems to me entirely antithetical to what appears to be a far more fluid and
adaptable conception of natural language emerging out of Names and Objects that is
perceptive of the many different ways in which meanings are grasped in ordinary
communicative discourse. This very fluid and adaptable conception of language is
precisely what makes later Mohist logic philosophically significant, and—dare I say—
original in the investigation of intensionality. The Mohists give us good reasons to
avoid any blanket assumption about the compositionality of natural language, and I am

17

As with the expression ‗killing robbers‘, I am following the suggestion of A.C. Graham on this point
(2003, 486).
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inclined to say that many contemporary Western philosophers,
notwithstanding, have important things to learn from them. 18

logicians

5. OBJECTIONS AND REPLIES
A common view of the Mohists‘ logico-semantical program is that it was motivated by
little desire to demarcate the kinds of formally valid inference patterns that are
characteristic of Aristotelian categorical logic. The reason often given is that the
Mohists had a more basic interest in the semantics of compound expressions that
distracted them away from the issue of logical form. This interest in semantics was
pursued in the context of a largely unsystematic program of analogical disputation that
involved categorizing linguistic forms into different classes on the basis of their
underlying semantical properties. The categorization of these forms proceeded by
examining parallels in phrasing and making judgments about their kind on a case-bycase assessment of their admissibility. Distracted by their own idiosyncratic
methodology, the Mohists failed to classify linguistic forms in the way that Aristotle
did, independently of their semantical content, and this undermined any desire they
might have had to develop a syllogistic-style logic of categories.
A view of this kind is proposed by Chris Fraser. Fraser suggests that the Mohists
were skeptical of the utility of studying purely formal methods because their own
technique of drawing inferences based on mere formal linguistic parallels was
―invariably unreliable‖. As a consequence, they had little desire to develop a working
theory of logical form:
Over-reliance on formal parallels tends to yield assertions that violate what the Mohists take to
be the norms for distinguishing various kinds … and predicating the corresponding terms.
When this happens, they reject these assertions on the basis of their knowledge of the semantics
of terms, which they take to be more fundamental than linguistic structure or logical form.
Their discovery of the misleading nature of linguistic parallels probably contributed to their
skepticism about the extent to which formal methods could be applied in dialectics or
disputation… This skepticism may in turn have helped point them away from any significant
study of formal logic, but in fact their inquiries were oriented in a different direction from the
start. (Fraser 2009)

Fraser is certainly right, I think, in making the general claim that the Mohists‘
skepticism about the utility of formal methods was a consequence of their recognition
18

It is not clear to me whether the Mohists thought that most linguistic contexts are intensional, or
whether they felt that intensional phenomena simply make up an important minority that ought to be of
concern to anyone engaged in the art of disputation. The treatise Names and Objects (reconstructed by
Graham) simply surveys a number of different possibilities, some extensional and some intensional, and
admonishes the reader to be ―cautious‖ when making inferences based on grammatical parallelisms in
language. Whatever the case, the Mohists‘ preoccupation with intensionality was enough, I believe, to
make them skeptical about role compositionality in language, and we do not see this perspective being
entertained with the same degree of interest anywhere in the early philosophy of the West.
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of the misleading nature of linguistic parallels. On the other hand, he seems to lose
sight of this as a real contemplative discovery—in spite of his use of the word. In
explaining why the Mohists draw the conclusion that killing robbers is not killing
people, Fraser proposes that the Mohists had in mind little more than an expedient
semantical invention: they simply stipulated that killing robbers is not killing people
out of an ad hoc attempt to reconcile their approval of the execution of criminals with
their doctrine of inclusive concern. This allowed them to go on advocating the
absolutist view that killing people is always wrong, even when offering their nod of
approval in sight of a criminal‘s execution. Indeed, the Mohists do seem to have
believed that they could justify their ethical views merely by drawing their opponents‘
attention to certain facts (or claims) about the semantics of compound expressions. 19
But as a tactic of moral justification, this seems dubious. In Fraser‘s view, even
granting that executing criminals is not the same thing as murder, it is ―still an event in
which people are killed‖. In other words, the Mohists were abandoning commonsense,
illicitly attempting to support their position on inclusive concern by denying what
others would take to be obvious, that the killing of a robber is indeed the killing of a
person. Granting the oddity of this, the Mohists could have simply distinguished
different kinds of events, some specific, and some general. In Fraser‘s words:
They could have pointed out that ‗killing people‘ refers generally to all kinds of actions in
which one person causes another to die. These include a range of more specific kinds of actions,
among them intentional, morally wrong killing of the innocent (murder) and communitysanctioned, morally justified killing of criminals (execution). Thus killing robbers could be an
action of the kind killing people without being one of the kind morally wrong killing. (Fraser
2009)

Why didn‘t they do this? Fraser‘s answer is that ―this route didn‘t occur to
them‖—they were simply unable to move beyond the assumption that every name in
language corresponds to exactly one distinct thing, as later classical thinkers did. That
is, the Mohists simply assumed that ―each unit of language should denote some
discrete kind (lei), or part of reality…‖, and this led them into the awkward situation of
being unable to distinguish terms of different scope, some of whose extensions fall
within others.
Yet the charge that the Mohists failed to differentiate terms of different scope is
simply incommensurate with the existing textual evidence. How else are we to make
sense of their more basic claim that all robbers are people—if not on the assumption of
19

True, the Mohists may have been simply naïve in attempting to justify moral judgments by an appeal
to an inventory of basic semantical categories. Yet this has no direct bearing on the issue of whether the
Mohists were right in asserting in their native tongue that killing robbers is not killing people. Our
concern here is with their assertion‘s logical form, as it was grasped by listeners of the era in which the
Mohists were advancing their philosophy. To the extent that the Mohists were grappling with a great
variety of compound expressions of varying degrees of idiomaticity, they were never inclined to take the
principle of compositionality for granted. This forced them to cast about for other methods of argument,
and this we see reflected in their very attempt to produce a taxonomy of semantic relations among basic
expressions.
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some analogy to the set-theoretical fact that the set of all robbers is a subset of the set
of all people? If the Mohists failed to differentiate terms of scope, then they would
have to have believed it necessary, too, to treat the terms ‗dao ren‘ (盗人, robber) and
‗ren‘ (人, people) as denoting two disconnected kinds or parts of reality. That would
have forced them to deny the admissibility of the claim that all robbers are people and
many others besides (‗Jill‘s parents are people‘, ‗Her brother is a handsome man‘,
‗Carriages are wood‘, and so on). But they did not do this. It cannot be a coincidence
that the majority of parallelisms investigated in the Xiaoqu involving the
intersubstitution of terms in intensional contexts appeal to logical relations whose
explanation naturally invokes the notion of extensions overlapping or falling within
one another.
Indeed, in the alternative proposal quoted above, Fraser is ignoring precisely what
he is willing to attribute to the Mohists elsewhere, that ―killing people‖ was conceived
in ordinary discourse in connection with acts of murder, the unjustified killing of
innocents. This is understandable; in English the expression lacks the idiomatic force
that we can say was likely ascertained by members of the Mohist community, who
were living in ancient China and dealing with an ideographic language of extreme
economy. In any case, the Mohists were not simply stipulating this; they were noting
an obvious empirical fact about linguistic usage in ancient China and attempting to
exploit it in their justification of the doctrine of universal love. If they had simply
stipulated this, then they would have been accused of violating or otherwise
abandoning the norms of speech. Admittedly, the difference between stipulation and
genuine analysis may be vague. Many words have a variety of meanings, and many are
polysemous. A proposed analysis of these words may provoke agreement in some
circles and disagreement in others, and in fact the Mohists‘ own analysis of the
Chinese expression for ―killing robbers‖ seems to have aroused a certain amount of
disagreement from members of the common community (cf. NO15). However, it
would be entirely uncharitable to conclude from this that the Mohists didn‘t care about
the norms of speech and were willing to stipulate meanings as they pleased, whether
common or not. For their arguments to have appeal, they surely would have felt the
need to identify some common ground with those they sought to convince; they would
have observed the common idioms of important terms carefully for the purpose of
winning over otherwise indecisive minds in argument.
Thus, the meaning of the whole was not resolvable into the meanings of the parts,
so the extension of the expression ‗sha ren‘ 杀人 (killing people), conceived as an
unanalyzable linguistic unit, would have been none other than:
(14) {x | x is an unjustified killing of innocents}
When we assume that this is the ground of the common idiom, and the extension
of ‗sha dao ren‘ (杀盗人) is {x | x is a justified killing of robbers}, then it follows,
trivially, that killing robbers is not killing people. The conditions that satisfy these two
predicates are not the same. The Mohists could easily have held this view while
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allowing that terms may be distinguished by their scope, with some being more general
than others. They may have held that the extensions of these phrases are subsets of
some more general set identified by any kind of action in which, say, a living being
caused to die. 20 But these possibilities are only appreciated when it is remembered that
the compositionality of classical Chinese cannot be taken for granted, since the
concatenation of ideographs in this language can produce expressions whose meanings
are not the mere sums of the meanings of their constituent parts.
If the Mohists did not develop an Aristotelian-style logic of formal inference
patterns, it is because the semantics of classical Chinese is in many ways resistant to
analyses that presuppose compositionality. But this is not a failing on their part. Rather,
what we find in the Canons are insightful responses to dilemmas that are faced when
reasoning in the context of a language whose basic elements exhibit, in combination,
varying and unpredictable degrees of idiomaticity. In this regard, the explanation I am
proposing here has the benefit of better explaining the peculiar nature of the Mohists‘
investigations of language and their unique concern with the development of
techniques of analogical argumentation. Specifically, the Mohists‘ insistence on
classifying various expressions on the basis of their consideration of the properties of
nominalized infinitives would have been entirely unpersuasive as the basis of
philosophical argument if it were not for the fact that there were genuine similarities
and differences in the meanings of these infinitives that members of the broader
population outside the Mohists‘ philosophical community would have been willing to
recognize. No charitable interpretation of Mohist literature would assume that the
Mohists lacked the insight to realize that a mere stipulation that ―killing robbers‖ is
different in kind from ―killing people‖ would fail to convince any reasonable
interlocutor to change his or her views about the ethics of justified execution.21
20

This is, to be sure, a matter of speculation, and I have not identified any textual evidence in support of
it. However, if the Mohists really were making observations on common idioms, then they probably
would not have felt it necessary to point this out, for their argument could have easily been made
without doing so. In effect, I am offering what I take to be an inference to the best explanation: the best
(and most charitable) explanation of the Mohists‘ arguments in NO15 and elsewhere is that they had
something like this in mind. It is the best explanation because it represents the Mohists‘ method of
argument as an inherently reasonable one, unlike any account that assumes that they were in the business
of making arbitrary stipulations of meaning.
21
It might be claimed that since, in my view, the Mohists rejected the possibility of articulating a
principled distinction between intensionality and extensionality, I should agree with Fraser that they
must have felt a need to make stipulations about critical expressions to advance their views. I disagree. I
take the Mohists‘ rejection of this to imply that they rejected the possibility of identifying any general
features in the grammar of classical Chinese that would have enabled them to distinguish one from the
other on the basis of mere grammatical form. Note that grammatical form can reveal itself in many ways.
In English it is identified partly through properties of inflection, which are absent in classical Chinese. In
the latter, it is primarily the ordering of ideographs in a grammatical sequence that bears the burden of
revealing differences in grammatical form. Now, the language of English, it should be noted, is no
different from classical Chinese in this regard. Here, too, we seem to encounter serious difficulties in
drawing a principled distinction between intensionality and extensionality merely on the basis of
grammatical form. If Jack is riding a horse, then there is some horse that Jack is riding. However, if Jack
is imagining a horse, then we cannot conclude that there is some horse that Jack is imagining. We seem
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6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
I mentioned at the beginning of this paper that the insights of the Mohists reveal
obvious and important limitations in any technique of analysis that is uncritically
applied with a decompositional approach in mind. It is now time to clarify these
limitations. We have seen that an analysis of natural language concatenation in terms
of predicate conjunction is questionable for a very large variety of expressions in both
classical and modern Chinese. That the Mohists were especially concerned with this is
obvious from their discussion of mou ( 侔 , parallelizing), where concerns about
compositionality come to the fore. With an admirable degree of lucidity, they realized
that arbitrary combinations of ideographs in Chinese, such as the joining of verbs with
nouns to yield nominalized infinitives, cannot be uncritically assumed to produce
complex expressions whose meanings are determined merely by the meanings of their
parts and their modes of combination. This awareness of the problems of
to have a discrepancy in logical form, but this discrepancy is not exposed in the grammar, for the
sentences ‗Jack is riding a horse‘ and ‗Jack is imagining a horse‘ appear to have the same grammatical
form. This puzzle is simple to apprehend, but early philosophers of language in the West do not seem to
have been aware of it. Instead, we find them assuming that we can identify the logical form of a sentence
primarily through its grammar, as in the case of the syllogistic logic of Aristotle. The idea there was to
identify the form of an argument (and therewith its sentences) by examining its logical content and by
ignoring its non-logical content. The former was thought to be identified through certain elementary
logical notions (‗all‘, ‗some‘) in connection with basic properties of grammatical form, those associated
with relations between subjects, copulas, and objects. Hence, from the sentence ‗All humans are mortal‘
we obtain the sentence schema ‗All As are Bs‘. This operation, which exploits basic features of
grammatical form, was thought to draw out the logical form that is otherwise implicit in a sentence‘s
meaning. In later Mohist literature we do not observe a similar preoccupation with identifying general
principles of logical form because the Mohists were skeptical about it from the start: they were aware of
too many counterexamples that frustrated the very idea of identifying a logical form from a grammatical
one. So they admonished caution on the matter of making inferences on the basis of parallelisms in
grammar and rejected any general distinction between intensionality and extensionality. This does not
mean, on the other hand, that they had no reason to look for common idioms and other conventions
recognized in ordinary discourse. One may consistently reject a principled distinction between
intensionality and extensionality while observing that our ordinary speech is abounding in common
conventions that determine on a case by case basis how expressions are to be understood. There is no
difference in grammatical form between the expressions ‗he kicked the container‘ and ‗he kicked the
bucket‘, yet the latter in today‘s English, unlike the former, will often be taken as an idiom meaning ―he
died‖. We cannot determine this idiomatic meaning simply by examining its grammatical form, or by
identifying the meanings of the words and the way in which they are combined compositionally.
Consequently, we cannot rely on the properties of grammatical form to tell us that this expression is to
be interpreted non-extensionally. Yet its idiomatic meaning is there nonetheless; it is recognized and
supported by the conventions of use. In my view, the Mohists were simply trying to exploit conventions
of this sort to support their arguments. The Mohists‘ assumption was that those who felt some of the
force of the common idiom of ‗killing robbers‘ would have been more likely to concede to the Mohists‘
views on the ethics of justified execution if they realized (as the Mohists wanted) that they themselves
had a disposition to reason similarly with other patterns of expressions of similar form, such as those
found in NO15.
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compositionality led them to an understanding of the phenomena of intensionality and
idiomaticity that went largely unappreciated (so far as I know) in the early traditions of
the West.
It is noteworthy that classical Chinese‘s modern counterpart, which has inherited a
great deal from its predecessor, is highly idiomatic and retains many of the features
that resist compositional analyses that can be found in its earlier forms. This of course
is evident from the sheer numerousness of Chinese cheng-yu ( 成 语 , set phrases).
However, beyond these we observe a wide spectrum of semantical possibilities among
compound expressions that resist any simple scheme of classification, not simply
among nominal compounds but among most other types as well. Verb-object
compounds, for example, exhibit varying degrees of idiomaticity in agreement with the
extent to which their constituents are grammatically separable in context. 22 The
meaning of the verb ‗zou xue‘ (走穴, to earn extra money as a part time entertainer by
performing in many venues) is highly idiomatic and irreducible to the meanings of its
constituent parts, ‗zou‘ (走, to walk) and ‗xue‘ (穴, cave, hole). For this reason it does
not support a grammatical separation of its constituents, as do the readily separable
verb-object compounds ‗shui jiao‘ ( 睡觉 , to sleep) and ‗shuo huang‘ ( 说谎 , to lie),
which are essentially non-idiomatic. Thus, the following are grammatical:
(15)

这一觉，睡得真好。

I had a really good sleep.
(16)

这个谎我们不能说。

This lie we cannot tell.
However, no such parallel construction is possible for the expression ‗zou xue‘ (走
穴), in which the second constituent of the compound is detached from its partner and
placed in the sentence-initial position. What makes this contrast problematic for the
thesis of compositionality is the fact that there are rather nebulous cases in between:
phrases which allow for limited degrees of grammatical separability and which exhibit
lesser degrees of idiomaticity. An example is ‗ge ming‘ ( 革 命 , revolution), the
meanings of whose constituents ‗ge‘ (革, remove the mandate) and ‗ming‘ (命, life) do
seem to be faintly involved in the connotations of the whole; but the whole, which is
still largely idiomatic, supports only highly limited forms of grammatical separation.23
Another example is ‗shang feng‘ (伤风, catch a cold), which does not support sentences
in which the second constituent occurs in the sentence-initial position, but which does
22

For further discussion of this, see Li and Thompson 1989, 73-81. Most of these examples are from Li
and Thompson; the exceptions are ‗zou xue‘ and ‗ge ming‘. Li and Thompson do discuss ‗ge ming‘, but
they treat it as irreducibly idiomatic, whereas I think that the meanings of the parts do play some role in
the determination of the meaning of the whole. I thank Bo Mou for his comments on this point.
23
An example of this separation, suggested to me by Bo Mou, is ‗wo men jiu shi yao ge ni men de ming‘
(我们就是要革你们的命, We insist that we reform your practices).
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support constructions involving more limited forms of separation. Thus, whereas (18)
is ungrammatical, (18) and (19) are acceptable forms of speech:
(17) *风，伤了。
*A cold, he caught.
(18) 他伤了风。
He caught a cold.
(19) 他伤大风了。
He caught a terrible cold.
What we learn from these points is not just that there are some Chinese linguistic
phenomena that are impervious to the application of the analytical techniques we
described above. As the Mohists knew, it is that no definite criteria are possible for
determining which of these phenomena are amenable to a decompositional analysis,
and which are not. We cannot, in other words, outline categorical differences here. We
have, on the whole, broad spectrums of compound phenomena that admit of no precise
points at which expressions whose meanings are determined entirely through their
constituent parts and their combination can be distinguished from those whose
meanings are essentially idiomatic and recognized independently of the semantics of
their parts.
This point is critical, because arguments for compositionality typically rely on the
assumption that intensionality in natural language, in whatever form it occurs, is
clearly identifiable and isolable, so that the meaning of any complex grammatical
string that is not intensional is determined exhaustively by the meanings of its
constituent parts and the structural mode of their combination. Abandoning this
assumption, we are led to a more fluid conception of language. Apprehension of
meanings in discourse may customarily proceed not merely combinatorially, through a
tacit apprehension of the contributions of semantical building blocks and their overall
form, but also holistically, by means of an appreciation of the idiosyncrasies of
linguistic complexes, conceived more or less independently of their parts. And in the
attempt to fully ascertain others‘ communicative intentions in ordinary discourse this
conceptual shift between combinatorial and holistic modes of thought might very well
occur episodically. This underscores the general belief that success in communication
invariably depends on a heavy dose of inductive inference and inference to the best
explanation, in addition to one‘s deducing, in accordance with the constraints of
compositionality and the conventions of meaning, the literal meanings of sentences.
Though in their own way brilliant thinkers, the Mohists were not entirely
unprompted in their desire to articulate a logic of intensionality. For there are, as I have
argued, certain palpable features of classical Chinese, of both a semantical and
syntactical sort, that led them into their investigations of intensional contexts and that
served as a primary catalyst that inspired their own ambitious program of ―rectifying
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names‖. As far as I know, the philosophical implications of these obvious features have
not been sufficiently addressed in the literature in comparative philosophy, in spite of
the fact that the lexical semantics of Chinese compound expressions has received
substantial attention over the years in journals on Chinese linguistics. In any case, as a
principle central to much of our efforts at analyzing the expressions of natural language,
compositionality will have to be relegated in status to a rule of thumb. It can no longer
be assumed a priori to hold of a definitive range of complex expressions that are
classifiable on the basis of syntactical properties alone, and this implies that the syntax
of compound expressions cannot be assumed to be an infallible guide to the meanings
that correspond to them. This is not to say, on the other hand, that Western techniques
of logical analysis are to be cast aside as irrelevant to the problems of Chinese
philosophy, or to the issues that preoccupied the Mohists in particular. It is just that any
application of them will have to accommodate greater flexibility than the principle of
compositionality seems to allow. As the Mohists say, it will be necessary, in hazarding
analyses of critical philosophical statements or positions, for us to ―proceed with
caution‖.
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TYPOLOGY OF NOTHING:
HEIDEGGER, DAOISM AND BUDDHISM
ZHIHUA YAO

ABSTRACT: Parmenides expelled nonbeing from the realm of knowledge and forbade
us to think or talk about it. But still there has been a long tradition of nay-sayings
throughout the history of Western and Eastern philosophy. Are those philosophers talking
about the same nonbeing or nothing? If not, how do their concepts of nothing differ from
each other? Could there be different types of nothing? Surveying the traditional
classifications of nothing or nonbeing in the East and West have led me to develop a
typology of nothing that consists of three main types: 1) privative nothing, commonly
known as absence; 2) negative nothing, the altogether not or absolute nothing; and finally
3) original nothing, the nothing that is equivalent to being. I will test my threefold typology
of nothing by comparing the similarities and differences between the conceptions of
nothing in Heidegger, Daoism and Buddhism. These are three of the very few philosophical
strains that have launched themselves into the wonderland of negativity by developing
respectively the concepts of nothing (Nichts), nothing (wu 無) and emptiness (śūnyatā).
With this analysis, I hope that I will clarify some confusion in the understanding of nothing
in Heidegger, Daoism and Buddhism, and shed light on the central philosophical issue of
“what there is not”.

Keywords: nothing, absence, Heidegger, Daoism, Buddhism

1.

INTRODUCTION

Parmenides expelled nonbeing from the realm of knowledge and forbade us to
think or talk about it. But still there has been a long tradition of nay-sayings
throughout the history of Western and Eastern philosophy. Are those philosophers
talking about the same nonbeing or nothing? If not, how do their concepts of
nothing differ from each other? Could there be different types of nothing?
Leibniz once famously argued against the possibility of there being more than
one void. He maintains that if there could be more than one void, then there could
be two voids of exactly the same shape and size. These two voids would be perfect
twins (Sorensen 2009, sec. 9). Leibniz‘s argument suggests that if we are dealing
with empty space, then a type of nothing potentially has ―shape‖ or ―size‖. But the
variety of traditional conceptions of nothing is much more complicated than this.
____________________
YAO, ZHIHUA: Associate Professor, Department of Philosophy, the Chinese University
of Hong Kong. Email: zyao@cuhk.edu.hk
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Surveying the traditional classifications of nothing or nonbeing in the East and
West have led me to develop a typology of nothing that consists of three main
types: 1) privative nothing, commonly known as absence; 2) negative nothing, the
altogether not or absolute nothing; and finally 3) original nothing, the nothing that
is equivalent to being. I do not claim that these exhaust the types of nothing in
which many other philosophers had more finely grained classification schemes. For
instance, the Neo-Platonist Ammonios Hermeiu and the Indian Yogācārins
distinguished five different types of nothing, whereas Marius Victorinus (another
Neo-Platonist), Immanuel Kant, and mainstream Indian philosophy had developed
various fourfold schemes. However, I think my typology will suffice for the
purpose of my paper which is to examine the similarities and differences between
the conceptions of nothing in Heidegger, Daoism and Buddhism. The reason why I
choose these three philosophical strains to test my typology of nothing is not only
because I am familiar with them, but also because they each respectively represent
the developing concepts of nothing in the West, China and India.
The logical positivist Rudolf Carnap once criticized the Western tradition of
metaphysics by taking Heidegger‘s theory of nothing as an extreme case of
meaningless discourse (Carnap 1931, 233). Similarly, in the eyes of orthodox
Confucian and Hindu scholars, both Daoism and Buddhism were seen as passive,
negative, and even destructive to intellectual and social norms. In fact, these
scholars condemned them as heresies and were determined to eliminate their
influence on Chinese and Indian minds. It is no accident that their opponents
developed a ―negative‖ impression of these traditions. These are three of the very
few philosophical strains that have launched themselves into the wonderland of
negativity by developing respectively the concepts of nothing (Nichts), nothing (wu
無) and emptiness (śūnyatā).

2.

ORIGINAL NOTHING

In his major work Being and Time, Heidegger apparently did not treat nothing as a
central issue. Only in his analysis of Angst, one of the fundamental attunements
(Befindlichkeit) of Dasein, does he touch upon this concept. The idea of Angst is
deeply rooted in the Judeo-Christian tradition. In a long footnote in section 40 on
―The fundamental attunement of Angst as an eminent disclosedness of Da-sein‖,
Heidegger refers to Augustine, Luther and Kierkegaard to support his distinction
between Angst and fear (Furcht). With regard to Angst, Heidegger says:
The fact that what is threatening is nowhere characterizes what Angst is about. Angst ―does
not know‖ what it is about which it is anxious. But ―nowhere‖ does not mean nothing; rather,
region in general lies therein, and disclosedness of the world in general for essentially spatial
being-in. Therefore, what is threatening cannot approach from a definite direction within
nearness, it is already ―there‖ - and yet nowhere. It is so near that it is oppressive and stifles
one‘s breath - and yet it is nowhere. In what Angst is about, the ―it is nothing and nowhere‖
becomes manifest (Heidegger 1963, 186; Stambaugh 1996, 174-5).

It is nothing (Nichts) and nowhere (nirgends), and yet the disclosedness of the
world lies within it. This reminds us of God being depicted in negative terms within
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the mystical Christian tradition. In contrast to the philosophical discussions of
nothing, as found in early western philosophers, such as Parmenides and Plato, the
Christian mystics who developed the negative theology regard nothing as an
experience. Their view has influenced many classical German philosophers
including Schelling and Hegel. In this sense, nothing is not an abstract concept, but
rather a reality that can be experienced. This is similar to the Eastern mystical
tradition of Daoism that emphasizes the sagely practice of experiencing nothing
(shengren ti wu 聖人體無).
Of course, it is not so easy to experience nothing. In fact, Heidegger admits
that such an experience is rare. In Heidegger‘s What is Metaphysics, he states:
―Does such an attunement, in which man is brought before the nothing itself, occur
in human Dasein? It can and does occur, although rarely enough and only for a
moment, in the fundamental mood of Angst.‖ (Heidegger 1978, 111; 1998, 88, with
my modification) In this work of 1929, we find the most extensive discussion of
nothing by Heidegger. Most of the work illustrates how nothing is revealed and
experienced in Angst. Moreover, he develops another theme that is not seen in
Being and Time which is the relationship between being and nothing. He says,
―nothing does not remain the indeterminate opposite of beings but unveils itself as
belonging to the being of beings‖. (Heidegger 1978, 120; 1998, 94) Furthermore,
he states that ―[i]n the being of beings the nihilation (Nichten) of nothing occurs‖.
(Heidegger 1978, 115; 1998, 91) We can infer from these statements that Heidegger
takes nothing to be equivalent to being.
The idea that nothing and being is equivalent can be found in many of
Heidegger‘s works. For instance, ―Being: Nothing: Same…Nothing is the
characteristic (Kennzeichnung) of Being‖. 1 Reinhard May, who studied these
expressions, tries to prove their connection with relevant statements that are found
in Daoism and Chan Buddhism. These statements include: ―Being and nothing
giving rise to each other‘‘ (Dao-De-Jing Ch. 2); ―The things of the world arise from
being. And being arises from nothing‖ (Dao-De-Jing Ch. 40); ―Being is none other
than nothing, nothing is none other than being‖ (Xin-Xin-Ming 信心銘, T2023,
1056a). May maintains that all of these Daoist and Chan Buddhist writings were
already translated into German in or before the 1920s, and so Heidegger may have
read these sources and become influenced by them (May 1996, 26-8).
Heidegger, however, only admits Hegel‘s contribution on this point. He cites a
statement from Hegel‘s Science of Logic: ―Pure being and pure nothing are the
same.‖ Pure being and pure nothing are two concepts in the beginning of Hegel‘s
logical system. They are the same because they are indeterminate, immediate and
pure. But Heidegger disagrees with Hegel on how and why they are the same. He
says: ―Being and nothing do belong together, not because both – from the point of
view of the Hegelian concept of thought – agree in their indeterminateness and
immediacy, but rather because being itself is essentially finite and manifests itself
only in the transcendence of a Dasein that is held out into nothing.‖ (Heidegger
1978, 120; 1998, 94-5) Here ―the transcendence of Dasein‖ is discussed earlier in
the same work: ―Being held out into nothing – as Dasein is – on the ground of
concealed Angst is its surpassing of beings as a whole. It is transcendence.‖
1

For more examples, see May 1996, 21-6.
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(Heidegger 1978, 118; 1998, 93) Dasein transcends the totality of beings and
therefore reaches the being itself. Meanwhile, Dasein is also ―held out‖ into
nothing, therefore being and nothing become identical in the experiential dimension
of Dasein.
Another theme that Heidegger devoted himself to is the relationship between
nothing and negativity, a concept again bearing a Hegelian mark. In Hegel‘s system,
negativity is apparently more active and important than pure nothing. It is the
engine of the Hegelian dialectics and makes becoming, movement and development
possible through its force of Aufhebung. Although Heidegger insists that ―nothing is
the origin of negation, not vice versa‖ (Heidegger 1978, 117; 1998, 86), he closely
follows Hegel when he describes how nothing functions through negation and
refusal. We can see this in two of Heidegger‘s works that were written in the 1930s
but only recently published.
Fullness is pregnant with the originary ―not‖; making full is not yet and no longer gifting,
both in counter-resonance, refused in the very hesitating, and thus the charming-moving-unto
in the removal-unto in the removal-unto. Here [is] above all the swaying not-character of
be-ing as enowning (Heidegger 1999, 189).
The questioning of the history of being not only experiences nothing not as void (Nichtiges),
when this questioning requests the being itself in the fullness of its essential swaying, nothing
is experienced as enownment (Er-eignung) (Heidegger 1997 , 313. My translation).

Here enowning (Ereignis) or enownment (Ereignung) functions as the
provider or giver of being and time, and it is the ‗it‘ in the phrase ―it gives/there is‖
(es gibt). Meanwhile, Heidegger stresses that the withdrawal or refusal that is not
providing or giving also belongs essentially to the enowning itself. It is this
withdrawal or refusal that makes providing or giving possible. Therefore, in the
withdrawal or refusal that is located in the heart of enowning, we see an original
nothing which is the ultimate ground for negation and negativity.
The term ―original nothing‖ (nihil originarium) appears in Heidegger‘s
writings only a few times. For instance, when discussing the world as nothing, he
says: ―The world is the nothing that originally temporalizes itself and simply arises
in and with the temporalizing (Zeitigung). We, therefore, call the world the original
nothing (nihil originarium).‖2 Nevertheless, this term captures very well the basic
meaning of nothing in Heidegger‘s usage, namely, as something experienced by
Dasein‘s Angst, equivalent to being, and functioning through negation and
withdrawal.
By using ―original nothing‖ Heidegger also distances himself from other types
of nothing that were discussed by previous philosophers. It is generally agreed that
what Parmenides forbade us to talk about is ―the altogether not‖ (τὁ μηδαμῇ
μηδαμῶς ὄν). Since Plato philosophers have tried to break this curse, but they were
only approaching an ―absence‖. In Kant‘s fourfold classification of nothing, these
two senses of nothing are respectively called negative nothing (nihil negativum)
and privative nothing (nihil privativum). He characterizes the former as ―the empty
2

Heidegger 1990, 271. Cited from Wirtz 2006, 333. My translation. For more discussions on this
concept, see Kwan 1982, 76, 83-84, and 142.
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object without concept‖ that is the impossible, e.g., a two-sided rectilinear figure,
and the latter as ―the empty object of a concept‖, e.g., a shadow or cold. 3 For many
philosophers, these are the two basic types of nothing. I therefore take them to be
the first two types in my classification scheme. But Heidegger‘s sense of original
nothing seems to have nothing to do with them. Instead, this nothing signifies
alternatively to his key concept of being. Nothing as being is also one of the four
types of nothing for the Neo-Platonist, Marius Victorinus. 4 Its traces can be found
in many classical German thinkers such as F.H. Jacobi, J.G. Hamann, Schelling,
Hegel, and F. von Baader. So, I include original nothing as the third type of nothing
in my classification scheme. With these three types of nothing in mind, we can now
discuss the Daoist concept of nothing.

3.

NOTHING

In early Daoism, nothing may not have been a central concept as ―Dao‖ but even at
this stage it is an essential aspect of Dao. Its position was further elevated with the
development of the Xuan School. The Neo-Confucian scholars, also known as
―Dao-scholars‖, were not necessarily upset by the idea of Dao, but often reacted
strongly against nothing. Nothing may not be the central concept of Daoist
philosophy, but it is surely the most characteristic Daoist concept.
According to Pang (1999, 348-63), the concept of nothing as discussed in the
rich canons of Chinese philosophy can be classified as having three different types.
These include ―nothing as absence‖, ―absolute nothing‖, and ―nothing as being‖
which are signified respectively by the characters ‗wang‘ (亡), ‗wu‘ (无) and ‗wu‘
(無). Interestingly, these three types correspond to the three major types of nothing
that I identified among Western philosophers, namely, privative nothing (nihil
privativum), negative nothing (nihil negativum) and original nothing (nihil
originarium). It is now pertinent to consider what type of nothing the Daoists were
talking about.
Many contemporary scholars distinguish two senses of nothing in Lao Zi‘s
Dao-De-Jing.5 One is the empirical or commonsense usage referring to empty
space. This usage is found especially in Chapter 11 of the Dao-De-Jing, where
nothing functions inside the hub, a pot, and the dwelling. The other is nothing in its
metaphysical sense, referring to the source or origin of all existents, and found in
key passages of the Dao-De-Jing, e.g., Chapters 2 and 40. 6 This distinction,
however, becomes irrelevant if we attempt to match Daoist nothing to my typology
of nothing. Both space and the origin of all existents are actual existence with real
3

See Kant 1956, 332-3. The other two types are rational entity (ens rationis) and imaginary entity
(ens imaginarium).
4
See Kobusch 1984, 809. The other three types are negation, mutual relation, and the not-yet
existent (Noch-nichtsein). Another Neo-Platonist Ammonios Hermeiu added the fifth ineffable
unrepresentable nothing to the list.
5
For instance, Liu 1997, 159; Wang 2001, 155; Lin 2007, 151.
6
I exclude chapter 1, because I read the relevant sentence there as ―the nameless (wuming 無名) is
the origin of heaven and earth‖ rather than ―nothing (wu 無) is called (ming 名) the origin of
heaven and earth‖.
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function. They are called nothing only because they are formless and imageless. So
nothing for Lao Zi, either in its empirical or metaphysical sense, is the ―nothing as
being‖ or the original nothing.
In the Dao-De-Jing, there are also a large number of compounds in the form of
―non-x‖ or ―no-x‖, e.g., non-action (wu-wei 無爲) and no-name (wu-ming 無名),
where the word ‗wu‘ (‗non-‘, ‗no-‘) functions as a prefix in the compound and
cannot act independently as a noun or a philosophical concept. Its meaning is close
to the privative nothing or nothing as absence. The Daoist classics never seem to
mention the absolute or negative nothing, which usually indicates logical
impossibility as in the case of late Moist classics. 7
In any case, the concept of nothing as discussed in the Daoist philosophical
context falls under the category of original nothing or nothing as being. It is
elaborated in two aspects. The first is the cosmogonical or vertical dimension, with
the emphasis of nothing being the source or origin of existents: ―The things of the
world arise from being. And being arises from nothing.‖8 It is this ability of giving
rise to all existents that makes nothing the true original nothing. The same idea is
elaborated in the Zhuang-Zi: ―The myriad things come forth from nonbeing. Being
cannot bring being into being; it must come forth from nonbeing, and nonbeing is
singularly nonbeing.‖9 The Xuan School, represented by Wang Bi, further develops
this line of thinking and interprets nothing as the ―origin‖ (ben 本) of all things. In
comparison to its Western counterparts, the Daoist nothing is more ―original‖ by
emphasizing its cosmogonical dimension.
The second is the ontological or horizontal dimension that emphasizes ―being
and nothing giving rise to each other‖.10 The mutual arising of being and nothing
horizontally illuminates the identity and transformation between pure being and
pure nothing. The formless imageless original nothing, through its identity with and
transformation into being, establishes its ontological position in the sense of
nothing as being. This runs parallel to the ontologies of Hegel and Heidegger.
Certain tension exists between the two dimensions, however, and many
commentators have attempted to explain the apparent contradiction. In my view, the
failure of classical Chinese philosophers, such as Lao Zi, to distinguish ontology
from cosmology or cosmogony contributes to this tension. The admixture of
cosmogonical and ontological approaches that dominates classical Chinese
philosophy probably owes its existence to the centrality of sheng (生) (begetting,
generating, giving rise to) in Daoist and Confucian metaphysics. Exactly for the
same reason, original nothing in Lao Zi and Daoist philosophy is realized in its
more complete ―original‖ form than in the works of Western philosophers such as
Heidegger, who only stress its ontological dimension.

7

See the Mojing and its commentary: 無不必待有，……無天陷，則無之而無 (Nonbeing does not
necessarily presuppose being. … In the case the nonbeing of the sky‘s falling down, it is nonbeing
without ever having been).
8
Dao-De-Jing, Chapter 40: 天下萬物生於有，有生於無.
9
Zhuang-Zi, Chapter of ―Geng-Sang-Chu‖: 萬物出乎無有，有不能以有為有，必出乎無有，而
無有一無有.
10
Dao-De-Jing, Chapter 2: 有無相生.
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4.

EMPTINESS

Let us turn to emptiness in Buddhist philosophy and its relationship to nothing. In
early and sectarian Buddhism, the concept of emptiness was employed to interpret
the foundational Buddhist doctrine of no-self. It became one of the key Buddhist
concepts with the rise of Perfection of Wisdom literature and its interpretation by
the Madhyamaka scholars. The orthodox Hindu scholars, who often classified
Buddhist philosophy into four major schools, namely, Sarvāstivāda realism,
Sautrāntika indirect realism, Yogācāra idealism, and Madhyamaka nihilism, were
especially critical of the latter. In their view, emptiness may not have been the
central concept of Buddhism, but it was no doubt the most characteristic of
Buddhist philosophy.
In the history of Indian philosophy, different schemes were developed for
classifying nothing or nonbeing (abhāva). The mainstream Vaiśeṣikas, Naiyāyikas,
and Mīmāṃsākas classified nonbeing into four types, namely, prior nonbeing
(prāgabhāva), posterior nonbeing (dhvaṃsābhāva), mutual nonbeing (anyonyābhāva), and absolute nonbeing (atyantābhāva). These four types can be
subsumed into two more basic types: absolute nonbeing and mutual nonbeing. The
latter covers the first three of four types, which are its manifestations in temporal
and spatial dimensions. Mutual nonbeing corresponds to privative nothing or
absence in my typology, while absolute nonbeing is the negative nothing with
respect to ―the altogether not‖. This popular scheme, however, does not include
emptiness. Among the Indic sources that I have encountered, only a Yogācāra
Buddhist text adds emptiness to the scheme as the fifth type of nonbeing. It is
called the ―ultimate nonbeing‖ (paramārthāsat) and interpreted as ―devoid of
intrinsic nature‖ (niḥsvabhāva), which is exactly the definition of emptiness. 11
In the history of Buddhism the Madhyamaka and Yogācāra traditions have
developed an interpretation of emptiness. It is generally agreed that the Perfection
of Wisdom literature and its Madhyamaka interpretation, while aiming at criticizing
and denying intrinsic nature, made emptiness a central Buddhist concept. Intrinsic
nature (svabhāva) was a key concept in Abhidharma scholasticism that
characterized the unanalysable elements (dharma) of all existents. In this
understanding, the intrinsic nature of each and every element should be distinctive
and consistent, otherwise their distinction will collapse. Meanwhile, their consistent,
even permanent, nature does not imply that existents made of elements do not go
through change or transformation. All the elements and existents, as long as they
are conditioned, must dependently arise and cease.
In the Madhyamaka view, however, the concept of intrinsic nature is
incompatible with the foundational Buddhist doctrine of dependent arising.
Nāgārjuna argues, ―[t]he origination of intrinsic nature from causes and conditions
is illogical, since intrinsic nature originated from causes and conditions would
become contingent. How could there be contingent intrinsic nature? Intrinsic nature
is not contingent, nor is it dependent on others.‖12 By upholding the doctrine of
11

It is found in the encyclopedic Yogācārabhūmi (T1579, 362c) and its commentaries (T1828, 416a
and T1829, 97a).
12
Mūlamadhyamakakārikā 16.1-2: na saṃbhavaḥ svabhāvasya yuktaḥ pratyayahetubhiḥ /
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dependent origination, one must give up and deny intrinsic nature, as Nāgārjuna
declares: ―Whatever is dependently originated, I claim it is emptiness.‖13 He holds
that all those in the net of causal arising—either conventional existence or its
elements—are devoid of intrinsic nature and empty. For the Ābhidharmikas, such
conventional existence—for instance, a desk or person—is conceptually
constructed, and hence lack intrinsic nature, but their building blocks are those
elements embedded with intrinsic nature. Nāgārjuna insists that even those building
blocks, as long as they arise and cease in the causal network, are also ―conceptually
constructed‖.14
There are at least two ways of understanding this claim of emptiness. If all
existents are conceptually constructed, as with illusions and hallucinatory objects,
then emptiness in this sense is absolute or negative nothing as in the case of the son
of a barren woman or square-circle, both indicating logical impossibility. This will
inevitably lead to a nihilist end that negates all existents, which, as a matter of fact,
dominates classical and contemporary interpretations of the Madhyamaka
tradition. 15 The other way, however, emphasizes that absolute reality such as
dharma-realm (dharmadhātu) or thusness (tathatā) is revealed through the idea of
emptiness that denies intrinsic nature.16 In this view, emptiness comes close to
original nothing or nothing as being. Nāgārjuna himself seems unwilling to fall into
either extreme when he claims that emptiness is ―the middle way‖17 which is
beyond nonbeing and being. From the viewpoint of my typology of nothing, if
emptiness is beyond negative nothing (the extreme of nonbeing) and original
nothing (the extreme of being), then it would fall under privative nothing. This
observation is supported by the very definition of emptiness as ―devoid of intrinsic
nature‖ which is a constant negation and antidote of any reification, even emptiness
itself, and therefore ―emptiness is empty‖. 18
In the Yogācāra School, even though emptiness is not as central as it is in the
Madhyamaka School, the Yogācārins understood it very differently. They refer to a
passage from an early Buddhist text, Cūḷasuññata-sutta, which is never cited by the
Mādhyamikas in their extensive discussion on emptiness. The text says: ―It is seen
that when something does not exist somewhere, that place is empty with regard to
the former. And yet it is to be understood that when something remains somewhere
it does exist as reality.‖19 In this case, emptiness is understood in terms of privation
or absence, or, in an Indian term, mutual nonbeing. But this type of nonbeing is
always relative to something existent. It is in this sense that emptiness serves as an
antidote to intrinsic nature in Madhyamaka. But when emptiness is expanded to
negate all existents at the ultimate level, it will cease to be a mutual nonbeing in the
hetupratyayasaṃbhūtaḥ svabhāvaḥ kṛtako bhavet // svabhāvaḥ kṛtako nāma bhaviṣyati punaḥ
kathaṃ / akṛtrimaḥ svabhāvo hi nirapekṣaḥ paratra ca //.
13
Mūlamadhyamakakārikā 24.18ab: yaḥ pratītyasamutpādaḥ śūnyatāṃ tāṃ pracakṣmahe /.
14
Mūlamadhyamakakārikā 24. 18c: sā prajñaptir upādāya pratipat.
15
Contemporary scholars with this approach are represented by Eugene Burnouf, H. Jacobi, M.
Walleser, I. Wach, A.B. Keith, and La Vallee Poussin. See Lin 1999, 183-6.
16
Contemporary representatives of this approach are St. Schayer, Stcherbatsky, and Murti. See Lin
1999, 186-91.
17
Mūlamadhyamakakārikā 24. 18d: saiva madhyamā //.
18
See Piṅgala‘s commentary on the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, T1564, 33b17.
19
Cited from Nagao 1991, 210.
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sense of absence and become an absolute negative nonbeing. The Mādhyamikas
themselves may not admit this, but their theory inevitably leads to this end.
The Yogācārins understood emptiness in terms of its root meaning of absence
and defined ―the characteristic of emptiness as nonbeing of subject and object and
the being of that nonbeing‖. 20 The subject and object, in their epistemologically
oriented project, is regarded as conceptual constructions on the basis of existent
conscious processes. The concept of emptiness denies the existence of these
conceptual constructions, yet asserts the existence of consciousness (vijñāna),
thusness (tathatā), or dharma-realm (dharmadhātu). In this respect, emptiness is
equivalent to the so-called ―wondrous being‖ (miao-you 妙有) and therefore comes
close to the original nothing or nothing as being in my typology of nothing.
Later Tibetan Buddhists characterized the Yogācāra way of understanding
emptiness as ―other-emptiness‖ (gzhan stong), in contrast to the ―self-emptiness‖
(rang stong) held by the Mādhyamikas, and condemned the former way of
understanding as heresy. This understanding of emptiness as wondrous being,
however, became dominant in East Asian Buddhism, a development based on the
influence of the Yogācāra as well as the Daoist sense of original nothing. As a result,
Buddhist emptiness and Daoist nothing were easily confused.21 Masao Abe (1985,
128-30), for instance, while discussing the superiority of negativity in Eastern
philosophy, treated Daoist nothing and Buddhist emptiness as equivalent to
wondrous being. In his discussion, both are understood to be original nothing or
nothing as being.

5.

CONCLUSION

By comparing the similarities and differences between the concept of nothing in
Heidegger, Daoism and Buddhism, I have tested my threefold typology of nothing.
If we distinguish the conceptions of nothing into three basic types, namely,
privative, negative, and original nothing, then Heidegger‘s and Daoism‘s
conception of nothing can be characterized as ―original nothing‖. The unique
Daoist cosmogonical-ontological approach renders nothing more ―original‖ than its
parallels in Western philosophy. In contrast, the emptiness in Madhyamaka
Buddhism is basically a type of privative nothing, but its tendency to negate all
existents at the ultimate level leads to negative nothing. And finally, the emptiness
in Yogācāra Buddhism is basically nothing as absence or privation, but its
affirmation of ultimate reality leads to original nothing. The latter sense of
emptiness was more influential among East Asian Buddhists, and more easily
confused with the Daoists‘ original nothing.
With this analysis, I hope that I have clarified some confusion in the
understanding of nothing in Heidegger, Daoism and Buddhism. This typology of
nothing also sheds light on the central philosophical issue of ―what there is not‖.
The perplexity of this issue is attributed to the fact that nonbeing or nothing, by its
very nature, escapes from falling into a being or something and thus resists any
20
21

Madhyāntavibhāga I.13ab: dvayābhāvo hy abhāvasya bhāvaḥ śūnyasya lakṣaṇaṃ /.
See the relevant studies in Luo 2003 and Zhao 2007.

Comparative Philosophy 1.1 (2010)

YAO

87

attempt of definition or characterization. In the history of Western philosophy, the
mystery of nothing is usually associated with two equally mysterious questions.
One is why, according to Parmenides, can we not think or talk about nonbeing?
This question becomes even more intriguing in contrast to the fact that we can talk
about nonbeing or nothing with ease in our ordinary language. The other is the
famous Leibnizian–Heideggerian question: ―Why is there something rather than
nothing?‖ which has been taken to be the fundamental question of metaphysics.
According to my typology of nothing, when Parmenides forbade us from
thinking or talking about nonbeing, he was warning us against the altogether not or
absolute nothing, e.g., square-circle and the son of a barren woman. It is evident
that this type of nothing was mainly a logician‘s concern, including Moists, Hindu
and Buddhist logicians, and contemporary analytical philosophers since Russell.
Given its nature of being logically contradictory and impossible, this type of
nothing, as predicted by Parmenides, does not really enter into the realm of
knowledge, but rather functions as an indicator of the limit of human knowledge.
What does enter the realm of our knowledge and ordinary language is a different
type of nothing. To break the curse of Parmenides, Plato and his followers were
approaching ―what there is not‖ in the sense of ―difference‖ or, in Indian
terminology, mutual nonbeing. As the absence or privation of being, this type of
nothing is always an essential part of our knowledge. So the reason that we can
think or talk about nonbeing or nothing with ease is not because Parmenides was
wrong, but because we are approaching a different interpretation of nothing.
Leibniz was the first philosopher to put forward the perplexing metaphysical
question: ―Why is there something rather than nothing?‖ Various attempts to
answer this question have understood nothing as an absolute nothing that is
logically impossible. As a result, the existence of something is believed to have a
higher probability or necessity. The question then becomes purely speculative, as if
it is possible for a state of absolute nothing to exist prior to something. However, if
we understand nothing in the Heideggerian or Daoist sense of original nothing, then
the question is a matter of cosmogony, i.e., how a concrete something with form
and image comes about from a formless imageless state. To answer this, Christian
theologians would resort to God‘s will, whereas Daoists would rely on the
creativity of Dao. In either case, nothing should not be understood as absolute
nothing or absence; such an interpretation will lead to vain speculations. Instead,
nothing is a formless imageless state of existence, which is described as earth and
water covered with darkness in the Book of Genesis, or simply as chaos in Daoist
writings. It is only with this conception of nothing that we can make sense of this
fundamental question of metaphysics.
I have expounded my typology of nothing by comparing the conceptions of
nothing in Heidegger, Daoism and Buddhism (three representative philosophical
trends in the West, China and India). Each has explored negativity to a great depth
and preliminarily answers two perplexing questions in the philosophical discourse
of nothing, i.e., ―why we cannot think or talk about nothing‖ and ―why there is
something rather than nothing‖. The depth of these discussions shows that it is
wrong to indiscriminately exclude all kinds of nothing from the proper realm of
philosophy. Instead we should treat the subject more seriously by engaging with
traditional sources in the East and West with the hope that we may eventually know
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better ―what there is not‖.
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COMPARISON PARADOX, COMPARATIVE SITUATION AND INTERPARADIGMATICY: A METHODOLOGICAL REFLECTION ON CROSSCULTURAL PHILOSOPHICAL COMPARISON
XIANGLONG ZHANG
ABSTRACT: It is commonly believed that philosophical comparison depends on having
some common measure or standard between and above the compared parts. The paper is to
show that the foregoing common belief is incorrect and therewith to inquire into the possibility
of cross-cultural philosophical comparison. First, the „comparison paradox‟ will be expounded.
It is a theoretical difficulty for the philosophical tendency represented by Plato‟s theory of
Ideas to justify comparative activities. Further, the connection of the comparative paradox
with the obstacles met by cross-cultural philosophical comparisons will be demonstrated. It
will be shown that to attribute the difficulty of cross-cultural comparisons to
incommensurability of traditions is irrelevant and misleading. It is to be argued that the
original possibility of comparison depends on the „comparative situation‟, i.e., the mechanism
of meaning-production that functions in a non-universalistic and anonymous way. A
philosophical paradigm does facilitate the attendance of such a situation, but it is also possible
for the situation to emerge between paradigms in a gamesome way. Accordingly, the genuine
comparison at issue will not originate primarily and merely on the level of concepts and
propositions, but can only be achieved through inter-paradigmatic conditions, where we have
the sharp awareness of a paradigm‟s boundary from which we can attempt to achieve
situational communication with another paradigm. In light of this, the perspective of a
philosophical comparison differs not only from the traditional or universalistic one, but also
from Gadamer‟s hermeneutics, such as the doctrine of „fusion of horizons‟. The new
perspective finds an illustration in Heidegger‟s relations with Daoism.

Keywords: comparative paradox, incommensurability, comparative situation, interparadigmaticy, Heidegger‟s attitude towards Dao.

With respect to cross-cultural philosophical comparisons, two attitudes can be
identified: one is optimistic, the other pessimistic. The former overlooks the special
obstacles in such comparisons, taking them as feasible as the comparison within one
tradition. The latter, because of being aware of the difficulty of the so-called
‗incommensurability‘ between philosophical traditions, denies the possibility of the
comparison. However, we do recognize that there have been some successful cross______________________
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cultural philosophical comparisons such as that between Indian Buddhism and the
Chinese Dao-oriented tradition, which differs profoundly from the efforts guided by
the aforementioned attitudes. What is taken for granted by the two attitudes is that
significant philosophical comparison must be done between concepts and propositions
in accordance with a universalizable ‗common measure‘ or standard. If no common
measure exists, then the attempt for comparison amounts to building architecture on
sand. This idea hinders methodological cross-cultural comparison, since there is no
universally valid standard between alienated traditions. To show that this shared
presupposition is untenable, I will start from a reflection on Plato‘s doctrine of
comparative possibility which entails a ‗comparison paradox‘. We will then try to find
what is required for a genuine comparison as well as a philosophical comparison. A
‗paradigm‘ does facilitate philosophical comparison in itself, not mainly because it
provides some common standard, but rather its encouraging of an emergence of a
comparative situation. As far as the situation appears and functions, comparison is
evoked. In this new perspective, therefore, inter-paradigmatic comparison may not be
impossible if the situation is not totally rejected at the interval.
1. COMPARISON PARADOX
Plato, the most influential philosopher in the history of western philosophy, establishes
a universal and substantial reason for the possibility of comparison. In one of his works,
Phaedo, he writes:
Then you too wouldn‘t accept anyone‘s saying that one person was larger than another by a head,
and the smaller was smaller by the same thing; but you‘d protest that you for your part will say
only that everything larger than something else is larger by nothing but largeness, and largeness is
the reason for its being larger; and that the smaller is smaller by nothing but smallness, and
smallness is the reason for its being smaller . (Plato, Phaedo, 100e－101a)

Plato is talking about a comparison, namely, between one person being larger or
smaller than another person. It seems that all of us are able to make such comparisons,
but how shall we provide a ‗reason‘ for this comparative ‗ability‘? Plato‘s answer is
that a comparative act depends on the Ideas (eidos, idea) as ‗largeness‘ and ‗smallness‘.
In other words, the comparative act will not consist of the experience of the two
compared things (e.g., seeing or touching A and B). There must be a third item of a
higher order (e.g., ‗largeness‘) to make the recognition of ‗A is larger than B‘ possible.
It is ‗largeness‘ or ‗smallness‘, being self-dependent and universally valid, that allows
for a common measure or pivot for comparison which makes the experience of ‗A is
larger than B‘ possible. Otherwise, how would you know that A is larger —instead of
whiter, darker, prettier, etc.—than B? If you have A and B, among many other items,
but not the Idea of ‗largeness‘ itself, then how can you possess the experience of ‗A is
larger than B‘?
The problem with Plato‘s account is that it fails to explain the ability of making a
comparison in a final sense. Even if we accept his theory of Ideas, we would only
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know that ‗A is large‘, where A participates in ‗largeness‘, but not that ‗A is larger than
B‘, since the phrase ‗larger…than‘ implies that ‗A is large‘ and ‗B is small‘.
We also know that Plato views ‗largeness‘ and ‗smallness‘ as radically distinct
from each other and cannot coexist in one situation at the same time. If we admit that
‗largeness‘ and ‗smallness‘ attend the same comparison, then the ‗common measure‘
that Plato believes constitute the experience of comparison will disappear. So, we
cannot make a genuine comparison in the Platonic framework. Furthermore, the
expression ‗A is as large as B‘, taken as a comparison, implies the possibility that ‗A is
larger (smaller) than B‘.
The difficulty of ‗comparison‘ made through definite Ideas can be expressed more
concisely as follows:
1. Any comparison must be accomplished by finding the sameness or difference
between two items (A/B).
2. On the one hand, finding ‗sameness‘, or what can be viewed as ‗the same‘
according to a common measure, has nothing to do with comparison because
any comparison can never arise in the pure sameness.
3. On the other hand, it is also impossible to find any difference between two
items, for according to Plato, the difference can only be found through a
common measure. Consequently, the so-called ‗difference‘ that is found in the
Platonic framework, such as the ‗large‘ or the ‗small‘, is no longer a difference
but a common point (largeness or smallness of things). 1
4. In conclusion, a genuine comparison is impossible.
Indeed, this ‗comparison paradox‘2 can be expressed even more concisely:
Any comparison will demand the simultaneous presence of ‗sameness‘ and ‗difference‘. This will
negate the common measure or the pivot of comparison in Platonic perspective, and thus make
comparison impossible.

The same paradox is recognized by Zhuang Zi (莊子) who writes in the second chapter
of his book:
Whom shall we ask to produce the right decision? We may ask someone who agrees with you; but
since he agrees with you, how can he make the decision? We may ask someone who agrees with
me; but since he agrees with me, how can he make the decision? We may ask someone who agrees
with both you and me, but since he agrees with both you and me, how can he make the decision?
1

Plato views ‗difference as such‘ as an ‗Idea‘ (Sophist, 255e), which comes into being by participating
or sharing the Idea of ‗being‘ (259e). Therefore, difference has its own being. But it does not explain the
difference in comparison. As for the Idea of ‗difference‘, we can ask: is it different from itself ?
Answering this question will result in a ‗paradox of difference‘, i.e., whether the answer is yes or no, it
will lead to its opposition. But as regards to the difference in comparison, the same question cannot be
asked, for it has no ‗self‘ [of its Idea].
2
The term ‗paradox‘ or ‗antinomy‘ is used in a less strict way to refer to a radical dilemma that cannot
be overcome by taking any direction, be it forward or backward.
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We may ask someone who differs from both you and me, but since he differs from both you and
me, how can he make the decision? (Zhuang Zi Chap. 2, 1989, 53)

The ‗decision‘ that Zhuang Zi mentions means that the arbitration of the controversy
between you and me naturally needs the comparison between the opinions of both
sides as a prerequisite. Zhuang Zi shows that it is impossible to accomplish a
comparison and hence an arbitration if we deal with the sameness and difference
separately.
2. THE PARADOX OF COMPARATIVE PHILOSOPHY
The ‗comparison paradox‘ is deeply implanted between different philosophies. In the
tradition of Western philosophy and the enterprise of philosophical comparison, which
on a large scale pursues explicitly or implicitly the Platonic ‗commensurability‘,
‗philosophy‘ is mainly viewed as an effort of thinking that inquires fundamental
problems by reflecting on and constructing individual concepts or propositions (or a
system of concepts or propositions). Consequently, this tradition has been seeking to
establish certain universal standards, foundations or premises from which all beings
must obey. In such a framework of thinking, cross-cultural philosophical comparison
cannot avoid the comparison paradox since the possibility of comparison will depend
on the universality that provides common measure for the compared sides. For instance,
the comparison between Western and Chinese philosophy, which is advocated by
Zong-san Mou（牟宗三）is constrained by this kind of framework. Mou holds that:
Ideas…will become universal when they become concepts. But this kind of universality, from a
Chinese viewpoint, bears its own peculiarities from the beginning of its civilization …
Consequently, there are Chinese as well as Western philosophy…which can be communicated,
however, through their universality. Communication means universality, and from here a common
understanding is possible. There will be no common understanding if there is no universality. (Mou
1997, 3-5)

It is clear that Mou, among many other philosophers who share this view, believes that
universal concepts guarantee sufficient comparison (i.e., ‗communication‘)
When we compare two philosophical doctrines, e.g., C and D, what we are trying
to do, in the most basic sense, is find their sameness and difference. Even an implicit
comparison, i.e., interpreting D from the viewpoint and method of C without
mentioning C itself, cannot be reasonably justified without the recognition of their
sameness and difference. When we are talking about the sameness and difference of C
and D, it is important to consider what common measure or standard of comparison we
are appealing to. But can we truly appeal to a common measure in order to obtain a
meaningful comparison? These problems are not often directly addressed, but how we
solve them, whether explicitly or implicitly, will influence the quality of comparison.
Most of the time, we speak of sameness and difference in light of the measure we are
accustomed to, such as, with an early introduction of Buddhism to the Chinese world.
Scholars or monks apply the method of ge-yi (格義, obtaining the meaning of alien
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terms by analogy with what we know) in order to translate and comprehend Buddhist
terms in virtue of the compared Daoist terms. On the contrary, in the period of a
‗paradigm shift‘, it is also possible to speak of sameness and difference in light of the
measure provided by the other side, such as what took place in the process of ‗reversed
ge-yi（fan-xiang-ge-yi 反向格義)‘ in China since the twentieth century (Liu 2007).
However, as the comparative paradox shows, not all of these comparisons are genuine.
As a result, many cases of comparison between Chinese and Western philosophy are
not entirely satisfying, and this problem cannot be solved by simply mastering the
literature of both sides or by being more tolerant of the foreign view. Surely we can
learn to be erudite and tolerant, and discover some apparent similarities or differences,
but this does not mean that we will find pivots of comparison that can help resolve
genuine philosophical problems with full constructive engagement. Once we try to
compare philosophical thoughts according to a certain imagined universal standard, we
will therefore either exceed or fail to achieve the middle pivotal junction by which they
are connected. Accordingly, ‗incommensurability‘ is not the proper expression of
difficulty that lies with philosophical comparison. If ‗commensurability‘ is taken as the
common measure or universal standard in comparison, then it is not only irrelevant but
misleading when dealing with the issue of possibility of philosophical comparison.
3. COMPARATIVE SITUATION
Although it is difficult in theory to make a comparison, in everyday-life we experience,
and often do make, successful comparisons. Comparison is the prerequisite of
recognition, and consequently of any meaning, consciousness, or perception. As
structuralism maintains, differentiations constitute the meanings of a language (F.D.
Saussure 1985, 164-165, 167-168). This differentiation, however, cannot be ideally
assimilated, i.e., differences made according to a common standard or Idea. Meanwhile,
it is not totally separable from similarity either. 3 Rather, it is the differentiation in
comparison.
When I see some dates on a high tree and several bamboo rods lying at the foot of
the tree, I take the longest rod to get the dates without any kind of idealized thinking.
In such an act, I successfully accomplish a comparison. The so-called ‗successful
comparison‘ refers to those comparative acts that produce the meanings or have the
effects that would not have appeared in unilateral or non-comparative acts. I call the
structure which makes the comparison successful a ‗comparative situation‘.
The following question now arises: how does a comparative situation appear,
especially with respect to different philosophies? Let us first reflect on the mechanism
of the comparison paradox. Plato claims that a successful comparison depends on the
transcendent common measure, e.g., ‗largeness‘, to which the compared items refer.
3

Saussure thinks that the basic differentiation is opposition. Opposition, such as ‗père/mère‘
(father/mother), ‗Nacht/Nächte‘ (night/nights) implies rather than presupposes certain similarity
(Saussure 1995, 166-169).
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However, as argued above, the experience of the comparison ‗A is larger than B‘
cannot be formed simply by participating in ‗largeness‘ because the experience of
‗larger than‘ implies in itself ‗smaller than‘; and a simultaneous experience of ‗larger‘
and ‗smaller‘ is unimaginable according to the theory of Ideas and rules of formal logic,
for there is no Idea that can be large and small at the same time. 4 Accordingly, if
philosophy is nothing but the result of Idealization or conceptualization, and if the
comparisons of philosophical doctrines can only be accomplished on a conceptual level,
then there will not be any fruitful comparison. It still belongs to where the comparison
paradox can be applied.
Is it necessarily contradictory and meaningless if ‗the large and the small‘ appear
in the same experience? Of course not. Otherwise no fruitful comparative experience
will occur. We all know it is possible, and it even takes place from time to time.
Furthermore, it will not work if we understand the co-existence of ‗A and non-A‘ as a
dialectic synthesis, i.e., as the development of ‗thesis-antithesis-synthesis‘, for this
already presupposes a comparison, but not the other way around. One fact is that the
application of dialectic in the philosophical researches of mainland China, during the
last sixty years, did not bring about any prosperity to cross-cultural philosophical
comparison, but rather, popularity of philosophical West-centrism.
In the traditional philosophical mainstream, concepts (e.g., the concept of
‗highness‘) come into being either by themselves or by abstraction, and thus contain a
hard and essentially idealized core, demanding distribution (universal applicability)
and identification. If concepts are not distributed or limited, this can only be caused by
adding more concepts to previous ones, but not by an act of comparison. For example,
if we add ‗middle‘, ‗extremely‘, or ‗not‘ to the concept ‗high‘, we respectively obtain
the following concepts: ‗middle high‘, ‗extremely high‘, or ‗not high‘. For this reason,
the theory of genos elucidated in Plato‘s Sophist, though it shows a profound motive to
save the ‗plurality‘ of phenomena, cannot enter into the dynamic phenomenal process
of comparison due to its method of grasping dichotomies like ‗similarity/difference‘ or
‗being/non-being‘ by ‗definition‘ and ‗conceptual division‘.
A ‗comparative situation‘ can be understood as a meaningful comparison without
appealing to a higher measure. We can say ‗Ming Yao (姚明) (2.29m) is taller than
Michael Jordan (1.98m)‘ as soon as we see them standing together. It has nothing to do
with participating in the Idea of ‗tallness‘, but simply with the experience of this
concrete comparative situation. Someone may argue that this situation presupposes
many accumulated experiences, e.g., childhood learning experiences, in which the
capacity of recognition and using a language is acquired, which imply the meaningacquisition of the concept ‗tallness‘. This explanation, though correct for the most part,
is false in the last assumption. The more we trace our experiences back to our
4

Plato, in order to avoid the weak point that Idealism lacks genuine ‗difference‘ and ‗non-being‘, argues
in the Sophist that ―highness and non-highness have the same measure of existence‖ (258a). But as the
first footnote points out, even if he can accomplish this argument, which is actually flawed and farfetched, the possibility of the co-existence of ―highness and non-highness‖ in the experience of
comparison remains unjustified in his theory.
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childhood, the less there could be any ideal model or measure, and the more important
a comparative situation becomes. So how do we begin learning the use of the term
‗tall‘? Is it by referring to a tall thing or the Idea of ‗tallness‘? In either case, how do
we learn this very notion of ‗reference‘? Is it possible to refer to ‗reference‘ itself in
order to learn ‗to refer‘?
In a comparative situation we can experience ‗taller than…‘ and ‗shorter than…‘
simultaneously because we do not just see A or B alone, even less see them by first
looking at ‗tallness‘ or ‗shortness‘, but simultaneously see A, B, and… Here the
ellipsis is indispensable and more important than what is explicitly said. It means that
everything else is being experienced by us in an indistinct, marginal, and hidden mode.
This plural-dimensional, clear-boundary-lacking field of experience, and occasional
confrontation of items, render ―A is taller than B‖ as a prominent phenomenon that is
directly experienced. This is the way in which people learn and accomplish
comparisons without presupposing an Idealized common measure or non-contextual
definition based on conceptual content. Indeed, we can (and do) know that ―A is taller
than B‖ without knowing what ‗tallness‘ in itself is, just as we can, and only can, learn
to ride a bike without knowing what ‗riding a bike‘ in itself consists of.
A situation is primarily a ‗space-time horizon‘ or ‗field‘, i.e., the potential and
non-objectifiable stream of space-time experience flowing from the past to future, and
the inner and exterior lived region accompanying every experience (there are other
things beside, behind, and between A and B…). It can also be viewed as an indistinct,
potential and all-related net that precedes all identifiable objects or subjects. The
relational things that we experience are just the manifested or prominent parts of this
anonymously functioning horizon. A comparative situation is no doubt just one of such
a situation.

4. PHILOSOPHICAL COMPARATIVE SITUATION EMERGING IN THE INTERPARADIGMATIC CONDITION
A philosophical comparative situation emerges when it earns its own comparison
situation. Therefore, the key methodology of philosophical comparison is to enter into
its comparative situation, rather than anything else. It first means that cross-cultural
comparisons cannot be limited to concepts, propositions, or philosophical arguments
since total dependence on them may cause a divorce from comparison situations,
which in turn may lead to the comparison paradox. Secondly, the comparison should
not be made only through a ready-made framework as the cross-cultural ge-yi (or its
reversion) does. Certain kinds of ge-yi may be an inevitable stage in the history of
trans-cultural intercourse, but there will not be any genuine and pregnant comparison if
we constrict ourselves to them.
We may find that in one major philosophical tradition or paradigm, comparisons
made between philosophical concepts and arguments are feasible and sometimes
significant. For instance, Aristotle and Hegel made quite a few comparisons of the
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philosophies before them. In Chinese Buddhism, pan-jiao ( 判教), or judging the
superiority of various Buddhist schools by comparing them, was a powerful way to
promote the philosophical sensitivity of the Buddhist monks. However, from these
facts it cannot be asserted that successful comparisons should be attributed to the
common standards or rules that the paradigm provides. A paradigm is not equal to a set
of conceptual rules or common standards for its composition and function is richer and
deeper than a system of rules.
Scientific paradigms, according to which Thomas S. Kuhn made the notion of a
‗paradigm‘ significant, not only to the study of the history of science but also to
humanities, are ―the community‘s paradigms, revealed in its textbooks, lectures, and
laboratory exercises‖. (Kuhn 1962, 43) They differ from a system of rules or standards
since ―paradigms may be prior to, more binding, and more complete than any set of
rules for research that could be unequivocally abstracted from them‖. (Kuhn 1962, 46)
A scientist acquires a paradigm ―through education and through subsequent exposure
to the literature often without quite knowing or needing to know what characteristics
have given these models the status of community paradigms‖. (Kuhn 1962, 46) So, a
paradigm can guide scientists‘ researches or make them convergent on their identifying
objects and relations, not primarily by establishing common rules or standards but by
providing a ‗network‘ of models of study which have a ‗family resemblance‘5 among
them. (Kuhn 1962, 43-46) Although a set of common rules may be abstracted from a
paradigm, where they may function during a normal period of research, there is no
guarantee that the unanimity among scientists about how to understand and apply these
rules will be established. Considering that Wittgenstein‘s central ideas, e.g., his notion
of language-games and forms of life, are imminently connected to the idea of ‗family
resemblance‘, which must have impacted Kuhn, we may reasonably assume that the
paradigm takes the situational structure of human life as its precondition.
Following Kuhn, we may say that a philosophical paradigm stands between
originally situated experience of human life and the total conceptualization of it.
Without the experience, the paradigm shall lose its motive; without moderate or
pragmatic conceptualization of the experience, philosophical approaches will fail to
form a continued tradition. Because of the overwhelming influence of Plato, the
paradigm of traditional Western philosophy has always been in danger of being overconceptualized.
5

Kuhn illustrates his idea of a paradigm‘s function by incorporating one of Wittgenstein‘s key terms in
his Philosophical Investigations, namely, ‗family resemblance‘. At the point where people fail to find a
common essence for a term or action such as ‗language‘ or ‗game‘, Wittgenstein proposes ‗family
resemblances‘ (Familienähnlichkeit) to explain what it is that holds all of these various cases together.
For instance, why do we call various activities a ‗game‘? He writes: ―We see a complicated network of
similarities overlapping and crisscrossing [among the various activities we call ‗game‘]… I can think of
no better expression to characterize these similarities than ‗family resemblances‘; for the various
resemblances between members of a family: build, colour of eyes, gait, temperament, etc. overlap and
criss-cross in the same way. ---- And I shall say: ‗games‘ form a family. … And the strength of the
thread [a term‘s identity] does not reside in the fact that some one fibre runs through its whole length,
but in the overlapping of many fibres.‖ (Wittgenstein 1958, §66-§67)
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A philosophical paradigm is revealed through learning a language, an education in
humanities (including philosophy and history), general education, life-experiences,
conceptual systems, and so on. One who conducts a philosophical comparison within a
paradigm does not first need to know a set of rules or standard. So the paradigm may
not merely allow but also in a sense encourage the function of a comparison situation,
if people do not make it too abstract or common-rule-oriented. However, this facility
for the presence of a comparison situation is missing in cross-cultural comparisons
where they are performed beyond a paradigm. Therefore, the difficulty of crosscultural comparison does not come from the absence of common rules between
paradigms, since there is no final need for such rules or measures even in the
comparisons within one paradigm. The obstacle should rather be due to the seldom
attendance of a comparative situation caused by the heterogeneity of participants‘
experiences in different paradigms.
In order to solve this problem, some scholars have advanced a series of significant
suggestions, such as, ‗implicit comparison‘ (Carine Defoort), ‗pluralized comparison‘
(Bo Mou 牟博), comparisons from linguistic comparisons—i.e., the awareness of
translation effects, the comparisons of grammar, semantics and pragmatics between
different languages—to philosophical comparisons (Roger Ames), and so on. The
reason that these comparisons can improve the conceptual and propositional mode of
traditional comparison is, to some extent, due to their ability to offset the separation
from comparative situation. For example, linguistic and translation comparisons, which
involve the analysis of certain key words and lead to philosophical comparison, have
the effect of immersing one‘s self in foreign languages and contexts, whereby the
sameness and difference between concepts and propositions exposed in the following
comparison will emerge more naturally. As a result, there will be a greater chance to
earn the comparative situation.
These improved strategies of comparison, however, still cannot significantly
enhance the possibility of an emergence of a comparative situation. Linguistic and
translation comparisons, for example, will still be constrained by the conceptual
framework of the one who makes these comparisons, especially when the attempt to
transform them into philosophical comparisons is being made. Consequently, if we are
not aware of this constraint or danger and in no way respond to it, there may likely be a
conceptual, situation-lacking comparison. Even a bilingual or multilingual
philosophical scholar cannot ensure that he is making genuine philosophical
comparisons because as soon as a reflective linguistic consideration is summoned, and
philosophical contrasts made, the vigor of context will decline immediately. What
remains is simply grammar, semantics and pragmatics that can be objectified. How to
deal with them seems to be a problem of different conceptual positions. For instance,
by observing the same Chinese language there will be opposite conclusions, such as,
with Chinese philosophy as either having no awareness of truth (e.g., Chad Hansen) or
having its own awareness of truth that is different from its Western counterpart (e.g.,
Chen-yang Li 李晨陽). Furthermore, this problem is not overcome in principle even if
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we form a ‗middle‘ language between two languages (e.g., ‗creoles‘ or ‗pidgins‘) 6
because it is then a new language and not a language between different languages that
may have a significant effect on comparison. In the same way, ‗implicit comparison‘
and comparisons between cultures and lifestyles, in most cases, are not
‗situationalized‘ but constrained by one paradigm. For this reason, the globalization or
the uniformity of languages and lifestyles will not necessarily give rise to the
emergence of a comparative situation and hence have its philosophical effects. Rather,
it is more likely to result in the dominance of certain systems of ideas, the damage of
those non-dominant traditions and the consequent destruction of inter-culturality.
What gesture of thinking, then, is more helpful towards the emergence of a
philosophical comparative situation? If we realize that a paradigm, including its
moderate conceptualization, is inevitable to philosophical comparison, and that the
conceptual dimension of the paradigm—especially the common-rule-oriented view of
paradigm—somehow covers up the original comparative situation, then a
methodological self-awareness, namely, ‗towards inter-paradigmaticy‘ may be more
desirable. As stated earlier, philosophical comparison, as the comparison of thoughts
and doctrines, is derived from certain philosophical paradigm and the conceptual
systems within it. In other words, it must be constrained by certain linguistic, cultural
or philosophical structures of meaning-concept production and maintenance. On the
other hand, cross-cultural comparison requires the appearance of a comparative
situation beyond one paradigm, and therefore cannot be completely dominated by a
single philosophical paradigm. Therefore, the philosophical comparison at issue must
achieve the inter-paradigmatic condition in order to activate the cross-cultural
comparative situation.
But does the inter-paradigmatic condition really exist? Is there comparative
situation in the condition? The so-called ‗inter-paradigmaticy‘ is a conscious state that,
although abiding in one paradigm, is strongly aware of the heterogeneous and even
threatening presence of other paradigms; an awareness prior to the so-called ‗fusion of
horizons‘,7 and nevertheless manages to maintain a marginal albeit authentic existence
6

So-called ‗creoles‘ or ‗pidgins‘ are ‗hybridized‘ languages created by people who, though speaking
difference languages, live together in a long time, to solve the problem of basic communication, e.g.,
Neo-Melanesian created in New Guinea (Cf. Jared Diamond, 1993, chapter 8).
7
The ‗fusion of horizons‘ (Horizontverschmelzung) is the key term of Gadamer‘s hermeneutics. It
indicates the successful understanding between two or more agents. ―[U]nderstanding is always the
fusion of these horizons supposedly existing by themselves.‖ (Gadamer 1989, 306) For Gadamer, ―The
horizon is the range of vision that includes everything that can be seen from a particular vantage point.‖
(Gadamer 1989, 302) ―The concept of ‗horizon‘ suggests itself because it expresses the superior breadth
of vision that the person who is trying to understand must have. To acquire a horizon means that one
learns to look beyond what is close at hand----not in order to look away from it but to see it better,
within a larger whole and in truer proportion.‖ (Gadamer 1989, 305)
The difference between the two theories, the fusion of horizons and the inter-paradigmaticity, lies
primarily in recognizing the inter-paradigmatic reality. Gadamer is unaware of the profound limitation of
paradigm to the inter-paradigmatic understanding, or the ontological meaning of the otherness. In this
respect, Martin Heidegger, especially Emmanuel Levinas and Jacques Derrida are much more sensitive
than him. Thus Gadamer is blind at what is really needed for a cross-cultural comparative understanding.
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at the interval of paradigms by certain non-conceptual, non-universalistic means, such
as, various forms of language-games (including translation) or spontaneous modes of
conscious acts.
Why do we expect the existence of a certain philosophical consciousness rather
than mere irrational arbitrariness at the interval of paradigms? The discussion above
provides some clue. A paradigm does not exhaust human sense-making activities.
Instead, the paradigm needs the potential field of experience or the stream of
consciousness as a precondition. 8 As a result, it is possible for us to experience a
marginal but deeper comparative situation than what is available in a paradigm by
tracing back to its origins. For a similar reason, though trans-cultural languages (e.g.,
Chinese and Sanskrit, Chinese and Greek or German) are incommensurable, it is not
impossible to translate texts, including philosophically profound ones, in one way or
another between those languages and related paradigms. Speaking more illustratively,
entering into inter-paradigmaticy means getting back to the native-land (Heimat) of a
paradigm in order to experience the concealed nativeness (Heimlichkeit) or nativity
(Nativität) of the interval where the cross-cultural, comparative philosophical situation
might appear. Because of the fundamental potentiality of the inter-(ness) or between(ness), the inter-paradigmaticy will not show itself as the higher voice or the universal
mind immune to contamination caused by the paradigm, but rather enable the inter- or
trans-condition with the paradigm. Therefore, any trans-cultural translation can never
be guaranteed and there will always be possibilities to reconstruct them reasonably,
just as how cross-cultural philosophical comparisons possess no doubtless certainty,
but always on the way to establish itself and reach the fittest for the time being. In brief,
at the interval, ‗it‘ (from the worst to the best) is always being possible without a fixed
controller. And that is exactly the meaning of a comparative situation.
In short, it is the dynamic structure of meaning-genesis or the potential, nonobjectifiable stream of space-time experience plus paradigmatic footing that gives rise
to the inter-paradigmaticy, but its own existence cannot be paradigmatized. If we
ignore the first half of this expression, relativism or the strong claim of
‗incomparability‘ will arise. If we ignore the second half, then rationalism or
universalism will emerge; a blind belief that comparison is always possible by
appealing to some super-paradigmatic universality.
From this viewpoint, a philosophical comparative situation may attend at the level
of inter-paradigmaticy, and consequently making it possible for cross-cultural
philosophical comparisons to bear paradigmatic effects. As previously argued, this
His views of ‗horizon‘, ‗prejudice‘, ‗fusion‘, etc. are too explicit, conceptual and objectifiable. His
interpretation overlooks the hidden, non-visible and non-objectifiable dimension of the horizon which is
emphasized by the author of this paper. His focus is merely put on opening the horizon to the past or
traditional text (Gadamer 1989: 304-7) and thence ―rising to a higher universality that overcomes not
only our own particularity but also that of the other‖ (Gadamer 1989, 305), and so his discussion of
understanding is fundamentally limited to one tradition with its language, history and past.
8
Cf. the doctrine of ‗field of perception‘ or ‗field of phenomena‘ in Merleau-Ponty‘s Phenomenology of
Perception (Merleau-Ponty 1996), and the doctrine of stream of consciousness in W. James‘ Principles
of Psychology (James 1981).
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emergence presupposes the recognition of the boundary of this very paradigm. The
illusion that this situational comparison can be pursued solely on the level of
conceptual expression, epistemological (subject-knowing-object) thinking, and
one/none paradigm should be deleted. For this reason, the ‗fusion of horizons‘
advocated by Gadamer‘s hermeneutics, compared with an ‗inter-paradigmatic
comparative situation‘, is still too optimistic and facile. We have to know that in many
cases the encounters between philosophical paradigms of alienated cultures with
‗prejudices‘9 will not result in the emergence of a comparative situation. The reason is
not simply that one‘s own horizon is not fully opened, or lacks the intention to open the
horizon (as what happened in the twentieth century with the ‗reversed ge-yi‘ – see
second section for the irrelevance of this intention), but the absence of recognizing the
inter-paradigmatic characteristics of cross-cultural comparison. In this view, interparadigmatic comparisons have no tendency towards a historical relativism which
Gadamer‘s hermeneutics imply because this kind of ‗relativism‘ appears only on the
level of propositional assertions or judgments.

5. AN EXAMPLE OF INTER-PARADIGMATIC COMPARISON:
HEIDEGGER‘S ATTITUDE TOWARDS DAO
Successful philosophical comparisons, e.g., the Sino-Indian philosophical comparison
which gave birth to Zen Buddhism and Neo-Confucianism, bears the disposition of
noticing the radical difference between two paradigms, admitting each other implicitly
or even critically, abandoning the illusion of ge-yi, standing in a paradigm yet not
being totally limited by it, and constituting the comparison both creatively and
conservatively (tracing back to its own tradition) in a dynamic situation. To illustrate
this point, consider one case in the twentieth century, namely, the philosophical
comparison made by Heidegger between his thinking and Chinese Daoism. It can
hardly be said to be a perfectly successful example, but at least in some respects the
demands of inter-paradigmatic comparisons are felt and responded.
9

‗Prejudice‘ (Vorurteil) is another important term used by Gadamer. It is a non-closed forejudging that
constitutes the foreground or background of the hermeneutic horizon. Everyone starts interpretative or
comprehensive action with such a prejudice but it will encounter, say, ―the actual meaning of the text‖
(Gadamer 1989: 269) and therefore fuse itself with the other side. In this way, the presence (the
prejudice) and past (the text) merge in such a way that the tension between the two sides allows for a
successful understanding.
The problem of his interpretation of the pre-judged horizon is that the non-propositional and
anonymous features given to the horizon by Husserl and Heidegger (it is from them that Gadamer gets
the term), is almost lost. ―Actually ‗prejudice‘ means a judgment that is rendered before all the elements
that determine a situation have been finally examined.‖ (Gadamer 1989, 270) The current paper on the
contrary argues that the chance for the prejudice, having been a judgment already, to be appropriately
rectified by the other side (e.g., text in other paradigm) and fused with it in a cross-cultural confrontation,
is extremely slight. The ‗method and truth‘ of Gadamer‘s hermeneutics is irrelevant to the possibility of
comparison which we are looking for.
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No later than the beginning of the 1930s, Heidegger shows a strong interest in the
Daoism of Lao Zi (老子) and Zhuang Zi, which influenced his Kehre (i.e., his turning
away from his early stage of philosophy to his later stage), and manifested itself many
times afterwards (Zhang 2009, 71 and notes 1-2). The ‗Kehre‘ was first expressed in
Heidegger‘s essay ―On the Essence of Truth‖ (1930) and displayed a shift on his view
on truth. The light (opening)-oriented view of truth (a-lētheia) in Being and Time
(1927) was turned to a light (opening)-black (concealing)-complementing one. This
change was affected or at least significantly accompanied by his encounter with a
Daoist view of yin (black)-yang (light) relation, especially his reading and translation
of a line in the 28th chapter of Lao Zi (Zhang 2009, 71; Zhang 2007, Ch.12). These
facts support the belief that Heidegger‘s interest was genuine and even had a
considerable impact on his thought (May 1996, Ch. 4). Meanwhile, in some other
circumstances, he emphasized the profound difference between Western and Eastern
cultures and philosophies, including Daoism, and even made westernizing claims like
―Only a God can save us‖ that demands a return to the origins of the Western world.
Accordingly, some literal-minded commentators judge that Heidegger‘s interest in
Daoism is not serious and even superficial. In fact, both apparent contradictory
attitudes are indispensable for the experience of a genuine philosophical comparison.
Let‘s take a look at the following paragraph:
Das Wort Ereignis soll jetzt, aus der gewiesenen Sache her gedacht, als Leitwort im Dienst des
Denkens sprenchen. Als so gedachtes Leitwort läßt es sich sowenig übersetzen wie das griechische
Leitwort λόγος und das chinesische Dao10. (Heidegger 1957a, 25)
(The words event of appropriation, thought of in terms of the matter indicated, should now speak
as a key term in the service of thinking. As such a key term, it can no more be translated than the
Greek λόγος or the Chinese Dao. (Heidegger 1957b, 36))

We can see that Heidegger‘s emphasis on ―the Chinese Dao‖ is so strong that he
juxtaposes it with Greek logos and the key word ‗Ereignis‘ in his later works. At the
same time, however, he asserts that this ‗Dao‘ is almost untranslatable, i.e., it cannot
be translated into Western languages without distorting its original meaning. This
observation shows his high sensitivity to the non-conceptual and non-propositional
feature of inter-paradigmaticy. Nevertheless, his recognition of the constraint presented
by the paradigm of language-philosophy goes hand in hand with his effort to
communicate with the Chinese Dao inter-paradigmatically. For example, in the same
year (1957) he wrote that:
Das Leitwort im dichtenden Denken des Laotse lautet Dao und bedeutet ‗eigentlich‘ Weg. Weil
man jedoch den Weg leicht nur äußerlich vorstellt als die Verbindungsstrecke zwischen zwei
Orten, hat man in der Übereilung unser Wort ‗ Weg‘ für ungeeignet befunden, das zu nennen, was
Dao sagt. Man übersetzt Dao deshalb durch Vernunft, Geist, Raison, Sinn, Logos.

10

The German and English texts render ―道‖ as ―Tao‖. For the sake of unifying format in this journal,
―道‖ is presented as ―Dao‖ without exception.
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Indes könnte der Dao der alles be-weegende Weg sein, dasjenige, woraus wir erst zu denken
vermögen, was Vernunft, Geist, Sinn, Logos, eigentlich, d.h. aus ihrem eigenen Wesen her sagen
möchten. Vielleicht vebirgt sich im Wort ‗Weg‘, Dao, das Geheimnis aller Geheimnisse des
denkenden Sagens. (Heidegger 1959, 198)11
(The key word in Laotse‘s poetic thinking is Dao, which ‗properly speaking‘ means way. But
because we are prone to think of ‗way‘ superficially, as a stretch connecting two places, our word
‗way‘ has all too rashly been considered unfit to name what Dao says. Dao is then translated as
reason, mind, raison, meaning, logos.
Yet Dao could be the way that gives all ways, the very source of our power to think what reason,
mind, meaning, logos properly mean to say----properly, by their proper nature. Perhaps the mystery
of mysteries of thoughtful Saying conceals itself in the word ‗way‘, Dao. (Heidegger 1971, 92))

Heidegger seems to give a translation of Dao or Tao (道),12 i.e., ‗Way (Weg)‘ and its
variations. But if we observe carefully, we will find that his translation is not the
conceptual, super-paradigmatic ‗one-to-one‘ translation (that is why he refuses to
provide previous ge-yi translations, such as, ‗reason‘, ‗spirit‘, ‗understanding‘ etc.).
Rather, his venture is to try to probe its multiple meanings, especially what can be
intuited and compared in the context, and translate them on a situational basis after
sensing the ―dichtend (poeticizing and creating)” nature of Dao in Dao-De-Jing
（《道德經》） or Lao Zi (《老子》). We know that the translation of poems (Gedicht) present the most obstinate linguistic paradigmatic obstacles, which can only be
overcome by the tentative dichtend way of translation, i.e., by seeking certain interparadigmatic and gamesomely expressions that may (or may not) work.
In order to enter a cross-cultural comparative situation, Heidegger first tries to
remove or omit those elements in the term ‗way‘ that still can be objectified and
transformed into a higher-rank principle, e.g., the element of ―route‖ by which ‗way‘ is
often superficially said to mean the connection between two locations
(Verbindungsstrecke), and by which ‗way‘ is translated abstractly and ―intellectually‖.
Then he attributes the more dynamic and self-constituting meaning of ―the way that
gives or opens all ways (der alles be-wëgende Weg)‖ to the Dao of ‗way‘.
Consequently, our understanding of this ‗way‘ is inseparable from the constituting
process and situation that makes it appear. The generative comparative situation
therefore looms between Lao Zi‘s ‗Dao‘ in Chinese and Heidegger‘s ―der alles bewëgende Weg (the way that gives or opens all ways)‖ in German, and thus the linear
translational strategy is abandoned. 13 ‗Dao‘ has no longer been viewed as one of the
highest philosophical concepts, no matter logical, semantic, metaphysical,
11

This citation is from the lectures titled ―Das Wesen der Sprache‖ (The Nature of Language) which
Heidegger gave in Dec, 1957 and Feb, 1958 at the University of Freiburg.
12
‗Dao‘ (道) is a key term in ancient Chinese philosophy and basically means the ultimate truth and
reality. Its etymology is ‗way‘ (Shuo-Wen-Jie-Zi), and derives from it the meanings of dredging (a river),
guiding, rule, principle and speaking.
13
Roger Ames and David Hall in their translation of Dao-De-Jing also translate Dao as ‗waymaking‘(Cf. Ames & Hall 2003).
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cosmological or ethical, because it is inseparable from its concrete comparative
situation or the meaning-becoming process. In this way, Heidegger continues:
Vielleicht vebirgt sich im Wort ‗Weg‘, Dao, das Geheimnis aller Geheimnisse des denkenden
Sagens.
Perhaps the mystery of mysteries of thoughtful Saying [thinking speaking] conceals itself in the
word ‗way‘, Dao.

It can be viewed either as another attempt of translation, i.e., to translate ‗Dao‘ as
―the mystery … of Saying‖ ―the origin of speaking‖, or as the expression of the interparadigmaticy of this ‗Dao‘ translation—―thinking speaking (denkendes Sagen)‖. The
phrase ‗thinking speaking‘ means that thinking never leaves speaking, and
consequently the linguistic paradigmatic limits of this thinking can always be made
aware; meanwhile, speaking never leaves thinking, and therefore speaking is a process
of dis-covering something fundamentally meaningful, i.e., what is constituted and
presented directly in the inter-paradigmatic condition. And the so-called ―the mystery
of mysteries (das Geheimnis aller Geheimnisse)‖ refers to the inter-paradigmaticy of
the ‗thinking speaking‘, which shows the nonlinearity, waiting-in-hiding and
anonymous occurrence. Furthermore, the very way in which it appears in such a
context or comparative situation, as ‗the mystery of mysteries‘, gives rise to the
impulse of comparing it with ―the most mysterious mystery (xuan-zhi-you-xuan 玄之
又玄)‖ in the first chapter of Dao-De-Jing.14 This comparison is a thinking-speaking
comparison that takes place in the philosophical comparative situation. Indeed, ‗interparadigmaticy‘ can also be properly described as ―the most mysterious mystery‖.
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RECENT WORK

THE MINIMAL DEFINITION AND METHODOLOGY OF COMPARATIVE PHILOSOPHY:
A REPORT FROM A CONFERENCE
STEPHEN C. ANGLE

In June of 2008, the International Society for Comparative Studies of Chinese and Western
Philosophy (ISCWP) convened its third Constructive Engagement conference, on the theme of
“Comparative Philosophy Methodology.” During the opening speeches, Prof. Dunhua ZHAO,
Chair of the Philosophy Department at Peking University, challenged the conference’s
participants to put forward a minimal definition of “comparative philosophy” and a statement
of its methods. Based on the papers from the conference and the extensive discussion that
ensued, during my closing reflections at the end of the conference I offered a tentative
synthesis of the conference’s conclusions. That summary has already been published on-line as
part of the bi-annual ISCWP newsletter (Angle 2008). In this brief essay, I recapitulate the
themes of my earlier summary and expand, in my own voice, on some of the key points.

An important goal of the conference was to bring together both practitioners and critics
of comparative philosophy, in its various incarnations, to reflect on and debate the
nature of our subject. There was thus no expectation that we would all agree perfectly
on what “comparative philosophy” is, and on how it should be done. However, we did
discover that there was considerable agreement. Most basically, it became clear that
comparative philosophy has at least two potential dimensions that, while they may
interact, are at least sometimes distinct from one another:
1. Use terms, ideas, or concepts from one philosophical tradition to help
understand or interpret another philosophical tradition.
2. Through cross-tradition engagement, seek to advance or develop philosophy.
Depending on how one defines “philosophy,” often the “traditions” in question will not
be only philosophical. Both historically and at the present moment, “Confucianism”
surely can refer to many discourses and practices that are not in any obvious way
philosophical. Almost all the conference participants agreed, though, that historical and
________________________
ANGLE, STEPHEN C.: Professor, Department of Philosophy, Wesleyan University, USA. Email:
sangle@wesleyan.edu
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more recent Confucian practice has included an important philosophical dimension,
and thus that one can treat the tradition as philosophy for the purposes of comparative
philosophy.
Not all participants agreed that comparative philosophy could successfully
accomplish these goals; I will discuss in a moment some of the challenges that were
articulated. In general, though, we thought that the goals could be met, and articulated
some success conditions:
1. Success comes in either of the above dimensions when the work is constructive.
2. Many of us agreed that success — and constructiveness — must be measured in
context. That is, what counts as an “advance” will be determined from within a
given philosophical tradition, rather than from a neutral standpoint above or
between traditions.
3. Some of us believed that it was possible to judge which idea or tradition was
better overall, at least in some circumstances. None of us believed that one
could readily judge which tradition was the absolute best.
Alasdair MacIntyre is well-known for having argued that, notwithstanding the
existence of a kind of incommensurability (on which see further below), it is
sometimes possible to compare two traditions and see which one is superior
(MacIntyre 1988). He argues that one might come to see that one’s tradition has failed
by its own lights, and furthermore that an alternative tradition can both explain this
failure, and does not itself fail by its own lights. In such a case it can be rational,
MacIntyre says, to adopt the alternative tradition. MacIntyre offers various possible
examples, and it can also be interesting to think about Chinese advocates of “complete
Westernization” in the early twentieth century in this vein. Still, even in such cases, the
judgment of superiority is still made from a particular standpoint that is initially rooted
in one of the two traditions.
If we set aside the type of case MacIntyre has in mind, then the only possible
success criteria would seem to be internal notions of progress or fruitfulness, on the
one hand, and a standpoint-independent idea of universal truth, on the other. In fact, if
we grant that the only access one has to truth is via the best epistemological standards
that one has so far come up with, then standpoint-independent truth will collapse into
internal judgments. Therefore we seem to be on solid ground in emphasizing that
success in comparative philosophy — the “constructive” kind of engagement that is
referred to in the title of the conference series — is judged from within the distinct
perspectives that the comparative philosopher is bringing into contact. One need not be
limited to only one of the perspectives. In an essay a few years ago in comparative
political philosophy, for example, I argued that if Chinese democratic centralism were
to undergo certain sorts of reforms, it would then be legitimate both in its own terms,
and from the standpoint of a Rawlsian “Law of Peoples” (Angle 2005). The exact
significance of this result varies, depending on one’s own position; I did not offer
either perspective as uniquely privileged.
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Depending on the nature of the philosophical work, the ways in which its
“constructiveness” might be evaluated will also vary. Current debates about the
applicability of the category “virtue ethics” to early Confucianism can illustrate some
of the complexities. For some (e.g., Van Norden 2007), the framework of virtue ethics
can help us better interpret and understand a work like the Meng-Zi. Others have
argued that this category highlights relatively unimportant aspects of the text, and leads
to a misunderstanding of its actual significance in its day. Whether a “virtue ethics”
approach to the Meng-Zi is constructive as regards textual understanding — the first
dimension of comparative philosophy mentioned above — will depend in part on the
outcome of debates like these. (It will also depend on the details of what a given
scholar takes “virtue ethics” to be, since this very category is by no means univocal in
current philosophical use.) If we turn to the second (“advance or develop”) dimension,
we see that constructiveness will be judged by whether some version of Confucianismas-virtue-ethics is judged to be a fruitful development of Confucianism, as seen either
by someone committed to the contemporary development of Confucianism as a living
philosophical tradition, or by someone interested in the development of virtue ethics in
ever more robust, explanatory, or transformative ways.
Participants in the conference identified a series of challenges to comparative
philosophy:
1. Incommensurability. If it is impossible to compare or translate, then
comparative philosophy cannot succeed.
2. Some say that philosophy is simply one thing; there is no room for
“comparison.”
3. A complementary worry is that different philosophical traditions lack adequate
common concerns.
4. Research and teaching of comparative philosophy lacks adequate institutional
support and potential students find it difficult to acquire the needed training. On
this we were all in agreement.
With respect to incommensurability, most of us at the conference believed that
differences between concepts or languages or traditions did not make comparison
impossible. Both theoretical reasons (e.g., Donald Davidson’s argument in Davidson
1984) and practical examples (of seemingly successful comparative philosophy) were
offered as evidence that this challenge could be overcome. My own view (as seen, for
example, in Angle 2002) is that there is ample evidence of cross-tradition philosophical
engagement despite the distinctiveness of each tradition, and that we can readily
understand how such communication across differences can occur. Indeed, according
to many plausible theories of linguistic meaning, communication across difference
takes place even when two native speakers of the “same language” talk to one another.
Concerning the idea that “philosophy” is one specific thing, leaving no room for
comparison, we should acknowledge that if philosophy is defined very narrowly, it
may be that there is not enough room for the level of different development on which
the possibility of comparative philosophy depends. Few of us were convinced that
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philosophy is such a narrow enterprise, however. Efforts to produce a narrow definition
based on early Greek “philosophia” are typically extremely ahistorical — ignoring, for
example, the evidence that philosophy was understood as a “way of life” (Hadot 1995).
Turning to the opposite worry, that different philosophical traditions may lack common
concerns, the most basic response is simply that many scholars have in fact found areas
of common concern in our work across traditions, and those of us at the conference
were therefore skeptical of any a priori argument that denied we could have done this.
“Common concern” does not, of course, necessitate finding identical formulations of
concepts or problems; this thought returns us to the same considerations that were
discussed in the previous paragraph.
The challenge of inadequate institutional support, we agreed, applies to each of our
countries. Pioneering comparative philosophers in China, as in the U.S., have certainly
had an impact, and there are now some institutional structures that welcome and
nurture comparative research. But many barriers remain. In China, it is often difficult
to be simultaneously taken seriously by specialists in different traditions, even when
they share a single department. In the U.S., specialists in traditions other than the
dominant Western ones are extremely rare within major graduate departments, as has
recently been discussed in an issue of the APA’s Newsletter on Asian and AsianAmerican Philosophers and Philosophies (Olberding 2008). We have a long way to go.
Finally, on the basis of this understanding of comparative philosophy, what could
we say about its methodology? At the conference there was quite general agreement on
the following characteristics of a minimal methodology:
1. Openness is fundamental, though so is the exercise of critical philosophical
judgment.
2. Traditions are not monolithic, but internally diverse; our specific methods
should take advantage of this.
3. The idea of family resemblance is very helpful.
4. A focus on concepts or problems is often more constructive than the
comparison of individual thinkers, though there are many exceptions —
particularly if the figure studied was him or herself engaged in comparative
work.
5. Careful attention to issues of language and grammar is important.
6. Adequate training and adequate institutional support is critical.
There is of course a great deal that could be said about many of these characteristics,
but the key is to stress that the “minimal” nature of the methodology does not mean
that we each felt that a more “maximal” set of principles was needed, but could not
agree on such principles. A few at the conference did indeed argue for a more
demanding methodology which they felt entailed constructing a kind of neutrality
among traditions or a perspectiveless perspective. In general the conference
participants were not sympathetic to such an approach, and noted that some of those
who advocated such an understanding of comparative philosophy did so in order to
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argue that the enterprise was impossible. Most of us felt this was attacking a straw
man.
The general preference for a “minimal” methodology, therefore, does not express a
compromise or a lowest common denominator. Admittedly, because comparative
philosophical practice is diverse, this limits the number of helpful generalizations about
methodology that can be made. Nonetheless, I feel that the conference’s agreed-upon
methodological principles are far from empty. The idea of openness, in particular, puts
the comparative enterprise into tension with many existing research programs in
philosophy that are narrowly constrained by explicit or implict assumptions about their
subject matters. Still, some at the conference commented on the minimal methodology
by suggesting that there was no real difference between doing what is here
characterized as “comparative philosophy” and simply doing philosophy well. This
may be true: perhaps all philosophy is comparative philosophy.
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